W
793 [38 cont.]
brother is a source of worry to Amadou Bamba, who nevertheless shows him great partiality and gives him large sums of money, which are soon spent. This Murid of fancy, however, this Sheik Thioro, is still not content. He puts on airs, flirts with the businessmen and traders of Senegal, and offers his services to the administration. All this bustling in a vacuum is quite harmless, for no one takes Sheik Thioro seriously.

W
*795 Provinces of N'guick-Mérina and Gandiolais. As one draws away from the Murid crescent which borders the Ferlo on the west, southwest, and south, [39] Amadou Bamba's influence vanishes. Thus, the provinces of N'guick-Mérina and Gandiolais are almost free of it. There is said to be a total of 80 sérignes and talibés in these two provinces, which represents a maximum of 250 persons under the spiritual authority of Amadou Bamba. No personality merits special mention.

W
[793]

000 The appendices attached are:

Appendix No. 15. Circle of Louga:
Enumeration by province of the Murids, the Islamized, and the total population.

Appendix No. 16. Circle of Louga:
List by province of the principal Murid marabouts, their origin, their residence, their spiritual father, and the number of their talibés.

7. Dakar and Saint-Louis

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*795
369 For the sake of completeness, the small number of Murids living in Dakar and Saint-Louis should be pointed out. There are about 140 in Dakar and 130 in Saint-Louis.

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795
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[162]
[166] These Murids are not even inhabitants of the city, but immigrants from Baol, Cayor, and Diambour; Dakar, indeed, is too

W *795 369 S 795 ●369

[39 cont.]

busy a city to lend itself to religious propaganda, and Saint-Louis is too enlightened a Moslem center to accept the doctrinal fancies of the Murids.

[166] W [463]

They are there as laborers, usually without their families, sent by their sheik to earn money. They work as porters on the quays and especially as makers and sellers of mats for the use of the natives. [40] In Dakar, they also work as water vendors in the Black quarters, and in Saint-Louis as vendors of firewood or of fodder for the many cows fed in the city.

S W [166]

When winter draws near, most of these talibés return to their country of origin to engage in the tasks of preparing the land and of sowing.

W 793

In general they are under the spiritual authority of Sheik Ibra Fal. He himself goes to Dakar. He is represented in Saint-Louis by Amadou Guèye.

Sheik Ibra Fal owns several compounds and various buildings in both Dakar and Saint-Louis.

Sheik Anta owns a handsome house in Dakar, in the Rue Raffenel, purchased for 28,000 francs from a native and now rented to a Moroccan trader named Madani El-Qtiri.

Conclusion

In this study of the cadres and the faithful of the Murid order, there ought to be included, aside from Amadou Bamba and the principal lieutenants already mentioned, a large number of local marabouts who have not all been taught by Amadou Bamba, but who, some of them possibly out of personal conviction, others out of self-interest and in order to keep their believers who were drawn to the new movement, have joined the order of the Sérigne and have become his vicars. To these should be added the chiefs of villages or factions, notables in quest of authority or prestige, clever traders who skillfully manage their commercial affairs and their spiritual interests.

/371/

121 369 To complement an urban geographical study of Thiès (1), a city located about 60 kilometers as the crow flies from Dakar, we have made an investigation in the villages of its suburbs.

[175 496] The sole object of this investigation was to learn to what extent the presence of a city founded entirely by Europeans as early as 1885 (date of the running of the Dakar--Saint-Louis railroad) may have effects on the neighboring rural groupings.

Consequently, this study will deal only with the relations that may exist between the city and the neighboring villages; agricultural problems will be dealt with only to the extent that they help to clarify certain aspects of the question.

[563] Seven villages were chosen. These agglomerations contain populations that belong to the principal ethnic groups of the region: Sérère-none /Serer/ at Tiali, Thiès-none, and Sapko; Wolof at Diakhaté and Keur-Mamour; Bambara and Wassoulonké at Karamoko and at Keur-Issa-Bambara (see the sketch below). All of these localities are located within a radius of less than ten kilometers around the city.

The presence of a city in a given region may have disturbed rural life in very different ways, depending on the distance from the village to the city and depending on its ethnic composition.

It may have acted on the choice of the site for the village, on its arrangement, on the creation of new rural groupings.

It may have caused modifications in the type of the traditional settlement, in its interior comforts, in its modes and methods of cultivation.

/372/ Finally, and above all, it may have led to more or less profound perturbations in the social and economic organization of the village.

Before developing these three points it seems necessary to

1. "La ville de Thiès /The City of Thiès/," to appear soon in Études Sénégalaises.

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

S 121 269 /372 cont./
delineate in broad strokes the natural milieu in which these rural agglomerations were established. /Fig. 1 appears here./

As could be assumed, the environment of each of them differs according to the ethnic group that occupies it.

S SR 361 The None /Serer/ village is generally divided into several hamlets of varying importance, but definitely separated from one another. They conceal themselves from sight under dense foliage in the heart of an arbored countryside. In the rainy season it is possible to pass near one of them without suspecting its existence. SR [412] Only the noise of the pestle in the millet mortars reveals its presence to us.

SR [137] [273] The fields extend around in a wooded landscape. The palmyra, with the shape of the leaves reminding one of an enormous /373/ fan, predominates over the other species. The harvesting of palm wine practiced by the Sérère-none seems to be the primary reason for their impressive number. The "kad"(1)

SR [137] [283] [241] is rarer than in Sine-Saloum; the baobab (with its trunk stripped for the making of cord) is preserved solely in the village itself. On the immediate outskirts, the millet fields are numerous; those of the groundnut seem to be less extensive. No plot of ground, except for some ferruginous crusts, seems to have been spared from cultivation.

S 361 W [361] The framework of the Wolof village is entirely different. The surrounding countryside is bare. A few rare trees put their dark blots on this monotonous countryside. The agglomeration is easily marked by the darker foliage that surrounds it.

The Bambara villages are sometimes located in a wooded countryside, like Keur-Issa-Bambara, and sometimes in a denuded landscape, like Karamoko. It would seem that this group has patterned its method of cultivation on that practiced in the neighborhood.

Keur-Issa-Bambara reminds one of the None village, not

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1. "kad" in Wolof = Faidherbia albida (A. Chev.).

3: Savonnet --3 E-5 (no date) 1955 MS37 Senegal MS37

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

/ 373 cont. /

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SR
W
102
131
361
S
491
496
712

/372/



Tiali
Diakhaté
Karamoko
Kaur Mamour
Thiès
Sapko
Sérère-none
Ouolof
Bambara
0
1
2
3

Fig. 1. Thiès. location of the villages mentioned in this study.

S
361 /373 cont. / by its internal plan (it is dispersed in a loose arrangement), but by the arbored countryside that surrounds it.

Karamoko, on the other hand, resembles a Wolof village: few or no trees except around the huts, a monotonous and open countryside.

S
369 The founding and the rapid growth of Thiès seems to have entailed perturbations in the life of the neighboring villages, especially at the end of the last century.

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

/373 cont./

S SR W 175 648 Before the arrival of the French garrison in 1865, the Sérère-none ruled supreme over the region. He was established as the traditional enemy of the Wolof, and from time to time he suffered from the incursions of his "tiédos" (2).

W [624] 2. Tiédos: name given to the Wolof war chiefs of Cayor.

After the definitive installation of our troops at Thiès and especially after the running of the Dakar-Saint-Louis railroad in 1885, many Wolof came to settle near our fortified post; at the same time they benefited from our pacificatory presence by being able to create farm villages in the heart of None country. W [464] Diakhaté was established about 1875-1880 (some of its founders worked on the construction of the railroad line in 1884); Keur-Mamour was created at about the same time.

The Bambara villages are more recent: 1890-1895. These were the /374/ terrible years when Samory sacked the southern Sudan and the region of the Wassoulou (east of Beyla in Upper Guinea). Through the authorities, it seems, some of the Bambara and Wassoulonké freed by our troops were sent to Senegal where the policy of groundnut cultivation was in full development. Keur-Issa-Bambara and Karamoko were founded at this time.

S [369] The city of Thiès was not very important at that time; it had hardly more than a thousand inhabitants. Nevertheless, it began to play a primary role; its presence imposed peace in the region formerly so disturbed by the None brigandage or the incursions of Wolof warriors. S 369 [311] [438] Its presence facilitated the founding of villages, the number of which would cease to grow in the subsequent period; all of the land capable of supporting crops was utilized at the beginning of the century.

In the years preceding the Great War, the escale (1)

1. Escale: by extension signifies a stopping place, a commercial agglomeration.

/374 cont./

369 [438] became a relatively flourishing commercial center; each year more than 20,000 metric tons of groundnuts were handled by the traders of the place and sent by railroad to the ports of Rufisque or Dakar. As early as 1907 the first work on the Thiès-
[496] Kayes railroad was begun. All of this new economic activity
[464] required the employment of many laborers, who were in part recruited on the spot, but also in the neighboring villages.

369 166 [464] During the dry season, work in the fields is reduced. A number of rural people in the vicinity come to offer their services as workers in the factoreries (2) or in the newly opened
[461] yards /chantiers, dockyards, woodyards, etc./. Some of these villagers feel that this kind of work is less arduous and more remunerative than that of agriculture. They become definitively attached to urban life and come to swell the population of the native quarters previously established.

[484] [221] Others return every evening to the village. During the rainy season they leave their urban job and devote all their activity to work in the fields.

During this whole period prior to the Great War the suburban village seems to have played the role of intermediary or rather of relay-station between the hamlet in the bush and
[464] the city. The call for non-specialized labor had echos not only in the outskirts /375/ of the city itself, but also in the more distant villages. Curiosity about new things, the opportunity to escape familial tutelage, and especially the promise of relatively high earnings stimulated some immigration movement toward the escales.

[574] By means of the great hospitality that he knows will be shown him by relatives or friends who live in Dialkhaté or Keur-Issa-Bambara, the rural person settles in these agglomerations.

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[443] 2. Factorerie: shop where everything is sold.

/375 cont./

● 369 166 [574] [425] [622] He works the lougan (1) of his host; after a few months he

1. Lougan; a Wolof term signifying a cultivated field.

obtains a little grant of land from the head of the village;
he builds a hut, and often his family joins him and comes
to share his life. Diakhaté and Keur-Issa-Bambara grow.
The new settler takes advantage of the inactivity that the
dry season imposes on him by offering his services temporarily
to the urban establishments. Each year he divides his
activities, which become half-urban, half-rural. If stable
employment is offered to him in the city, he leaves the care
of his lougan to his family and devotes himself entirely to
[484] his new activity. For a few months he will accept this daily
travel, but he has no deep attachment in the village that
welcomed him earlier; tired of his long daily journeys,
perhaps also pushed by a kind of pride in becoming a city
dweller, he will finally, he and his family, leave the rural
life and settle in the huts of the native quarters of Thiès.

369 241 Perhaps he retained a little lougan in the village?
His family will come to maintain it each year. Perhaps he
exchanged it for a field located in the vicinity of his new
establishment? In general, because of a kind of peasant
atavism, he always keeps a little bit of ground near his
[451] quarter. The harvest will give some protection against possible
shortages; the sale of the products of the soil will be a
considerable balance when enforced idleness or lack of
money occurs.

369 621 The period of the maximum development of Keur-Issa-Bambara
is set by the old people in the decade 1910-1920.
This swelling of the population often required splitting
the village in two. For reasons of familial misunderstandings
or the necessity of being nearer to fields too far away, this
disassociation was brought about in several hamlets (at

/375 cont./

369 Diakhaté, for example).

621 Sometimes the discord between religious heads be-
[798] longing to different sects provoked the separation in fact of
the two opposite camps (Keur-Mamour).

Up to here the presence of the city acted only indirectly in stimulating /376/ the swelling or the splitting up of the village and the temporary or definitive emigration of some elements. It may also have more direct effects on the agglomerations.

369 During the last three decades, through the establish-
[498] ment of the great repair workshops /ateliers de réparation/
of the Dakar-Niger, Thiès has been in the process of becoming
[712] an industrial city; in a parallel way the military bases are
becoming larger at the expense of the neighboring rural
territories.

369 Even before this last war, the None village of Tiali,
423 located one kilometer from the city, was the first to be de-
[712] prived of about a third of its land by the establishment of
the camp of military aviation. In 1947 plans to extend this same base brought about the complete evacuation of Thiès-none which was established south of the railroad, in the vicinity of Sapko. Almost all of these fields were relinquished to the military authorities. Finally, in 1953, execution of the plan for the urbanization of the city obliged the inhabitants of Wango to rebuild their huts in the quarter of Greater Thiès. Part of these lands have been relinquished to the municipality.

369 The land shrinks, the population grows; in order to subsist, a part of the rural population is obliged to go to work in the city.

[361] But before studying this question of the changing of the rural worker into an urban worker, we shall see whether the presence of the city has an influence on the plan of the village and especially on the settlement pattern.

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30
Bambara FA8

S /376 cont./
● 369 The appearance of the village itself varies according to
361 the ethnic groups. Among the None, it is tightly grouped
SR around a little central plaza, in the middle of which grows a
[361] majestic baobab. The Wolof disperses his compounds of huts,
W each delimited by a tapade (1) made of plaited millet-stalks.
[361]
[351]

1. Tapade: a kind of walling made of straw, bamboo, branches, which separates the space between two familial compounds.

This dispersion is also found at Karamoko and at Keur-Issa-Bambara.

Apparently the city seems not to have had an influence on the arrangement proper of the village. It has very nearly preserved its old plan.

S Even today the traditional mode of construction of the
342 hut appears different according to the ethnic group. The None
SR erect strong mud dwellings on a square base with a floor of
[342] stamped earth; the whole is covered by a roof of thatch. The
[343] kitchen, on the other hand, is made of some posts fastened to
the ground itself and supporting a roof of palmyra leaves.

W /377/ The Wolof prefers straw or plaited millet stalks as
[342] material. The house rests merely on the sandy ground, without
B any floor of stamped earth. The Bambara willingly lives in a
[342] hut of straw, but he is careful to fill in the interstices with mud.
The floor is of stamped earth; a wide pent roof generally protects the entrance. Sometimes two huts are connected by a kind of veranda where he spends the evening; mud is frequently utilized in this group. /Fig. 2 appears here./

S The proximity of the city has to a certain extent improved
SR the traditional modes of construction. The plan and the material
342 used have been improved.
369 The hut with a single room and a square base has been replaced by a cottage with a rectangular base and often containing two rooms with the narrow window closed by a solid shutter.

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

/377 cont./

S SR 342 369

Although the walls are still constructed of mud, they have been strengthened by a plastering of cement which prevents their rapid "dissolution" under the action of the rain. In general the thatched roof has been replaced by a covering of corrugated metal. What the dwelling gains in strength, it loses in comfort; the absence of the ceiling, the thinness

S SR [361]



Fig. 2. Thiès-none, a village little urbanized, with mud huts and thatched roofs.

/378/ of the metal, and the lack of ventilation give the interior of the rooms a suffocating atmosphere in the warm season and a cold one in winter.

These improvements may have numerous variations: hut with square base, plastered with cement, with a thatched roof; hut made entirely from retrieved planks. /Fig. 3 appears here./

W [342]

These modernized dwellings are numerous, particularly in the None villages; 22 out of 204 (including kitchens) are made of mud, with cement plastering and roofing other than thatch. They are rarer in the Bambara agglomerations, /379/ absent at Keur-Mamour

[text continues on p.11]

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

S
SR /379 cont./
369 and at Diakhaté where the hut of straw or purely of mud
[342] prevails. Could it be that the occupation of mason to which
W some None seem to devote themselves is a factor in this
[342] modernization of their settlements?

SR A certain "coquetry" absent in the bush villages leads
[463] some autochthones to lay out a little flower garden near their
S [351] hut (Tiali, Keur-Issa-Bambara)..

S The presence of the city is also reflected in the equip-
369 ment used by the rural people. The furniture is always sum-
352 mary, but more and more the iron bed is replacing the lat-
[513] tice of wood or the mat put on the ground itself. A mattress,
a military blanket, and commonly a mosquito net of a very
light fabric complete this relative comfort. Often a little
S table of unpainted wood, a chair made of old boxes, a bit
[353] of mirror hung on the wall, and sometimes an impressive
number of photographs, or, lacking them, pages cut out of
an illustrated magazine pasted to the walls, give a special
stamp to this interior, which is no longer typically rural.
Sometimes one even has the surprise of encountering in
these modest interiors a wardrobe and a little buffet, which
adorn, the more since they are not utilized, the room of a
privileged native. But this comfort is an exception.

S The calabash, which is the very foundation of the
369 kitchen utensils, is still commonly utilized for household
415 tasks and for the common meals. Nevertheless the cast-iron
or aluminum saucepan is no longer a luxury; the glass and
above all the bottle are in common use.

S The clothing, too, has been modified. The loincloth
369 in bright colors, laboriously woven by the Toucouleur
291 /Tukolor/ weaver, durable but expensive, has become a
177 luxury. Imported printed cloth of moderate price has sup-
S planted it everywhere. The white robe with embroidery has
[292] become the festive garment par excellence; the shorts, the
trousers, and the jacket, often furnished by the European,
are now the clothes utilized for work.

Serer FA32
Fulani MS11

/379 cont./

S
369 Only food seems to have undergone only slight im-
[262] provement: the couscous of millet or rice (a little fish or
meat during periods of abundance) are basic in their diet.
Bread, rarely eaten during the meal, is reserved for children;
S it takes the place of cake. Water remains the essential
[271] drink of the Moslem; water, palm wine (during the harvest),
[273] and grape wine (on feast days) are consumed by the non-
SR Islamized None.

[273] The frugal housewife profits from the proximity of the
S 369 *escale* for /380/ the daily sale in the market of the products
241 of her personal garden. She cultivates tomatoes, beans,
438 pumpkins, and okra. At Keur-Issa-Bambara she has tried,
with greater or lesser success, to cultivate potatoes and salad
greens; the gathering of mangoes also procures a little profit
S for her. When the harvest from the garden is exhausted, the
[372] collection of dead wood which she will take to sell in the
market in the form of little bundles will yield a few coins
for her.

In parallel fashion, the husband-cultivator harvests on
a plot of his *lougan* products that are easy to sell on the Thiès
market; at Keur-Issa-Bambara he lays out flooded rice-fields
and cultivates the sweet potato and manioc, part of which is
S SR offered to the clientele of the *escale*.

369 During the dry season the None principally works at
438 gathering palmyra leaves; they will be sold, as bundles of
[314] thatch, for making roofs for the huts of the urban quarters;
[342] after the harvest he carries dried groundnut leaves to the city
[231] for fodder for the little horses harnessed to the taxicabs.

S Despite the ready sale that can be made with cattle,
SR they are not very numerous. When the epizootic diseases
369 have spared them, they give an appreciable profit to their
234 owner through the sale of milk. At Tiali, the only herd in
438 the village, which contains about 30 animals, belongs to a
S SR single breeder. It is guarded by Peul shepherds who lead it
F [233] to graze in the neighboring woodlands. The morning milk
[465] and the calves belong to the owner; the evening milk goes

Serer FA32
Fulani MS11

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[234]
[233]
[465]

/380 cont. /

to the shepherd as compensation for serices rendered. Although lactation is very poor (one to two liters per day per head), this sale practiced in the city a a relatively high price (30 francs per liter) is a source of not inconsiderable profit.

F
[233]
[465]

The Sérère, despite the poor foo resources he commands, practices for the benefit of Europeans te raising of pigs in the narrow and miry enclosures formed by takes driven deeply into the ground and close together.

SR
[231]
[417]

The mode of settlement and the economy of these suburban villages, although they have not ad profound modifications, nevertheless are in the process o continual reorganization and adaptation.

S
[361]

These very modest contributions of the urban economy thin out very rapidly as one goes farthe from the city. Karamoko and Keur-Mamour, located six ad seven kilometers from the escale, and even Diakhaté, which is nearer, give the appearance of wholly rural villages. The women who each morning leave in Indian file /381/ to sell their products in the city make up the single element that enters into the circuit of the new economy offered to them.

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Has the social and economic orgnization, on the other hand, been more profoundly modified? An examination of the ethnic and functional composition of the groups of the villages will permit an understanding of the data on this problem.

For this study we have grouped the villages under three rubrics:

1. The assemblage of Tiali, Thiès-None, and [illegible] near the escale, but having undergone perturbations in their economy by the loss of part of their lar
2. Keur-Mamour and Karamoko form the group farthest from the city.
3. Diakhaté and Keur-Issa-Bambara are the two villages near the escale which have not suffered any loss of territory.

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The first assemblage musters a total population of 406

S
SR /381 cont. /
369 inhabitants. These three villages are located less than two
[162] kilometers from the first urban quarters, consequently a favorable location for the daily departure of workers for the escale.

S The ethnic composition of these agglomerations, despite
SR the urban proximity (favorable for the mixing of peoples), has
369 remained homogeneous. At Sapko there is no foreign element;
162 at Tiali two Wolof and one Sérère-Sine were working there
[563] temporarily at the time of the time of the inquiry; by contrast, nearly a tenth of the population of Thiès-None is made up of individuals belonging to non-Sérère ethnic groups (Wolof, Toucouleur, Peul). A parallel must be drawn between this
S quite relative heterogeneity and the almost total Islamiza-
SR tion of the locality. Nearly four-fifths of the population of
[771] Thiès-None has embraced this religion; Sapko and Tiali, by contrast, remain essentially Catholic or fetishistic, the Moslems living there generally being transient elements.

S A kind of self-defense by the Catholic group that lives
SR in a region largely Islamized seems to be one of the primary
582 reasons for this ethnic integrity. Under the influence of the
794 fathers, who possess, it seems, a profound authority over every
[563] Christian agglomeration, marriages occur from None village to None village and between Catholics (1).

S
SR
[779]

1. The woman seems to be the element through which the transition from the Catholic religion to the Moslem religion occurs. The young Christian who marries a Moslem no longer practices and quickly abjures her first religion; her children and the whole line will become Islamized under the paternal influence.

S
SR /382/ An examination of the male and economically
162 active population of these three agglomerations gives the
369 result that 38% of its elements have remained essentially

S SR 162 369 /382 cont./ agricultural, 27% work wholly at Thiès, and 31% divide their activity between the city and the country, depending on the season and the labor market.

S SR 241 Thus, the decrease in the cultivable area has brought about a decrease in the number of cultivators. But the None is above all a man of the soil, a peasant. Even as a laborer, he will not give up his bit of land which will give him a harvest. Each evening upon his return from work, he will take up his iler (1) and go to cultivate his lougan of millet or groundnuts. And if he has an occupation that suits him in the city and in addition personally owns good land? He will hire the services of a navétane (2) to whom he will relinquish a portion of his land and to whom he will grant some free time for his personal crops. This navétane will work his fields, and, through this procedure, he will be able to sell or amass a considerable harvest at the end of the year.

S SR 241 369 427

S SR 162 463 An examination of the occupation of temporary or permanent workers shows an important number of laborers, 19, of masons, 12, and a more modest number of boys /domestic workers/ and shopkeepers, 8, out of a total of 71 workers. These results corroborate those given in the human study of the escale of Thiès.

S SR 162 191 [871] In spite of a relatively close urban neighborhood, the number of inhabitants understanding French is very modest: only 13 understand our language; 15 children out of a hundred go to the nearby French school. These results may appear deceptive if one considers that all the conditions of the milieu seem favorable for closer contact with the European element.

S SR [412] 1. Hilaire or iler: implement par excellence of the Senegalese cultivator, made up of a metal blade in the shape of a heart fixed to a long handle.

2. Seasonal agricultural worker.

/382 cont./

S An examination of the suburban villages farthest from
162 Thiès will give even lower figures.

S Karamoko, located seven kilometers from the city,
162 musters 106 inhabitants. Its ethnic composition is clearly
563 different from that of the above None villages. Very great
heterogeneity prevails there; it is made up of 30% Bambara,
30% Wassoulonké, and 25% Peul-Toucouleur. The Bambara
and Wassoulonké form the ethnic base of the village, of
which they were the creators. The other elements through
the play of marriages have superimposed themselves on these
groups.

W /383/ Keur-Mamour, by contrast, has remained Wolof;
[563] only a few Peul shepherds have infiltrated into the village.

S The distance from the urban center has considerably
162 reduced the relations with Thiès. They have both remained
369 rural: less than 10% of the economically active male popula-
463 tion have non-agricultural work; more than 60% have remained
wholly faithful to the land.

S
W At Keur-Mamour, although some elements were formerly
369 employed in the escale itself, at the time of the inquiry only
463 one-tenth were employed as laborers at the Péchiney phosphate
317 quarries located in the vicinity of their village. (We have here
an indirect effect of the urban presence: the opening of extra-urban yards offering extra-rural work to the neighboring villages.) As a consequence no worker was employed in the city itself.

S Karamoko and Keur-Mamour thus present limited charac-
369 teristics of the urban suburbs.

Keur-Issa-Bambara and Diakhaté, located in the vicinity of the escale (about one kilometer from the first outskirts), would have to form the type proper of the suburb.

S The ethnic composition is essentially Wolof at Diakhaté,
369 composite at Keur-Issa-Bambara. In this latter agglomeration
563 the Bambara, the Peul, and the Toucouleur respectively ac-
162 count for 30% in the composition of the group. The remainder
W is made up of Wassoulonké, Wolof, Malinké, and Sarakolé.
[563] Consequently the heterogeneity seems to be greater there than

/383 cont./

369 at Karamoko. This leads to the supposition that there is great
instability on the part of the families who, coming from the
563 Sudan, for example, momentarily settle in the village before
162 being integrated into the urban population of Thiès.

An examination of the table below[1] will permit a comparison of the structure of the four non-None villages (the None villages are homogeneous, as we have seen above).

/384/ In the predominately rural villages, the number
369 of individuals born in the village almost balances the number
563 of those born outside: Karamoko, 34 as against 35; Keur-Mamour,
162 28 as against 22. It should be emphasized that at Keur-Mamour
166 most of the men were born in the village itself, 21 as against 3,
but by contrast, most of the women are of outside origin, 19 as
against 7. At Karamoko, on the other hand, an equal number
of men and women leave their village of birth to settle elsewhere.

In the predominately urban agglomerations, the individuals who come from the outside are clearly in the majority. At Diakhaté, 31 are natives of the village as against 48 from the outside. At Keur-Issa-Bambara, only 23 are natives of the village as against 51 from the outside. Let us note that the number of men and the number of women born outside of the village are nearly identical: 22 men as against 29 women at Keur-Issa-Bambara, 23 as against 25 at Diakhaté.

These comparative figures emphasize a greater ethnic mixture in the villages whose economy is marked by the presence of the city.

The villages of Sudanese origin in particular require com-
563 plementary data concerning the place of origin of the emigration.
162 To what extent do these villages maintain relations with their
166 country of origin? Does the emigration movement toward Senegal,
primed at the end of the last century, continue with as much
strength in our day?

An examination of the place of birth of individuals belonging to the over-40 age group (early emigration) and the individuals not having reached this age (recent emigration) will illuminate

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[1] [see cat 116, p 18 - ANALYST]

/384 cont./

S this problem.
563 At Keur-Issa-Bambara, out of 37 individuals born in the
162 Sudan, 20 are over 40 years of age. At Karamoko, 28 are natives
166 of the Sudan, but 18 have reached 40 years of age. Out of 65
individuals of Sudanese origin, only 27 are young elements.
Over half of those classed under the rubric "emigrant" were aged
persons, some of whom perhaps assisted in the creation of the
village in Senegal.

These few figures are an index of the mediocrity of the
present immigration of the Sudanese to the region of Thiès. The
unions and the displacements of families or of familial elements
seem to occur now between relatively close villages.

S An examination of the division of activities at Diakhaté
162 and at Keur-Issa-Bambara will permit to some extent "gauging"
463 their index of urbanization.

● 369 At Diakhaté, 20% of the economically active male popula-
W tion work /385/ at Thiès, 60% have remained agriculturalists,
[162] and the remainder, 20%, is composed of workers of mixed activi-
[463] ties, half-rural, half-urban. Keur-Issa-Bambara shows only a
[369] very low percentage of workers in mixed activities: 60% are rural;
more than 30% work in the city (one sees that this latter figure is
slightly higher than that for the None villages, 27%).

S The workshops of the Dakar-Niger employ a considerable
[498] number of permanent or temporary workers from these two vil-
lages. These two localities in fact furnish 19 permanent city
workers, 15 of whom are employed on the Dakar-Niger; among
the four temporary workers from Keur-Issa-Bambara, three have
W worked in this enterprise. In addition, Diakhaté furnishes tem-
[463] porarily for the city: four tailors, one mason, and one carpenter.

S Let us add that a minority of natives, despite the contacts
162 that they can have with Europeans, understand our language, a
[191] little less than 5%. The number of children who go to the Euro-
[871] pean school is almost null, scarcely 1%.

S
369 After this quick study of some types of villages in the vicinity

/385 cont./

369 of Thiès, it clearly appears that the characteristics of the suburbs of the African cities noticeably differ from those of the cities of the mother country. Can one use the term suburb /banlieue/ for these types of suburban villages? Sapko, Thiès-none, Tiali, and Keur-Issa-Bambara, on the one hand, can be regarded as suburb villages; in fact they possess the essential characteristics: proximity to the city, relatively high percentage of workers traveling daily to the enterprises of Thiès, a considerable number of mixed workers, sale of truck-gardening products in the city, relatively high percentage of improved dwellings...

Keur-Mamour and Karamoko already appear to be outside of the economy of the city and cannot be regarded as suburb villages. Diakhaté would be a marginal type; despite its proximity to the first urban quarters, its economy seems to be little influenced by that of the city (only a fifth of the economically active population works in the city).

On the mother-country plan, a city such as Thiès would [498] have an important industrial suburb. Let us not forget that the workshops of the Dakar-Niger engage nearly 2,500 native workers.

369 241 The agrarian economy plays an essential role in these villages, but it has remained traditional. The introduction of new crops and the extension of the zones of gardening and orchards are very slight. The woman has perhaps extended by a few square meters the /386/ area of her vegetable garden for the cultivation of vegetables intended for sale at the market, but no serious systematic arrangement has been made. Traditional cultivation, with its archaic methods, prevails everywhere. If

369 464 166 the need for money stimulates the rural person to offer his services in the city, he seems to choose the place of work nearest to his home. Is it truly out of liking that the Wolof of Diakhaté hire themselves out to the workshops of the Dakar-Niger? Is it out of liking that the None near the mercantile quarters hire themselves out as laborers or boys? The proximity of the place of work seems to enter considerably into the choice of urban occupation.

The suburban village, as we have noted several times, has

/386 cont./

●369 two important roles in the economy of the escale: it is a re-
464 serve of workers who can be employed temporarily; it is also
166 the position of withdrawal when enforced idleness and strikes
interdict work in the city.

[463] A functional examination of the different human groups has in fact revealed that an important proportion of the male elements has a hybrid occupation: half-agricultural, half-laborer. These workers fluctuating between two activities seem like a shock troop of laborers who are employed on the occasion of great undertakings: embankments for the laying of the road from Dakar to Thiès, putting through and establishing new streets, the installation of the military camps, the extraction of phosphate in the Péchiney quarries... The yard closed, they temporarily return to the land.

These villages are also withdrawal points in case of prolonged work stoppages. If the worker is discharged from his establishment, if he suffers from enforced idleness in his occupation, is he totally deprived of money? He knows that he will
[574] be able to wait for better times thanks to the hospitality that he
will find in the neighboring agglomeration. Settled near the escale, it will be possible for him to look for work every day.

369 Reserve of manpower, reserve of food products intended principally for the native, these are the two points that justify the term suburb given to these few villages.

Their external appearance and their internal organization as we have described it scarcely correspond to our Western view of the suburban phenomenon. But we should place this problem in its African milieu where the conceptions of the city, animal breeding, agriculture... profoundly differ from ours.

How long will this type of suburb of the African cities preserve this rural appearance? Evolution in the modes /387/ of settlement, in interior comfort, in the extension of new crops...., already primed in some villages, will progressively continue in the neighboring agglomerations.

In spite of appearances, modifications occur rapidly

/387 cont./

369 (especially since the end of the last World War). It is probable that at such a rate in a few decades these suburban villages will have lost their rural appearance and will look like extensions of urban quarters. It seems difficult to foretell, however, to what extent and in what direction the Africa of tomorrow will be able to sustain its present efforts at evolution.

/388/

369 433 [162] The city of Thiès, 60 kilometers east of Dakar, contains 36,000 inhabitants, according to a recent census. All of its activity seems to be centered around four principal poles: commercial, industrial, administrative, and military.

[487] Its commercial activity is due to its position at the crossroads of important paths of communication: railroad lines from Dakar to Saint-Louis, from Dakar to Bamako, and from Thiès to Kaolack, and roads from Dakar to Saint-Louis and from Dakar to Diourbel, Tambacounda, and the Sudan and Guinea.

[498] [464] It also owes the essential part of its industrial activity to this implantation at an important rail crossroads; the repair shops of the Dakar-Niger rail system, where nearly 1,000 workers of all grades are employed, have been set up there.

[497] [634] Apart from the workshops of the Dakar-Niger, it must not be forgotten that Thiès is also where the management of this system resides. And it is also the principal administrative point of a circle /cercle, an administrative district/. We will thus find, besides the workers, a rather large proportion of office employees, managers, and executives.

[712] Finally, the military function of Thiès is due to the presence of two important camps: the "DMA" (Détachement Motorisé Autonome), and an air base.

[166] [241] Besides these four centers of activities which give this city a modern character (economically speaking, at least), a fifth one intervenes in a not inconsiderable proportion. A rather large population of cultivators, who in winter cultivate groundnuts and millet in nearby fields, has settled on the periphery of Thiès. And the city is the point to which, at the time of the groundnut trade, all of the agricultural activity of the circle comes to assert itself. Its commercial importance is thereby further increased.

162 463 /389/ Here is some numerical information concerning the occupational distribution of the population of Thiès.

Out of an economically active population of 11,040 inhabitants at the date of the census, there were counted:

Thie's
Wolof MS30
Serer FA32
SONINKE MS21
BAMBARA FA8

/399/ Table III (cont.)

W
SR
So
B
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511
S
426
511*

No.	Ethnic Group	Occupation	Income	Monthly Surplus or Deficit	% in Relation to Income
32	Wolof	Cultivator	25,000	+ 1,442	5.7
33	Sérère	Chauffeur	25,000	+ 1,128	4.5
34	Wolof	Employee P.T.T.	25,900	+ 977	3.7
35	Wolof	Staff employee D.N.	27,000	+ 2,117	7.8
36	Wolof	Private accountant	34,000	+ 751	2.2
37	Wolof	Truck-gardener	36,000	+ 1,237	3.4
38	Wolof	Jeweler	50,000	+ 2,555	5.1
39	Sarakolé	Teacher	51,000	+12,894	25.2
40	Wolof	Staff worker	55,000	+ 2,494	4.5
41	Sarakolé	Head employee D.N.	55,500	+ 5,599	10.0
42	Bambara	Chief worker C.D.N.	56,000	+ 4,726	8.4
43	Wolof	Doctor	81,000	+ 847	1.0

S
*511 /400 cont./ of supporting a second wife in another city on an income that is not very high. Nos. 36 and 43 have a lower percentage of surplus, but here we were able to get quite precise information on the utilization of the /401/ surplus and were able to include these sums in the total expenses.

S
178 *262 [369] [264] It has become banal to state that the diet of Africans lacks variety. The food habits remain the most deep-rooted, and although one sees imported food products appear more and more among the African families of the cities, it is striking to verify that almost all are merely superimposed on the old ones. The food base, the meals at noon and in the evening, rarely evolves, no matter what the ethnic group, the income, or the

/426 cont./

*511 352 lists is the bed (1). In nearly all of the African lodgings we

1. The 13.3% of the cultivator, No. 32, arose from the purchase of a cart and a horse.

find at least a bed, but there is rarely one for everyone. And
● [369] to sleep in a bed has become the best proof that one can give
of his acclimatization to the city.

If the income is higher, one may be able to buy more important pieces of furniture. Then, in the order of their urgency, the armchairs, the rugs, and then the tables and wardrobes appear.

*511 Then we come to the rubric "Exceptional Expenses," those for which no absolute necessity is felt. Moreover they are rarer at the top of the table, only three, and then they multiply (Table XIV).

[405] The first thing that we find here is the watch or the alarm
clock, closely followed by the jewelry of the wife or wives.
[301] There follow, but only in the highest incomes, the bicycle,
[493] or, depending on the possibilities, the bicycle with a motor
[207] on it or the motorcycle, then the battery radio. There is
nothing very original in all this, and, except perhaps for the
[301] importance given to the jewelry of the women, we would find
similar pretensions among European families having equivalent
incomes.

*511 In the last table (Table XV)[1] we have grouped a series of
794 expenses that have a common origin, the religion of the fami-
[771] lies investigated, all Moslems except one. Two Moslem holi-
days are involved, Tabaski and Korité, religious assessments,
/427/ /Table XIV appears here/ /428/ offerings to the marabouts, and, finally, expenses arising from sending children to the Koranic school.

*511 796 For Tabaski, each family slaughters a sheep. There

[1] [See cat 116, pp 69-71. ANALYST]

/431 cont./

*511 not been able to take this income into account, but he is certainly erroneously placed in our list; this is No. 23. The 15,000 francs shown indeed correspond to his way of life, but he should certainly be higher.

Finally, many do not know where the money goes... and would be very surprised to learn that they should normally have a surplus at the end of each month. It is very probable [426] that they loan /432/ much of it, which is never returned to them and which they do not think of asking for; they are the ones who permit the system to remain in equilibrium.

*511 114 Many points have remained obscure in the course of this study, and many others require some explanation. We have strictly limited ourselves to a report of the verifications that we have made concerning the budgets of our families, not wishing to go still further and speak of the "standard of living." These are thus raw results which need to be worked over, put back in their framework, and illuminated in the light of their context: all the elements that make up African daily life.

But other studies of the same order are under way. One was recently made in Dakar itself; another will soon begin in Saint-Louis. By combining the results we will then be able to confirm certain of the tendencies shown and, finally, perhaps to draw some valid conclusions.

*511 The provisional conclusions would be: the apparent impossibility, or in any case the difficulty, of balancing a budget when the income is less than 15,000 francs, at least by changing the food habits (by consuming more millet, for example) and above all the social context. But on this last point the traditions are still the strongest. On the other hand, as we have just said, it is because of them that the system remains in equilibrium. [369] But from this struggle between two forces, the traditions of the rural life and the necessities of life in the city, there is the danger that disequilibrium will arise. In any case this is what often happens on the level of the familial groups that we studied.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961)·1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

121
563 only black African territory where there was a sizeable French community. In Dakar alone the French numbered
[160] 6,600 in 1931, 17,300 in 1948 and increased to nearly 30,000 in recent years. It is interesting to examine how the *colons* on the spot reacted to the acceptance of Africans as
[369] equals in law and political rights and finally how far assimilation, by providing a new common culture, was able to break down traditional indigenous inter-ethnic hostilities.

175 small island of Gorée further down the coast. However this
did not mean that the French lacked interest in the interior.
From 1749-53 Michel Adanson explored the Senegalese
coast and undertook the first really scientific description of
West Africa. His writings were largely responsible for the
later hope that European colonisation of this part of Africa
would be possible. But for the rest of the eighteenth century
France's hold on St. Louis was too tenuous for anything of
this nature to be undertaken. Indeed during the Seven
Years' War the town fell to the British and was only returned
175 in 1779. By the end of the eighteenth century St. Louis
563 with a population of 7,000, had a European colony numbering 600, the largest on the whole of the West Coast. It also
● 369 had an important assimilated mulatto community, whose
[162] descendants are known today as St. Louisiens. Indeed there
had been a very high degree of *métissage* by the end of the
eighteenth century, since most Frenchmen there took
permanent African mistresses known as *signares*, and ensured
the education of any children they had by them. Indeed
in all but legal status these *signares* were wives and their
'marriages' were celebrated by their families with all the
pomp of a normal wedding. However, with the improvement of communications between Senegal and France and
the arrival of larger numbers of soldiers in the middle of
the nineteenth century, mistresses were much more temporary in nature and the number of Frenchmen prepared to
educate resulting offspring was considerably reduced.

175 In 1789 St. Louis sent its *cahier* of grievances to the States-General on the eve of the French Revolution, demanding
567 the end of the monopoly of the great companies, freedom of
trade and the abolition of slavery, which had hitherto formed
[439] the main item of export from St. Louis. These grievances
were heeded. Slavery was abolished and the companies
had their charters withdrawn. But the position of slaves
and slave-trading in the colonies was not in fact settled until
the end of the wars that followed the French Revolution.

175 During these wars St. Louis once again fell to the British
648

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

and only under the terms of the Treaty of Paris which ended S 648
the Napoleonic Wars was it finally returned to the French [175]
in 1817. Under King Louis XVIII, France embarked on a
policy of European colonisation of Senegal. Colonel S W
Schmaltz negotiated with Moctar Diop, the Lebou chief 648
of the small village of Dakar, for land to settle 200 emigrants
to be despatched from France under the auspices of the
Société Coloniale Philanthropique. But climate and disease
soon put an end to this venture. Nevertheless Schmaltz
persisted with his schemes in St. Louis so that Senegal could
by its products enrich the mother country. He made agreements
with local chiefs for the agricultural settlement of
part of the Oualo or hinterland of St. Louis and in 1819
a model farm was established to experiment in the growing of S
cotton, olives, dates, coconuts and coffee. This policy was 648
pursued enthusiastically by his successor, Baron Roger,
and a number of experiments, mainly concerned with
cotton, were undertaken in the next few years. By 1822
nearly fifty concessions had been granted to the French by
local chiefs and for the next five years further experiments
were carried out by Monsieur Richard who started a full
scale research station at what is now called Richard-Toll
or Richard's field. But his efforts were not crowned with
success, and later governors influenced by the reaction against
colonialism in France lost interest in agricultural settlement.
This was perhaps fortunate for modern Senegal,
since had these first experiments been fruitful she might
have been saddled with a settler problem today.

France was already working towards an assimilationist
policy. A governmental despatch to Schmaltz informed
him that his political aim should be 'to introduce gradually
among the blacks of Senegal a civilisation based on free
labour . . . education, and public peace . . .' It continued: S
'A mulatto is now mayor of the capital of our possessions, [563]
and a black could become so too.' Two years later Baron
Roger was informed that since most of the free population [369]
of St. Louis was mulatto or African it was 'very important

648 [563] [369] not to let the same discriminations and prejudices such as exist in other colonies be introduced among them.' At the same time the metropolitan Government was asking whether Africans would make suitable corporals and under-officers. Furthermore Schmaltz, whilst advocating a system of economic exploitation that seemed to be entirely to the advantage of France, maintained that the Senegalese were not merely to be auxiliaries and that they would be encouraged by fixed prices for their crops to produce more and become 'civilised' by their contact with Europe.

648 567 641 So far France had made no definition of the position of non-French inhabitants of her colonies. Even though France by the decree of 16 Pluviose Year II (1792) had abolished slavery and declared that 'all men, without distinction of colour, domiciled in French colonies, are French citizens, and enjoy all the rights assured by the Constitution', and even though the slave trade had been outlawed in 1818, until 1833 freed slaves had uncertain status in law, and domestic slaves still existed in large numbers. A royal ordinance of that year proclaimed that 'Any person born free or having legally acquired his liberty enjoys in the French colonies: (1) civil rights; (2) political rights under conditions prescribed by law'. But only in 1848 was the status of *captif* or domestic slave abolished, though the majority of *captifs* continued to serve with their former masters. Naturally this law only affected inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée and the other French posts like Dagana and Richard-Toll.

648 [641] [218] [799] The most important result of these two laws was to give about 12,000 Africans, mostly illiterate, the full rights of French citizens. Of these less than a thousand had been converted to Christianity by their French, mulatto or Christian African masters. Educational facilities, which would have to accompany any effective conversion of illiterates into full scale French citizens were still rudimentary. But it must be remembered that in France, at the time, the electorate was suddenly increased from 200,000 to

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 colonies other than Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion and at the same time they were subjected to rule by direct decree of the Emperor.

[167] It was under the Second Empire that the first great period of French colonial expansion in black Africa took place. It was during that regime that Faidherbe, who was to Senegal what Lugard was to Nigeria, first embarked on his African conquests. Faidherbe himself embodied this dichotomy in French colonial policy: an authoritarian agent of an authoritarian regime, he was often found introducing reforms and innovations that conformed with the most liberal application of an assimilationist policy.

[643] Faidherbe was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854.
369 At the time St. Louis, according to Abbé Boilaut in his
Esquisses sénégalaises was a city of 12,336 inhabitants with
[162] only 177 Europeans. There were two primary schools run
[563] by Catholic missionaries. A full scale administration had
[872] succeeded in imposing on a town otherwise consisting mainly
[797] of single storey houses, a governor's palace, a 'very elegant
[361] Palace of Justice', a large naval hospital, a fine church and
an army barracks.

648 From his base at St. Louis, Faidherbe, in a series of
643 brilliant campaigns, notably against the powerful emir of
Trarza and the Muslim reformist and Toucouleur leader, El Hadj Omar, was to lay the foundations of France's West African empire. To do this he organised the now famous *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, since Europeans did not stand up well to the climate and the prevalent diseases. By conquest or by treaty he brought most of modern Senegal and much of
643 Soudan (Mali) under French rule. He installed an efficient
military administration, and even published an official
[804] newspaper the *Moniteur du Sénégal*. Altogether Faidherbe
was a remarkable man. He was a firm believer in the
equality of races, and did much to increase the educational
[871] facilities of the colony. He established a school for the sons
of chiefs, and lay schools for Muslims, who objected to
[797] attending the mission schools. Whilst Faidherbe wanted to

encourage the evangelisation of the population, he[1] was 643
sufficiently knowledgeable about the country and its people [797]
to realise that it would be impossible to win converts from
among the Muslims who formed the majority in Senegal.
Scholarships for primary education in St. Louis, and second- [871]
ary education in France were awarded under his auspices
to promising students. Small technical schools were established at Dakar. And he even opened a museum at St. Louis.

He tried to equip the colony with some of the benefits of
a modern economy. He established the Bank of Senegal, [453]
laid out St. Louis afresh as befitted a capital city, and under
his influence Pinet-Laprade founded the new port of Dakar. [369]
He promoted the export of the ground-nut crop, becoming [439]
increasingly valuable to the colony's revenue which rose
from 12 million francs in 1848 to 37 million in 1869, and [433]
proved a profitable substitute for human merchandise. He made valuable and detailed studies of the local people. Like Lugard he seemed to be able to think of every aspect of administration at the same time. The historian G. Hardy wrote of him: 'He touched on everything, and always with good results.' But as J. Richard-Molard commented, 'He was the first great Frenchman to realise the wish of Barth. But he did it as an officer of the Empire, endowed with an abominable character and a sense of authority which bordered on vice. He was proconsul of an authoritarian Empire.'

One decision vital for the future of the Senegal was made 648
during the Faidherbian regime: this was the final abandonment of any ideals of European colonisation. It came at a time when the French were settling Algeria, and was not altogether altruistic, as the ministerial instructions of 1859 showed:

> Nothing similar to Algeria could be undertaken in Senegal. The climate is against it. The land should therefore be left to the natives, at least as a general rule. It is by their hands that it should be cultivated and if our rule is to be extended over all the territory

[1] [i.e., Faidherbe, who became Governor in 1854--Analyst]

till the end of the nineteenth century, neglected the Pro- 646
tectorate and seemed to think that the only parts of the 563
country that mattered were the four communes. Naturally 633
their official business with the Protectorate was limited, but
they did control the three main ports of the country through [439]
which the products of the interior passed to France. The 646.
councillors, too, restricted education largely to the com- 871
munes, where on the whole it reached a satisfactory level.
They even sent students on scholarships to France, but [369]
unfortunately too few of these returned to Senegal to use
their newly acquired talents. It was not until the establishment
of the Government-General of French West Africa
in 1905 that educational facilities were extended to the [648]
Protectorate in any great measure.

The increase in education amongst citizens of African 641
origin meant that by the turn of the nineteenth century they were less willing to accept European domination in the communes and the General Council. The assertion of their rights is one of the main factors behind the attempts of the administration to deprive the indigenous Senegalese of their position as *citoyens*. Actually the Administration was batting on a good wicket. Technically a French citizen was one who accepted French rights and duties without qualification.
In the case of the Africans in Senegal they had been allowed [671]
to retain their own *statut personnel*, that is private law, with reference to civil disputes, matrimony, divorce, inheritance and land. But this seemed to conflict openly with the definition of a French citizen. It seemed wrong that a man should exercise the rights of a French citizen and not accept the consequent obligations. Many Frenchmen felt it quite illogical that an African with four wives could yet be a citizen. And indeed in later years the main obstacle to granting citizenship to other colonial peoples was to be the question of retention of the *statut personnel*. Thus many of the attempts by the French to deprive the Senegalese citizens of their rights were the result of quite genuine
objections to the illogicality of their position. Faidherbe, [643]

however the younger generation of Senegalese were
648 beginning to question the moral right of assimilation. These
891 critics were the educated élite, by-products of an educational
policy of which Governor-General Chaudié had written
571 in 1897: 'The school is the surest means of action by which a civilising nation can transmit its ideas to people who are still primitive and by which it can raise them gradually to its own standards. In a word the school is the supreme element of progress. It is also the most effective tool of propaganda for the French language that the Government can use.'

Ousmane Socé Diop, in *Karim*, a remarkable study of the sort of young Senegalese most affected by French assimilation, published in 1935, shows not only how effective this policy was in those early days, but also points to the awakening of the Senegalese to the values of their own traditional society.

648 On certain evenings in Dakar, Karim and his young
591 friends would talk not only of love but of their political and social ideas:

> The teacher was there, reasonable, but capable at moments of behaving foolishly, such as over the beautiful eyes of a Senegalese girl. He was a 'progressive', a partisan of a plan of evolution with its basis in the fundamental characteristics of his people.
>
> The graduate, a know-all, spoke of 'cleaning-up Senegalese traditions and of bringing about an immediate and thorough Europeanisation.
>
> The doctor, a Catholic, adopted Western civilisation without question. Nevertheless, his atavistic temperament remained one with that of his own people.
>
> Abdou was born a Muslim and an oriental and had been educated at a French school. His mind had been nurtured on European ideas and logic. His heart had been formed within the curious framework of the *Khalam*, of French poetry and European music. He was a person of contrasts. He could dance to the tam-tam as well as do the tango, he liked Negro music and black girls, but also dreamed of Deauville, of Paris and of some film-starlet, a blonde blue-eyed Venus.

[369] Later Karim is sent out to a small town in the 'bush' where he has to help with the collection of the ground-nut

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

crop. Struck by the simple, uncomplicated ways of the bush compared with that of Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis he reflects: 'The teacher and above all the graduate who spoke so often of immediate and complete Europeanisation, should be here to see for themselves.' 648 571 369

Ousmane Socé Diop has pin-pointed perfectly the growing conflict in the minds of the educated Senegalese at this time and the ever increasing gap between the peoples of the *Quatre Communes* and the *sujets* of the bush.

Furthermore the Senegalese student in Paris was beginning to question the rights of colonialism in general and the honesty of France's assimilationist policy in particular. He was hardly encouraged by the pronouncements of a leading politician during the twenties and thirties like Albert Sarraut who wrote in *La mise en valeur de nos colonies* that the colonies had a threefold purpose of serving France. First the numbers of France's overseas peoples increased her population from 40 million to 100 million, thus giving her a greater manpower than Germany. Secondly they could make a financial contribution to France. Thirdly they could supply her with the raw materials she needed. France's civilising mission, whilst important, was conceived of by Sarraut as a by-product of these functions. (Quoted in L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa.*)

As we have seen, assimilationist professions were rarely matched by the facts. And indeed in other parts of French West Africa education was limited. But in Senegal France made a major effort in education, so that by 1940 there had already been formed a substantial African élite, particularly in comparison to the country's population. 571 871 648

By 1938 18,000 boys and 1,500 girls, taught by 132 European and 337 African teachers were at school; even so, a very low percentage of the population of school age actually attended school. Nevertheless this was considerably higher than that of any other French African territory. Children were educated according to French methods with few concessions made to local factors. The aim was not

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

VII. THE FRENCH IN SENEGAL

800 The less intelligent the white man, the more stupid the black man seems to him.

André Gide

563 369 The first thing that strikes the casual visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans and the apparent absence of any colour problem. Senegal in fact has an exceptionally good record of race relations, especially when one considers that the proportion of Europeans to Africans is much higher than in many countries with acute racial problems. The French in Senegal today probably [162] number some 40,000 of which nearly 30,000 live in Dakar alone. In comparison with other territories of French speaking Africa, Senegal has always had a large European minority, and this has increased rapidly since the war. Thus in Senegal the policy of assimilation was not applied in the abstract by the metropolitan Government to a people who, with the exception of administrative officials, had practically no daily contact with Frenchmen. In the major towns the Senegalese have been used to the presence of a substantial French community for well over seventy years. But, as we shall see, it was one thing for the metropolitan Government to initiate a policy of assimilation and quite another to expect its citizens to apply it on a personal level in their relations with the people who were being assimilated.

Though the French community in Senegal is relatively [162] large and in Dakar constitutes at least a tenth of the population, it must not be confused in character with the settler communities of Kenya and Rhodesia.

563 The great majority of Frenchmen have no intention of remaining in Senegal after their retirement. On independence few Frenchman opted for Senegalese nationality

though few picked up their bags and left 'in disgust at the 563
new order of things'. Of course in certain uninformed quarters there was the inevitable short-lived panic about what independence would mean for the French community, and even today, despite reassurances from the Government, certain sectors remain oversensitive to each move or speech made by a Minister. For many Frenchmen their stay in Senegal is not longer than five years, and as a result there is a higher proportion of bachelors than one would normally expect in a community that had intentions of making the country its permanent home. This proportion is largely accounted for by the presence of a French army [648]
base.

On the other hand the Dakar European population has 563
none of the temporary character of the English communities 369
in West Africa. Far from living in reservations outside the city, as is still the case with the European population of Lagos, they have moved into the centre of the town and made it a small corner of Europe, and the more the French population has increased the more it has tended to create a metropolitan life for itself in Africa. The range of European-style shops, the number of restaurants, night-clubs, and women's hairdressers shows that although the Dakar Frenchman may have no intention of settling in the city for good, he is determined to live his life in the maximum comfort during his stay. There is relatively little of the attitude of living for the next leave.

Another distinguishing feature of the European community in Senegal is that not only is it not a true settler community but also its economic interests, whilst vast, have not involved any important alienation of land and until very recently have not brought it into conflict with African economic interests. Dakar can in no way be considered a small Algiers. The majority of Europeans, whose [463]
per capita income is about £600 a year, are employed by the Administration or commercial and industrial undertakings in executive posts or in technical and clerical positions

563 369 [463] for which no trained African staff is available. There is a wide range of professional occupations, but private enterprise by individuals is largely restricted to higher-class shopkeeping and the running of bars and restaurants. [439] Most of the export and import trade is still in the hands of the large commercial houses controlled from France as distinct from individual Frenchmen in Dakar.

Relations between the African and European communities have been remarkably good. There have been no really significant racial conflicts in Dakar since the war. But relations are *negatively* good. That is to say that there is almost no contact between the two groups outside work. The French in Dakar, despite the official assimilationist policy of the mother country, have shown little inclination to extend it on a personal plane during their sojourn in Dakar. On the other hand when they were officially representatives of the colonial Power they rarely attempted to enforce discrimination against Africans. Apart from the time of the unfortunate Vichy episode there has never been any open discrimination in Dakar. Africans always had legal access to all places the French had, though inevitably there were a number of private associations such as the *Amicales des Provinces Françaises* which excluded Africans by definition though never by statute. A visitor might be tempted to think that the absence of Africans from the French-style cafés in the main streets of Dakar indicated some subtle form of discrimination, but in fact any African entering would be served, and the sparseness of African clientele is determined by economic and social reasons. Drinks are enormously expensive in such bistros, and few [162] [779] Muslims, who form the majority of the population in Dakar, care to be seen drinking in public. Nevertheless it is true that proprietors of certain bars do their best to maintain a white clientele.

There is a certain residential separation, once more largely determined by economics. The expensive European

flats and villas are usually beyond the range of the African 563
purse though the difference is being eliminated by the [369]
accession of Senegalese, immediately prior to and in particular since independence, to high administrative posts and today there is no real residential separation. Many Europeans live in housing estates built primarily for Africans and not a few live in the Medina or main African quarter. [467]
Some trade unions are divided on racial lines between Africans and Europeans, largely because the European workers are skilled technicians and there are even to this day few Africans trained in most of the industrial work [463]
done by Europeans.

Nevertheless there are certain cases of bitterness between 563
Africans and Europeans over the question of equal pay for 465
equal work. Though the basic principle is that both groups should be paid the same rate for the same kind of work, the European in many cases gets an expatriation addition of up to two-fifths of his basic salary. This is not true of all classes of work. For instance shop girls in Printania, a local version of Woolworth's, earn the same pay whether white or black though of course the European staff are recruited locally from wives and daughters of Frenchmen working in Dakar. It is surely a healthy sign that Europeans and Africans can work together on equal terms and that Europeans can occupy what in Europe would be considered very humble positions.

One does not detect amongst the French in Senegal any 563
very strong feeling for or against the African. Where any form of racism does manifest itself it is mainly at the level of the artisan worker or the *petit blanc*, a term generally used to describe the poorer white community of small [571]
shopkeepers, clerks, mechanics and skilled workers. When the Senegalese are confronted by outbursts of racism from members of this group they are usually inclined to return the abuse in kind, for the Senegalese are naturally an immensely proud people and have very little feeling of racial inferiority. Close contact with a French community

563 that ranges from the Olympian civil servant to a taxi driver and a clerk without work, has left them under no illusion about the equal fallibility of the European. This is in direct contrast to Nigeria where until very recently all Europeans held executive posts, lived in large houses in separate reservations, had cars, servants and high incomes, all of which gave the impression to the vast majority of Nigerians who had not travelled overseas that the English were a race which commanded and did not occupy itself with subaltern work. Thus to this day, even [369] in Lagos, the European is still a 'remarkable' being. In Dakar the Frenchman passes unremarked, and the *Dakarois* is as used to seeing him on foot or on a velo-cycle as in a car, with the result that the Senegalese on the whole do not have any complex about the European as a person although he does about the technical superiority of the European and about France's insistence on the superiority of its culture.

P. Mercier, the French sociologist, in an investigation into [369] the habits of the European community in Dakar, found that very few Europeans had African friends outside work, and that contact between white and black was largely limited to the following spheres: among colleagues, employees, and domestic servants, in cultural and sporting activities, and in schools. Few marriages take place between African and European in Dakar and when they do they are usually between African male and European female, and are contracted in Paris. There are two obvious explanations for this. For many it is impossible to find a wife of the same intellectual level in a society where Islam has retarded female education. For many others the need for a companion leads to love affairs and eventual marriage with women whom they would not consider marrying at home. The reason that few French women marry Africans in Senegal, as distinct from in France, is that they become more aware of the type of society into which they are [596] marrying. It is very difficult for the European woman,

563 formed as a result of the *loi cadre* reforms, are typical of the
[645] Frenchmen who have identified themselves with the country
of their sojourn. Indeed such was the devotion of Peytavin to his party's cause that he was retained as Minister of Finance even after independence and opted for Senegalese nationality, a step that Bonifay found himself unable to take. These were men of high education—Bonifay, a well known lawyer, and Peytavin a veterinary surgeon. There were many others like them, not only applying such principles in the political field, but in the administration and commerce, who helped to dispel from the African what would otherwise have been a dominant impression of an isolationist and sometimes racist French community.

[369] It would be foolish to paint too idealised a picture of
race relations in Dakar. Many Europeans, particularly
[577] the *petit blanc*, openly admit to holding the African in
contempt. But these are usually Europeans of little economic or political consequence and since independence their opinions have obviously carried negligible weight with the Senegalese.

Furthermore most Europeans in Dakar and the other main towns of Senegal, whatever their prejudices, send their children to local schools, where perforce they mix on terms of equality with Africans. The same is true of
[873] Dakar University which has a large number of French
students, the majority of whom are girls whose parents are working in Dakar. Their brothers try if possible to go to French universities. Though friendships tend to be
[572] within the same racial group, there is a considerable number
of inter-racial friendships.

563 The main point of conflict would appear to the casual
visitor to be the economic domination of private enterprise
369 and the more important subaltern jobs by Europeans.
463 But before analysing any tensions that have arisen from
472 this, it is essential to point to some special features of Sene-
galese society. In Senegal, by contrast with Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast, there is no entrepreneurial class of

Africans. Indeed only very small scale trading is in the 563
hands of Africans, otherwise large scale commercial 369 ●
enterprises are run by Europeans, and most of their mana- 463
gerial staff being European. Between these large scale [490]
organisations, the whole range of middleman trade is
dominated by Lebanese and the so-called *petit blancs.* [571]
Small shopkeeping is predominantly in the hands of the Mauritanians, though larger shops particularly in Dakar, are run by Lebanese and Europeans. At first sight this would seem to be an unhealthy situation, and it would be foolish to ignore the inherent dangers in it. But the most ardent critics of this state of affairs are as often as not visiting Africans, not the Senegalese themselves. When a Nigerian shops in Printania or goes to the local bank in Dakar, he is shocked by the number of Frenchwomen employed in jobs he is accustomed to seeing held by Africans in Lagos. But in considering the rather special case of Dakar one must take into account a number of factors that are often overlooked by would-be critics.

Senegal is a territory of only 3,100,000 people and in the [161]
normal run of education in French-speaking African states, even taking into account Senegal's special position among them, the percentage of the population available to fill managerial and sub-managerial posts or indeed any 'European-style' job in all sectors of the economy, can hardly match up to the requirements of the most highly
industrialised city in West Africa. In addition Dakar has a [508]
large international airport and a port that was the third [504]
largest in the French Union. It is also the centre of govern- [496]
ment for Senegal and the terminus of a railway. It is not 463
surprising therefore that Senegal finds it more difficult 563
to find the appropriate number of Africans to fill its senior posts in commerce and industry than Lagos which has a Nigerian population of over 36 million to draw on. Furthermore Lagos is in the centre of an area where missionaries have been active for over a hundred years and consequently

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

VIII. THE SENEGALESE

> 563 The case of the one and only Senegalese is interesting. There you have a man no longer designated by his tribe, but by his colony. We are not told what tribe in Senegal he belongs to, Serer, Wolof or Lebu. That he comes from the Colony of Senegal is enough to give him some sort of status, and for native policy to know whom it is dealing with. He is not a *déraciné* from a small isolated Africa; in Bobo *cercle* he is son of the mother colony of all the colonies of the Federation. He is settled in Bobo as he might elsewhere, as a man of the new African world that has got beyond race, where natives of all races give life to the colonial structure and break it open from within.
>
> ROBERT DELAVIGNETTE: *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*

● [369] [292] If the first thing that strikes the visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans, the second is the homogeneous character of Senegalese society itself. It is not possible, as it is in Lagos or Leopoldville, to tell from a glance at a man or a woman's clothes from which ethnic group he or she comes. Senegal not only has an excellent record of race relations between Europeans and Africans but between the various indigenous ethnic groups. This happy position is typified by the President of the Republic, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who comes neither from the majority tribe nor the dominant religion of the country, but is a Serer and Catholic. Furthermore he is married to a French woman.

563 162 Senegal has six major ethnic groups accounting for all but 130,000 of its population of 3,100,000. The last census figures gave the Wolof as the largest ethnic group with 35 per cent, followed by the Fula with 17 per cent, the Serer, 16 per cent, Toucouleur, 9 per cent, Diola, 9 per cent, and the Mandingo 7 per cent.

[p 76]

184 563 [631] this homogeneity by reducing the traditional authority of the chiefs who more than anyone else are responsible for the preservation of ethnic differences, in being the repositories of tribal customs.

For Senegal as a whole, this homogeneity does not go beyond similarities in socio-political structure, a common adherence to Islam, uniformity in styles of dress, a tradition of common relationship and a growing use of Wolof as a lingua franca. Only in the larger towns has there been
563 [369] any general break-down of traditional tribal barriers and only in the town does one find a high incidence of inter-ethnic habitation and, more important still, inter-ethnic marriage. And since it was mainly in the towns that the French applied their policy of assimilation it is reasonable to assume that there is probably some correlation between the two. In the first place the French in Senegal have always tended to think of the local inhabitants as Senegalese rather than Wolof or Serer, which runs contrary to the common European attitude to ethnic divisions, particularly in British territories where the tendency was always to emphasise the tribal origin of an African rather than the colony in which he lived. Indeed the British administrators, as Lord Lugard himself observed, were always great partisans of particular ethnic groups. Such an attitude, however, has not always been absent in Senegal. For instance Mercier has remarked that certain European foremen in factories tended to choose workers of the same ethnic group in order to avoid possible friction, but he adds that this was not always justified.

563 619 [369] In the *Quatre Communes*, which for a long time *were* Senegal as far as the French were concerned, the inhabitants came to accept from early on the idea of being Senegalese as well as Wolof and Serers. Or they might have thought of themselves parochially as St. Louisiens or Dakarois. With their elected deputy, their *Conseil-Général*, and their municipal councils, the Senegalese crossed early on the barrier between tribalism and nationalism, a result for which other African

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962

MS37 Senegal MS37

. Wolof MS30

S 563 about tribe, the women, who in a Muslim society rarely
[582] gained the opportunity of education, tended naturally to
be more conservative in such matters. Nevertheless many
originaires have married outside their ethnic group and can
claim to be Senegalese and Senegalese only, for how else,
they ask, can they describe themselves when one grandparent
is Wolof, another Toucouleur and yet another Serer?
This is by no means common in Senegal, but its highest
S incidence is amongst the most assimilated groups in Senegal.

563 One of the most difficult barriers to break down in African
tribal society is that of the taboo on marriage outside the
582 tribe or clan. Onuora Nzekwu in his *Wand of Noble Wood*
[619] gives a very illuminating study of this problem. In Senegal
[369] however, there is an exceptionally high rate of inter-ethnic
marriage for Africa. Mercier, in his study of Dakar, ob-
W served that the rate of inter-ethnic marriage was below the
[582] Senegalese average amongst the Diola, Serer, and Wolof
where endogamy is clearest, whilst the Bambaras and
groups of the south, and particularly the Lebou who are
inter-marrying increasingly with the Wolof, were above the
average. Out of 696 monogamous families investigated,
71 per cent had married a woman of the same tribe, but
the figure of 29 per cent for mixed marriages must be
S considered extremely high for Africa. Out of 228 polyg-
[595] amous families interviewed 43 per cent were all of the same
ethnic group but 57 per cent had at least one wife of differ-
ent ethnic origin. The highest incidence of inter-ethnic
S marriages in Dakar occurs amongst clerks, administrators,
[369] employees of commercial houses and the professional classes,
i.e. those who have been most affected by French assimil-
ation and for whom ethnic considerations are considerably
S less important than for the peasant, who is so much closer
[619] to the traditional concepts of the tribe. There is then in
Dakar, and one could apply this to other main towns, a
S significant increase in inter-ethnic marriages, though as
[369] far as Senegal as a whole is concerned ethnic considerations
[582] in marriage are still very important. But the multiplication

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

of inter-ethnic marriages in the towns is indicative of a major social change and a reflection of the effects of an assimilationist policy on the Senegalese. S 369 563 [582]

Though many communities in Dakar are based on ethnic and family ties, particularly amongst the immigrant Toucouleurs from the Vallée du Fleuve, Dakar is on the whole a heterogeneous city. Mercier has observed that inter-ethnic habitation is particularly frequent among young bachelors, who often club together to hire a room. S [589] [591] This is still relatively rare in Africa except amongst educated élites. But in Senegal many young men resent being asked the question whether they are Wolof or Serer, answering only to the name Senegalese. S [619] As far as friendship outside the ethnic group and in particular living with someone from another tribe is concerned, one great advantage is the existence of a common cuisine for Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur and Lebou. S [262] There is even a national dish known as *riz sénégalais*, known further down the coast as Jollof rice. W [262] This means that not only can friends share the same plate, but a man is not frustrated in his desire to marry outside his ethnic group by fear of a foreign cuisine.

Another important factor in the breakdown of tribal barriers has been the urbanisation of Senegal. Over 25 per cent of the population live in towns, the bulk in Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis and Kaolack. S 369 [619] [162] This represents a higher rate of urbanisation than in any other West African territory except the Western Region of Nigeria, where, it must be pointed out, urbanisation was intense long before the arrival of the Europeans and therefore does not owe its origin to colonisation as it does in Senegal. It is difficult in the present stage of research to measure the results of the inter-mixing of races in urban agglomerations. S [563] But in an environment whose *raison d'être* is completely different from that of the tribal village, the individual is subjected to so many pressures that his ethnic individuality has to be extremely strong for him not to assimilate both ideas and customs from his neighbours and above all from the

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

S 369 563

French. The Moors are an obvious exception to this, as P. Dubié has pointed out. Though they work in all the major towns of Senegal they have retained complete identity of tribal customs, even maintaining abroad the traditional hostilities between their own tribal subdivisions. The tribal structure of Dakar, which is the most heavily industrialised single city in West Africa, gives an idea of the common melting pot that the new cities and towns in Senegal represent: Wolof constitute 25 per cent; Lebou, the original inhabitants, 15 per cent; mixed Wolof-Lebou, 11 per cent; Serer, 3 per cent; Bambara, 9 per cent; Toucouleur, 10 per cent; Fula, 5 per cent; Moors, 4 per cent; Diola, 5 per cent; Soussou, 2 per cent; Cape Verdians 2 per cent. The result is that the inhabitants of Dakar are forced to learn some form of *lingua franca*, in this case Wolof or French, if they are to live in the city.

W [369] S [162] S [197]

In the modern economy of the city, where one seeks work where work is and where housing is short and expensive, it is difficult for any of these groups to keep up any pretence at tribal solidarity. However, as Schapera has shown, it is possible for the African migrant working in industry 'to maintain two quite distinct spheres of human relations. The African who leaves his tribe to go and work in the town will take part in the social organisations, e.g. trade unions, he finds there, but these will affect him only as a factory worker, and will have no place in the subsistence economy which is governed by traditional tribal and social relationships. The two spheres are distinct spatially as wellas socially, and despite the exchange of ideas between them they remain none the less parallel.'

S [164]

In Dakar this is particularly true of the immigrant Toucouleur from the Vallée du Fleuve, as A. Diop shows in his excellent study of Toucouleur immigration to Dakar. But it should be noted here that the Toucouleur are not permanent emigrants from their areas, and have only come to Dakar temporarily to supplement the low incomes of the Vallée du Fleuve. Permanent settlers without the ultimate

goal of return to their tribal home, even Toucouleur, 369
find it more difficult to resist the pressures of their environment, 563
and Dakar has a large number of permanent settlers,
who are first and foremost *Dakarois*.

Many of these have found a common brotherhood above 467
tribe in their trade unions. These, despite various setbacks 563
and restrictions, have been well organised in Senegal.
Indeed the 1944 decree restoring liberty of association did
much to ensure this, by insisting that trade union officials
should have good educational qualifications and that
accounts should be scrutinised by the administration.
Most of the unions belonged to one of the large French
confederations from whom they received considerable
help and advice. Since Senegal has until quite recently
had over 40 per cent of the organised workers of French
West Africa, trade unionism embraced a large number of
people of different ethnic groups brought together to seek
ends that went far beyond the limited horizons of tribal
ambition.

The influence of the towns extends beyond their limits. 369
Both in the cities, and increasingly in the villages, young [595]
men who have come in contact with the new life of Dakar or
of the other major towns tend to contract monogamous
marriages in the European style. Amongst the Diola,
as L. V. Thomas has observed, young men are now building [591]
their own houses outside the parental extended home. But
probably most important of all in the breakdown of tribal
barriers is the increase of economic individualism, the desire
to have possessions, and particularly good clothes, all of [422]
which run contrary to the traditional social system which
leads to the maximum dispersion of a man's gains amongst
his relatives.

Only the very strongest survive the effect of the city, 369
in particular a city like Dakar, the most sophisticated, the 563
most European, the city most diametrically opposed to the
tribal life of the bush. Indeed among Dakar's inhabitants
only the Moors and Toucouleur really withstand the

● S 369 563 immense impact of the town. They[7] live in small villages
made up of relations and fellow villagers. They even club
together, subscribing to a common fund to receive their
S [463] fellows from the Fleuve, and as far as work is concerned they
virtually monopolise certain jobs such as bootboys, waiters,
and newspaper sellers. This maintenance of tribal cohesion
is a difficult task in this city of French creation, where a new
community of Dakarois is rapidly coming into existence.

S 665 563 [619] [182] An important factor in the breakdown of tribal ties
has been the creation of political parties and the creation
of a new political élite that thinks in national terms.
Experience in Africa has shown, however, that this can work
two ways, for many political parties are in effect organisations intended to defend ethnic interests. Senegalese
politics have on the whole been remarkably free from
tribalism, though Senghor did in fact achieve much of
his success in the early days of the *B.D.S.* though the
emphasis he laid on ethnic considerations in the organisations
of his party, and certainly there have existed specifically
regional and ethnic parties like *Le Mouvement Démocratique
Casamançais* and the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.*
But, as Kenneth Robinson pointed out in his study of
Senegalese politics in *Five Elections in Africa*, these ethnic
and regional aspects were compensated for by the federal
aspect of the major party, *Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.*
In 1954, in fact, all ethnic and regional sub-sections
of the *B.D.S.* were abolished and individual membership
was insisted on. But though this led to the breaking-away
of certain elements in the Casamance, it would be fair to
say that the party has been much less dominated by those
regional differences that normally influence political parties
in West Africa. Nevertheless, as Robinson found in the 1957
S [666] election, there were a number of constituencies where
ethnic rivalries were more important than political issues.
W. [666] [665] At Linguère, a single member constituency, the population
was divided between Fula and Wolof in the proportion
of three to two. When the sitting member, a Fula, was

[7] [i.e., The Moors and Toucouleurs in Dakar--Analyst]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

433 reaching economic development plan. Mamadou Dia
668 has described the plan as the 'décollage' or taking-off
point of the country's development. The plan is the expression of the African socialism of which Senghor and Dia
have so long dreamed. It has two important points.
Relatively little emphasis is placed on industrialisation,
and fundamental to the development of the country are
[474] 'rural animation' and co-operatives through which the
people will be made aware of the great future that could be
theirs if only they co-operate in the realisation of this
plan. Already 80 per cent of peasant farmers are organised
in co-operatives.

Senegal's economy is based today on the export of its
ground-nut crop of just under 800,000 tons a year. This
has been produced to the detriment of subsistence crops,
with the absurd result that Senegal, a basically agricultural
country, is importing foodstuffs to the tune of £15 million
a year. Furthermore there has been a great disparity in
the economic and social development of the towns in com-
[369] parison with the bush. Thus whilst Dakar is one of the most
modern and prosperous towns in West Africa, the Vallée
du Fleuve is abysmally poor and Casamance hitherto
neglected. Thus the emphasis is on rural development; the
[871] extension of educational facilities to a population only 30
per cent of whose children go to school; then the increase
in medical facilities; the supply of water to villages without
it; and in particular the opening-up of hitherto neglected
regions by improved communications, which includes the
[491] tarring of over 1,000 miles of roads and improvement of
600 miles of dirt road. But above all the emphasis is on the
increase of home food crops and the widening of the variety
of foodstuffs available to the peasants. It is estimated that
if the plan works out, then the global index of production,
taken as 100 in 1959, will be up to 137 in 1964. New industries such as the phosphate works at Taiba, an oil refinery,
chemical factories and textile printing works will provide
10,000 new jobs, and thus absorb some of the unemployed

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

EVOLUTION OF SENEGALESE ELITES

P. Mercier

571
178

The increasingly rapid development of elites[1] of a non-traditional type is a conspicuous feature of the social change now occurring in all African territories. It is a sign of the most recent phase of the crisis through which colonized societies are passing. The problems connected with the crystallization[2] of such elites vary considerably in different regions and in different economic, political and social contexts. Even inside the group of territories composing French West Africa appreciable local variations can be observed. But everywhere these elites exert ever stronger and more united pressure on existing politico-social organizations in the hope of attaining to the leadership they feel to be their destiny. Wherever we study them, we find the same situation—fraught with conflict: conflict with the existing African social system imposed by colonization; conflict with the traditional ruling classes or what remains of them; internal conflict, when the elites do not—as yet, at any rate—form a homogeneous group, or, alternatively, when divergent trends appear. The same phenomena can be found everywhere, and go to make up a general pattern. [578]

If, however, we wish to understand the discrepancies observed in the pace at which the new elites developed, their composition, their methods and capacity for self-expression, their ambitions, etc., we must study the differences between them. Among the criteria applicable in a first attempt to classify the various regional situations, the following appear to me to be the most important:

1. Extension of education. We have to take into account both a territory's crude school rate and, among other facts: any divergencies between the rates reached by different regions of the same territory; inequalities in the distribution of school facilities on racial, religious or other grounds, the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds and degrees of education, the distribution of the school population classified by sex, etc.
2. Types and degree of economic development, i.e. whether or not it has permitted the emergence of social categories well-integrated in modern economic life, and, in particular, with the capacity for investing money: rich farmers (mainly planters), merchants, entrepreneurs, etc.;[3] whether or not an embryonic working class has emerged in urban centres (an elite of manual workers more or less closely linked to the intellectual elite and anxious to assume leadership of a pseudo-proletariat[4] of casual labourers).[5]
3. Role of the traditional structures and social grades. The traditional political, religious and other systems have more or less succeeded in holding their own and the governing classes which made them work have been able to

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[1] The word 'elite' is used here in a very broad sense. It does not mean a ruling class, but a social category more or less enjoying prestige status and exerting influence, by its example, over the whole or large sections of the population.

[2] Crystallization which does not necessarily result in the formation of well-knit groups.

[3] The Ivory Coast offers the most typical example of such development.

[4] In most cases, it maintains close ties with the district or the group from which it came.

[5] The classic example is that of the Senegalese towns.

[369]

standing in the modern context does not often completely redeem a traditional 571
inferiority. The latter obviously does not prevent accession to such rank, 178
but it does prevent a man from reaping the full benefit of the prestige which [554]
it confers. We shall have to revert to the ambiguity which thus characterizes
individual situations, because it is an important aspect of the problem of the
modernist elites. The old political organizations have either been destroyed
or considerably weakened, though the prestige of the aristocratic families who
hold the chefferies or are closely connected with them has not completely
disappeared. But an important change has occurred: the power and influence [631]
of the traditional political chiefs has to a large extent been transferred to
the khalifas of the great Islamic sects;[1] the latter represent today the principal [793]
force capable of resisting the modernist elite, and the one with which the latter
and the political movements identified with it must to some extent come to
terms.[2]

The changes due to the new economic conditions resulting from the colonial
period can be discerned at several levels. The rural economy has been radically
transformed—progressive abandonment of subsistence farming in favour of [433]
a single cash crop throughout a large part of the territory.[3] In contrast with
regions where a plantation economy has developed, the average farmer's
income has remained extremely low. Consequently, what has elsewhere been
termed a 'rural bourgeoisie' has not emerged, and the most favoured economic
categories coincide, by and large, with the upper strata of the traditional or
semi-traditional type (heads of sects),[4] or with those artificially created on the
same model by the colonial administration. Again, the group to which the
name 'commercial bourgeoisie' has been given is still too small to have much
influence;[5] almost all African traders are small shopkeepers and make no
appreciable impact on the affairs of the community as a whole. The most
significant changes are found at another level: urbanization and industrialization. [369]
Senegal is the most highly urbanized territory of French West Africa; [762]
about a quarter of the population live in the big towns and the administrative
and trading centres. A very large wage-earning class with a steadily growing
nucleus of stable labour has developed.[6] A workers' elite has appeared, and
intensive trade union activity in the big towns has brought this class into [467]
touch with the educated elite (the administrative bourgeoisie, etc.).

This educated elite deserves special attention; in Senegal more than elsewhere,
it represents the dominant element among the modernist elites. The educational [871]
policy was definitely conceived and organized at the beginning of the colonial
period in the context of a policy and a ideology of assimilation. The educational
curriculum introduced in the French establishments in Senegal at the beginning
of the nineteenth century was essentially foreign to the tradition and culture
of the autochthonous societies. Thus, in a recent paper, the author made much 571
of the point that 'it was not a factor making for integration of the individual 178
in his group, but rather—at any rate in the first historical phase—one making
for a break. The adaptation of the curriculum and even of teaching methods 871

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[1] Their functions are hereditary.

[2] Cf. below, remarks on the political parties of the traditional type.

[3] In this case, groundnuts.

[4] The economic role of the Mouride brotherhood is particularly important: colonization of new lands, experiments in mechanization, etc. [793]

[5] The middle-man trade is practically monopolized by the Lebanese colony; in the town of Dakar alone there are more than 5,000 Lebanese. [369]

[6] The region of Dakar alone has more than 30,000 wage earners in the private sector. [762]

[563]

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

571 178 871 to the African social environment was scarcely taken into consideration. The fact that the African languages were, and still are, totally excluded, even in the lowest school classes, brings out this tendency quite clearly, whatever the jutification that may have been offered on practical grounds. The original policy has of course been relaxed in certain points; the principle of adjusting the French educational system to local conditions has been accepted—the adaptations being concerned however more with the physical than with the social and human framework. But the basic tendency remains.'

571 178 However, the schools could reach—and still reach—only a fraction of the population. And so the training of an 'elite' came soon to be regarded as a necessary first stage in the process of assimilation. The two ideas emerge closely intertwined in Faidherbe's famous declaration of 1860: 'Everyone can reach the same goal when he satisfies the conditions required of all of you alike, conditions which we are today putting within your reach. You see young men from the Christian families of Saint-Louis, who after a good start in the mission schools, go and continue their studies in a secondary school in France, come back fit for filling the highest positions in the colony. That road is open to you all alike. We are ready to facilitate access to the liberal professions for every child who shows exceptional talent at school. . . .' As a matter of fact, those, as yet few in number, who at the start of the colonial period received instruction on Western lines were supposed to be the answer to immediate, limited needs. The main object was to train interpreters, lower grade civil servants, clerks, etc., as the indispensable auxiliaries in the establishment of a colonial administrative and commercial system. Their role was a humble one, but they shared in the prestige of the European group and also, to some extent, in its privileged economic position. The notion of an elite rapidly acquired a wider and hazier signification; it came to cover all those who were thought to serve as a link between the colonizers, the bearers of civilization, and the untaught masses who were destined gradually to acquire it. In fact, the eager adoption of European values, and the acceptance of ! assimilationist policies characteristic of the period up to the last war, accentuated the trend towards a rift between the indigenous elite and the masses who still adhered to their traditional cultural and social systems.[1] [369] [871] [554] A point deserving emphasis is the considerable attraction exerted by the centres of assimilation, notably the 'four communes',[2] the natives of which very soon received French citizenship, and in which education developed much more rapidly than elsewhere.[3] These events in the recent history of Senegal explain why prestige in modern times was focused on the 'intellectual' elite,[4] and why the latter made a considerable impact on that colony sooner than they did on the other French West African territories.

[369] Intensive investigations have been made in the principal urban centres of Senegal[5] to ascertain the aspirations of the various population classes and the models they adopt. They cover adults as well as children. More summary samplings taken in rural surroundings show that there is less difference in this matter between the city and the country than might have been supposed.

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[1] Firm links subsisted, however, as will be seen later on.

[2] Dakar, Gorée, Saint-Louis, Rufisque.

[3] Multiplication of primary schools, introduction of secondary education, etc.

[4] Taken in a very broad sense; for a long time, the mean type of this new intellectual elite was the *certifié* (the holder of the primary school certificate).

[5] By the sociology section of the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

This is a significant fact; high prestige, more or less definitely acknowledged 571
by the whole population, crystallizes around professions, functions or situations
which are considered to be 'intellectual'—implying in fact a minimum of 178
Western-type learning. Prestige on economic grounds seems to be definitely 369
on the decline.[1] At Dakar, Thiès and Saint-Louis du Sénégal, adults were
questioned about the trade or occupation they would like their children to 554
take up. A vast majority of the socio-vocational categories (unskilled and 463
skilled workers, traders, clerks, civil servants, etc.) from which the population
sample under study was taken gave the same answer. Between 65 and 80 per
cent mentioned an intellectual profession. Those most frequently cited were
teaching (primary or secondary school teacher) and the liberal professions
(lawyer, doctor, etc.); the technological professions (engineer etc.) were much
more rarely specified.[2] One of the commonest answers was that vague but
highly significant term, 'civil servant'. The fact is that the trend of education
in the period before 1945 helped to establish a very close link between education
and a job in the administration; this is still the case, despite the changes [641]
effected in the last few years. Similar attitudes are found in the results of
surveys among children in the primary schools at Dakar. Among those who
replied specifically[3]—about three-quarters of the children questioned—more
than 80 per cent expressed a preference for an occupation considered to be
intellectual, irrespective of their father's occupation; next came certain
manual trades, with commerce far behind. The choice of an unspecified
administrative job was less frequent than among the adults. It follows that the
view generally taken about education—including primary education—viz.
that it will lead almost inevitably to an intellectual occupation,[4] however
modest, remains very stable; but it is less and less in keeping with the realities
of the situation.

A brief study of the facts in the development of the educational system 871
will allow us to make a first evaluation of the system. The crude school rate
rose rapidly from 1946 to 1953 and has since continued to rise pretty regularly 178
(16 per cent in 1953, 18 per cent in 1954, about 20 per cent in 1955). Senegal's 571
early advance in this respect explains why the increase is less steep there than
in most of the other French West African territories.[5] True, the school rate is
still relatively low (and a fairly large proportion of the children do not complete
even the primary course and will probably soon lose such learning as they
have acquired), but a plateau was reached several years ago: primary education
turns out many more pupils than the 'administrative bourgeoisie'—characteristic
of the colonial period—or its equivalent in private enterprise can absorb.
Formerly, the surplus of the educated population could be absorbed by the
manual trades or by migration to other territories. But this second door is
gradually closing now that these other territories are catching up in education.
Moreover, the slow pace of economic expansion precludes any big increase
in the number of openings for technical workers or in the supervisory grades in
industry.[6] This is the justification for the talk about the educational over-

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[1] Material security (e.g. that enjoyed by civil servants) seems to be desired more often than actual wealth. [556]

[2] They are only beginning to acquire some prestige; the number of students choosing this branch has risen considerably in recent years.

[3] Children from 10 to 14, in the 'intermediate' classes.

[4] A job in the bureaucracy was for years the standard aim.

[5] The school rate in the Ivory Coast almost trebled between 1946 and 1953.

[6] Limited, but chronic unemployment, already exists in Dakar.

[464]

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

571 equipment of Senegal in relation to the existing employment market. These 178 facts must, however, be considered from another angle. The real problems are those of the true integration of education into a developing social environ- 871 ment, its adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the Senegalese people's conception of education. These problems look, of course, more acute in the big towns, particularly in the former 'centres of assimilation',[1] which have often reached a relatively high school rate (sometimes more than 50 per cent); in many rural districts the [369] critical phase is still a long way off. Recent changes in the position are marked by another important feature to which I shall revert at greater length: the difference in the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds of education. The past 10 years have been marked by the development of secondary and technical education, and the introduction of local higher education. At the beginning of 1955, pupils and students were distributed approximately as follows among the different types of education: 87 per cent in primary schools, 9 per cent in secondary schools, 2 per cent in vocational training schools, 2 per cent in higher education and its various equivalents.[2] At the same time education in French West Africa ceased to be an almost isolated system providing degrees and diplomas which were not recognized in metropolitan France and qualified their holders only for subordinate positions in most occupations.[3] The intellectual elite is becoming steadily more diversified. Its ideals are being noticeably modified; some of its prestige values are being revised; the masses are beginning to change their idea of what they mean by the elite. This is a transitional stage, with its own special tensions.

178 At this stage in the development of education—the outstanding fact in 571 which is that, particularly in the urban primary schools, the demand exceeds the supply[4]—the signs are already fairly evident of a trend towards less mobility 369 in the social scale. The prospects of reaching the ranks conferring most prestige [871] differ in the towns and the rural zones, for the reasons already indicated. They are also tending to be less evenly distributed among the various sections of the urban population as the latter becomes more diversified. It is not, however, a case of the urban population breaking up into closed or nearly closed groups; none of the discernible social categories are of this character, nor can they be in any way likened to social classes.[5] In particular, relations based on kinship in the widest sense of the term continue to play a fundamental [602] role, and maintain in being close ties among all the individuals composing the family group. Severance of these relations occurs only in extreme cases. Nevertheless, a trend towards the crystallization of social categories does appear, through the mere accumulation of circumstances.[6] The problem has been studied in a recent work the principal points of which I will venture to recall.[7] A survey of the urban district of Dakar—confirmed by later research [963] in other cities—showed certain significant differences in the social origins of

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[1] The 'four communes' mentioned above.

[2] Including young people studying in France.

[3] Even in teaching, medicine, etc.

[4] In Dakar it became necessary to establish part-time classes to meet an over-rapid increase in demand.

[5] Cf. P. Mercier, 'Aspects de la Stratification Sociale dans l'Ouest Africain' (*Aspects of social stratification in West Africa*), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XVII, 1954.

[6] Studied, e.g. by G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires* (Sociology of the coloured population of Brazzaville), Paris, 1955.

[7] Cf. P. Mercier, op. cit.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

the individuals questioned; and these differences are likely to become sharper— 178 45 per cent were farmers' sons, but considerable variations appeared according 571 to the socio-vocational category. The proportion of unskilled workers was 80 per cent; it was only 42 per cent for skilled workers and craftsmen; still 369 lower (33 per cent) for civil servants and subordinate office employees (the widest category of the 'administrative bourgeoisie' characteristic of the colonial 463 period), 28 per cent for senior clerks and civil servants;[1] for members of the liberal professions in the widest sense[2] it was no more than 21 per cent. These last three categories taken as a whole represent the 'intellectual professions', according to the meaning still ascribed by the great majority of Senegalese to that phrase. Of those who had a father already in one of these professions, three-quarters were engaged in the same work. The same process of stabilization can, however, be observed, though less clearly, among specialized workers; of those whose father was a worker, nearly two-thirds still belonged to the same class; most of the others had been absorbed into the 'administrative bourgeoisie'. These, moreover, are the two chief categories,[3] from which there has emerged a new type of elite which really began to grow in size only after the last war.

Important changes in outlook, not only in Senegal, but in the whole of 178 French West Africa, have accompanied this most recent historical phase. From the elite of the strictly colonial type as defined above there has begun 571 to emerge—and even to take on separate existence—a new intellectual elite, still a relatively small group.[4] This elite, which might be termed that of the [463] liberal professions—this time in the strict sense of the phrase—having a distinctly higher level of education and more definite professional competence, is able to lay claim to a quantity of posts until now almost exclusively held by Europeans. The category was not completely non-existent during the pre-war period; it developed earlier in Senegal than in the other French West African territories as a result of Senegal's possession of an embryonic [873] system of secondary education.[5] Being numerically weak, this elite had an opportunity of associating, to a certain extent, with the European population, a fact which manifestly lessened its prospects of playing an active role and assuming the leadership of the African masses. Furthermore, it continued to follow the policy of assimilation and was the only element in the 'colonial elite' which succeeded in achieving it. It could find only a limited field of action in the political life of the 'four communes'. It consisted mainly of lawyers, a few members of the teaching profession and doctors and even a few administrators. It doubtless set an example for a colonial elite of a far inferior grade from which it was not entirely cut off; it showed them the road to be taken by the seeker after modern knowledge. Prestige of the kind hitherto enjoyed [554] only by Europeans was transferred to them and was thus seen to be no longer out of reach and so engendered ideas of power—a share, even if limited, of political and administrative powers—and wealth, or material security, at the lowest. This role continued to develop after the war, though with a rather abrupt change of direction.

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[1] i.e. those holding posts of responsibility, regardless of their educational level.
[2] Notably, teaching, medicine, etc.
[3] The first, especially.
[4] Only a few hundred individuals, including members of the 'colonial elite' who were belatedly given fresh opportunities for completing their studies and reaching a higher status.
[5] Lycée at Saint-Louis, later at Dakar.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

p. 450

178 571 masses, it found in the 'colonial elite' the go-between it needed for the resumption of contact to which it aspired.

The activity of this new elite is beginning to be discernible in its political and trade union work, and its basic aspirations can be defined. 665 178 571 As has already been said, a Western-type political life was introduced fairly early in one part of Senegal. Political parties were formed; after 1946, their influence extended throughout the territory. In a recent paper[1] we stated that they had become, in the 'four communes', an almost traditional part of the social system. Once they reached the whole of Senegal, they acquired an enormous body of followers, the divisions among whom reflected successively—or simultaneously, according to the district—a number of historical, social, ethnic and family rifts. Thus, the antagonism between the Socialist party and the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, which has been a salient factor over recent years, did but reproduce according to time and place, the antagonism between former 'citizens' and former 'subjects', Ouolof and non-Ouolof, Moslems and Catholics, one Moslem sect and another, etc. On the whole, the 'colonial elite' has assumed the leadership of these parties.[2] But recent surveys have shown that, in the urban centres at any rate, membership in a political party might ● [369] be commoner among the illiterate elements than among the 'educated'. This is a clear indication of the gap between the political parties and the present ambitions of the elites. A strongly held local position or the prestige of certain leaders is the reason why the traditional parties, though ill adapted to the present situation, have succeeded in keeping afloat. However, the waning influence of the Socialist party (the oldest organized party) was the sign after 1950 of the start of a new phase. The young elite from the liberal professions, followed by numerous young members of the 'colonial elite', remained markedly aloof from these movements, which seemed to efford no opportunity for the political action in which they intended to engage. Their sympathies went to a movement of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain type, although they were unable to impose it because of the strong positions held by the traditional parties. Yet some of the more influential members of this young elite finally decided to join the Senegalese party which seemed to have the strongest hold over the popular masses, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.[3] There, they will doubtless play an important role. The point has been reached at which the new elite is seeking to take over the torch from the 'colonial elite', but with political ambitions of a much more radical nature; I shall consider later the ideological aspects of the problem. In the case of the trade unions, 460 178 571 the position is slightly different. Their activity,[4] of recent origin, soon acquired deeper significance. The more energetic elements of the 'administrative bourgeoisie', in alliance with the still small working-class elite, embarked in the trade unions on a course of action which was more directly effective than that of the political parties.[5] The climate of thought, directly or indirectly influenced by theories of Marxist origin, favoured the growth of an awareness of the 'colonial situation'. In this respect, however, the new intellectual elite played

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[1] Cf. P. Mercier, *An Experimental Investigation conducted by means of Questionnaires in the town of Dakar*, report presented to the Conference on the Social Impact of Industrialization and Urban Problems, organized by Unesco at Abidjan, 1954.

[2] As have, needless to say, certain members of an elite formed from the liberal professions, which had already emerged before the war.

[3] In which they represent the 'left' wing.

[4] Most of the unions are affiliated to the trade union federations in France.

[5] And more resolutely modernist in its outlook.

2

The Revolution

494 OUR bus had been travelling across monotonous scrub
country for several hours. The road was excellent, but the
journey uncomfortable in the heat of the afternoon sun. The goats
on the roof had not stopped screaming since we left Kaolak and
the hair of two Mauretanian women sitting in front of me
302 exuded a suffocating odour of rancid butter, with which it was
greased, attracting a large swarm of flies. The bus had a drowsy
lethargic atmosphere in which we could neither sleep nor think.

After we had been travelling for what seemed an eternity, the
133 skyline was broken by some small hills, covered with lemon-leafed
trees. I cannot adequately describe the visual relief those
hills afforded. For their significance, they might have been
mountains. Towards evening we left these hills behind us and our
road quite suddenly came upon the sea, which stretched out
before us an undecided compromise between grey and blue. Its
[361] shore was skirted by mud huts, from which hung long fishing
nets, tied to gaily painted canoes.

361 There was a sudden stir in the front of the bus. A voice cried:
369 'Dakar, ici Dakar.' I looked beyond the fretwork silhouette of the
fishing village, beyond the cold grey of the sea to an incredible
backdrop: a vast city of giant houses, gleaming in the late sun,
rode the horizon like some fantastic flotilla of the future.

'Dakar, ici Dakar.' The voice cried once more and the excited
passengers took up the refrain.

Our bus pulled up into a large lorry station, in a part of
[498] Dakar whose resemblance to the Motte-Picquet-Grenelle suburb
of Paris immediately struck me, except that Africans had been
substituted for Algerians. At once there was a mad scramble to get

Dakar
Wolof MS30

out of the bus and it was only with difficulty that Arnold and I S 369
managed to extricate ourselves. We took a taxi, at almost greater 361
cost than the journey from Kaolak to Dakar, to a dingy little [494]
hotel, in the old quarter of the city. To reach it we passed through
the centre of Dakar. Trees lined the streets and the architecture of
both offices and houses was admirably suited to its tropical setting.
It was at once evident that Dakar was a city and not just a town
that had, like Lagos, rambled and sprawled and got too big. With
its statuesque young skyscrapers and its wide streets, Dakar
seemed a model city for the new West Africa. It was neither
distinctly African nor European, but had its affinity with the
modern cities of South America.

Arnold, accustomed to the higgledy-piggledy, chaotic sprawl S 369
of Lagos, and the quiet Victorian dignity of Freetown, could not
quite take this in. He seemed almost to resent it as an imposition
on Africa, as something that was not African. True, I found that
against this background the African appeared, at first, to be an
intruder. Nothing seemed more incongruous than a vast Jollof W [291]
belle, dressed in her traditional robes of lace and muslin, sweeping
past the more outrageous examples of *cinema moderna* architecture,
or standing pensively beneath a marble plaque depicting a
naked African surrounded by the fruits of progress. More
incongruous still was the sight of them being spooned in and out
of fast American cars or staring into patisserie windows—just
imagine one of those muslin cocoons tackling a chocolate éclair.
Yet the Africans seemed to have accepted their surroundings with
such aplomb that very soon I was to feel that it was the Europeans
who were out of place. There seemed nothing unnatural in
half a dozen Africans making up their bed for the night on the
pavement outside a twelve-story bank, or the young men in
tight jeans standing on the street corners eyeing passing girls,
just like Saturday night back at the Buildings.

We stayed one night in the Hotel des Fleurs, the cheapest I S [366]
could find in Dakar. It was owned by a Lebanese, and for Dakar, [563]
a city which is almost prohibitive in price for an Englishman, it was [511]
remarkably cheap. A haircut in Dakar is 12s., and it has one of the
highest cost of living indices in the world.

That night when I entered a bar called appropriately 'Café de S [875]
Paris', I was unable to believe that we were still in Africa. It had

Dakar

369 275 all the accoutrements of a Montmartre bistro, together with a large, bad painting of the Sacré Coeur above the bar. Drinks were served by a tall barmaid, with long flaxen hair and make-up applied so that she looked like a German-doll. The clientele was mainly composed of soldiers from the barracks by the sea-front, but at our table sat two elegant Jollof girls, both very drunk. [548] They made it fairly clear they were prostitutes and it was not long before a policeman came to arrest the more intoxicated of the two. She spat, screamed furiously and struggled to break away. Just as she was about to enter the car, she demanded: 'Let me finish my drink.' She was allowed to return to her table, where she drank her beer slowly, eyeing us all as if we were vermin. Then just as slowly, with the comic dignity that comes so naturally to a drunk, she swept to her feet, stood with her henna'd hands on her hips, spat with incredible accuracy at the feet of a nearby soldier and shouted in a voice ringing with anger, and looking at us with contempt: 'Salauds.'

Then an African sergeant came in, asked for a drink, which [563] the flaxen doll served him. She served African and European alike. I found this hard to believe after the Gambia, where no white woman could serve drinks behind a bar to Europeans, let alone to Africans.

369 563 Next morning, I was even more surprised when Arnold took me into a large department store and pointed to the counter-girls. Seventy-five per cent of them were white. Outside a Frenchwoman was selling vegetables at a small stall. Of course, in this respect Dakar is exceptional for West Africa. It is the only city with a large population of Colons. Over 25,000 Europeans live [162] there. They came from every walk of life and have more affinity with the Colons of Algeria than anything else one can cite on the Coast. You can walk into the most ramshackle bar and yet be served by a Parisienne. You will find poor whites living in the Médina, as the African quarter is known. Each year, 'Les Girls' from a Paris night club do a season at the *Bodega*. The N'Gor Hotel and the 'Croix du Sud' are as fine as you will find in France. Dakar's Colons have re-created Paris in Africa. Most of them have never ventured out of the city, and if they had to go into 'the bush' they would probably prepare for it as though they were Mungo Park setting out to discover the Niger.

Dakar
Wolof MS 30

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Arnold was critical of these Colons, for in British West Africa there is no such class. Indeed he seemed almost to resent their presence, though he has no dislike of Europeans. His opinion is shared by a number of Africans who come into competition with whites for jobs. 369 563

'In Lagos the counter girls are African. Why shouldn't they be here?' Arnold argued.

On the other hand in Lagos service and shopping facilities are infinitely inferior to those of Dakar. Another thing that struck Arnold was the absence of Africans from the main cafés and hotels. Surely this indicated a subtle colour bar, he argued. However, I had the answer to this from an African whom I invited to have a drink in a café with me. He declined, because as a Muslim it would not do for him to be seen in a café by any of his friends or relations. If they did see him there would be terrible trouble. S [873 369]

The Jollofs, Dakar's main tribe, are proud of their race and not over-keen on mixing with whites. Nevertheless relations between African and European in Dakar are extremely cordial. France is still aware of the debt that she owes the Senegalese troops for their part in the last war. There is, moreover, none of the patronizing attitude in the French approach to the African. If anything, as many French complain, the Jollof is the one who does the patronizing. W [563]

We went from the Hotel de Fleurs to some rooms in IFAN, the Institut Français D'Afrique Noire, which were lent us by its Director, Professor Theodore Monod, whom I had met on my last visit to Dakar. Professor Monod is one of the most impressive men I have ever met. He received us both in his large, book-lined office without looking up from his work. We both fumbled and fidgeted nervously studying the pictures on the wall, many of which were religious paintings or texts from the Bible. When I was beginning to feel acutely embarrassed, he looked up from his work revealing a gaunt, hollow face with deep-set piercing eyes, half obscured behind the glass of his horn-rimmed spectacles. I informed him that we had met some two years before, and that I should be grateful for his help on my journey. He looked at me vaguely, smiled, and then suddenly seemed to come into contact with the world we inhabited, and promised to arrange for letters S 123 [815]

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37
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A general view of Dakar, capital of French West Africa

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Wollof women on their way to market in St. Louis



[J 48 (B)]

665 648 little misguided. He handed me a copy of the party manifesto. On the front it read:

> 'At the historic moment of Bandung and of the Colonial and Imperialist system, at the moment when political confusion submerges Black Africa under French domination, our duty as Africans obliges us to bring before the masses of our country the problem of national independence and the transformation of our economy into a socialist economy.'

[204] He also handed me a copy of the party newspaper, *La Lutte*, 'The Battle', which is surprisingly well produced at an intellectual level. It even had an article explaining why Sputnik stayed up. On another page a cartoon demonstrated party feeling towards France: Picture I. Thin, Belsen figure, in casque colonial, sucks from straw the lifeblood of Africa—Picture II. Fatter version of this Frenchman leaves for home, a small Africa behind him.

But the magazine was directed not only against France. Jibes were made at the Minister of the Interior of the Senegal, and at the high wages paid to Ministers. Mahjemout Diop was later arrested on the orders of the Minister of the Interior.

OLD SENEGAL

Dakar—Gorée—St. Louis

369 [491] [361] [175] Our third afternoon in Dakar, Arnold and I took the afternoon ferry to Gorée, a tiny island embraced by the bay of Dakar. This island, which until the turn of the century was better known than Dakar itself, was discovered in 1444 by Dinis Dias, one of the early Portuguese explorers, and commands the entrance to the port of Dakar, so that for long it was prized as the most strategic of islands on the Guinea Coast. Today it is no more than an historical relic, but whether against a clear blue sky or of dark grey rain clouds massing for an assault on the mainland, it serves as a reminded that though in Africa the revolution has taken place largely over the last ten years, its groundwork has been prepared by centuries of contact with Europeans and their way of life.

The small ferry was crammed with trippers, armed with

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37
Goree

expensive cameras and an intriguing assortment of seaside 369
equipment. The boat ploughed through the brisk waters of the bay before it pulled alongside the jetty, at Gorée, where the passengers climbed out with great difficulty because of the swell in the ice-blue waters, so transparent that I could see myriad fish lurking on the sandy bottom. I was cluttered up with cameras, so a tall, light-skinned African helped me on to the jetty. His fine, [563]
almost European features revealed that he was a Fulani, a curious tribe of cattle nomads to be found throughout West Africa. Some of the tribe have settled in the towns, as a superior aristocracy. The young man, a guide book in his hand, introduced himself as Seyni Djibey, and asked me whether this was the first time I had been to Gorée.

'No, I've been here before. Two years ago,' I replied.

'But you're not French,' he remarked with some astonishment. He looked at Arnold. 'I could tell because of him. The clothes he is wearing are not what the French Africans would wear,' he added.

'Where do you come from?' I asked.

'From Niamey, that's in Niger, you know!' he replied.

'Yes, I'm going there,' and before he could ask me why, I asked him a similar question.

'But what are you doing here in Senegal?'

'I just came to look. I had leave from my job, so I decided to spend some money I had saved up, travelling around West Africa. I've already been to Bamako. Next week I'm going to Conakry and Abidjan. I wanted to come here and see what Gorée is like.'

He walked towards the house of a friend to whom I had been given an introduction. The beach was littered with naked bodies, white and black, roasting in the sun that glared through a thin veil of cloud. Overlooking the right-hand wall of the beach was [366]
the picturesque Hostelerie du Chevalier de Boufflers, from which stretched in a generous semi-circle an intricacy of old houses, each one a perfect example of nineteenth-century French colonial architecture, with crumbling plaster façades, slatted shutters, large sash windows and delicately patterned verandas. Old wrought iron lamps clung to the walls of each house, giving a strangely Victorian atmosphere to the narrow street.

Seyni, looking up from his guide book, pointed to an old fort.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37
Goree

369 'That must be the Batterie Nord.'

[699] As we passed a gang of prisoners shuffled through its main gates outside which lay rusting cannons, their barrels stopped with cement. In the shade of palm trees at the entrance to the fort a guard played draughts with one of the local inhabitants, whilst the wives of the prisoners washed clothes or prepared their evening meal. Only the grim bars set deep into the dark stonework of the fort indicated that it was used as a prison: otherwise the entrance to the fort was more like the gate of a Moslem city, such was the coming and going.

I took some photographs and remembered with amusement an account of a former Earl of Scarborough's visit to Gorée in his diary, *The Cruise of the African Witch*, *1890*:

> 'As I was taking a photo of a part of the island a nigger had the audacity to tell me that no one was allowed to photograph in the neighbourhood of the fort, and when I asked him who he was, he said: "Je suis Français". I sent him about his business and he ran to tell the guard in the fort. Europeanized niggers are obnoxious and often intolerable.'

Eighteen-ninety is a long time ago for Dakar and Gorée, though unhappily in East Africa such sentiments are still not out of date.

As I walked down the rubble-filled streets of the island, the occasional perfectly preserved balcony or heavy wooden shutters conjured up vivid memories of the old colonial society that used to inhabit Gorée. Today fat black mammies lean over the balustrades to hang out their washing whilst their naked children play on the rusty cannons encased in the mud and sand of the pavements. From the Rue de Dakar, with its crumbling houses and elegant street lamps, I could see the skyscrapers of the mainland. Above the harbour, fish hawks glided lazily, swooping suddenly with outstretched talons and amazing precision on their prey, whilst in the water bronzed Frenchmen with underwater diving equipment conducted the same operation with less success. In Europe one rarely remarks upon the contrast between
[175] history and the present: the two are so constantly juxtaposed as to
[633] be unworthy of comment. Yet in West Africa, where nearly

Goree

everything seems to have been built within the last half-century, 175
an island like Gorée, full of historical sites, stands to remind one 633
how long Africa and Europe have been in contact. Gorée itself [369]
has been controlled by many masters: the Portuguese from 1444–1595, the Dutch 1597–1677; the French and British at intervals from 1677–1817, when the island was finally ceded to the French by the Treaty of Paris. Many famous explorers including Nuno Tristão, Fernando Po, Bartholomew Dias and Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus, as well as scholars like Camoens and St. Francis Xavier, stayed on the island. A small church was built by Diogo d'Azembuja, the architect of the fort of Elmina on the Gold Coast. The Dutch used Gorée for their trade with the Gold Coast and India, though later it became to its various owners important as a slaving post, as the gracious
Maison des Esclaves, built between 1776–1778, witnesses. I was 567
taken there two years ago by an African guide, through a low, 439
damp tunnel into some squalid little cells whose only source of 175
light was from a small grille facing on to the sea; below was a 633
sheer drop on to Atlantic breakers. Into those cells slavers bundled hundreds of miserable wretches, seized from their villages, as often as not by other Africans. There they were imprisoned, their feet held by the heavy balls and chains that still littered the floor, until a ship was ready to take them to the New World. Often more than half of them died on the Middle Passage, and many died waiting in this house because of cold and damp, or just the lack of will to live.

However, in 1794, when Gorée was in French hands, the Revolutionary Convention abolished slavery, and accordingly deprived Gorée of its main source of income. But in 1802 the law was repealed, only to be reinforced again in 1817, so that ironically Gorée, which had been built into a naval base and the administration headquarters of French West Africa, became a major centre for the suppression of the slave trade.

Towards the end of the century Gorée declined at Dakar's 633
expense. By 1929, from having been one of the Quatre Communes, the others being St. Louis, Rufisque and Dakar, sending representatives to the French National Assembly and enjoying equal rights with Frenchmen, it had so declined in importance that it was incorporated into the Municipality of Dakar.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

369 [633] Today Gorée is a residential suburb of Dakar, where administrators and merchants live. In the hot sun of the afternoon, Gorée, an island of unopened shutters, of lazy negroes passing life away in sleep, and of buildings that look as though they would crumble in one's hands like a hard-baked sand pie, was little more than an historical relic.

Gorée was a dead town. More pathetic, I found, was St. Louis, the capital of the Senegal, which is a dying town. I flew to St. Louis for a week-end, leaving Arnold in Dakar because his attack of dysentery had not yet cleared up.

[361] I loved St. Louis, a quiet little city on an island in the estuary of the river Senegal, which bounds the northern frontier of the territory to which it has given its name. I remembered it clearly from my previous visit, a city with no important industries, and few modern buildings to detract from the quiet serenity of the cool, colonial style houses, heavily shuttered against the fierce sun of the desert. In two years not much had changed. The houses had crumbled a little more, adding to, rather than detracting from its dignity as capital of two territories, a unique honour. The governments of Senegal and neighbouring Mauretania are to be found there.

369 633 But the serenity of this ancient city, which dates back to 1659, that had struck me so forcibly on my first visit two years ago had gone. The Mauretanians' decision to transfer their capital to Nouakchott, in their own territory, was something the St. Louisians could understand, even if it did mean a loss of income to their city. But when their own government decided to move their capital to Dakar, the Federal Capital, the population was profoundly shocked. I found them extremely bitter about it. The provincial calm of the city was for once shattered, and its inhabitants had but one topic—the transfer—and the prospect of seeing their city die, for St. Louis depends largely on the administration for its income.

One man told me with extreme bitterness: 'Dakar has killed Gorée and Rufisque. Now it will kill us.' Since the creation of a port at Dakar, the chief *raison d'être* of St. Louis has been as an administrative centre. Take away the administration and the town could not survive.

My first afternoon in St. Louis I saw M. Valdiodio N'Diaye,

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

Acting Prime Minister of the Senegal, and cousin of Pierre Njie 369 in Bathurst. I asked him what his party would do to save St. 633 Louis from becoming a second Gorée. N'Diaye replied confidently: 'My government intends to build up St. Louis as a new and prosperous economic centre for the Senegal valley, just as Kaolak is the centre of the Saloum and Zuiginchor of the Casamance. We plan to build a great dam at Dagana which will open up the Senegal to extensive cultivation and St. Louis will not die. Of course the money for the dam will have to come from France. You see,' M. N'Diaye continued, 'St. Louis is really rather [361] absurdly placed, lying at the extreme north and the extreme west of the territory. It is "doublement periphique", whilst Dakar is the economic centre of the Senegal.'

'Already, of course, the transfer is proving more difficult than they thought,' a member of an old and respected St. Louisian family told me. 'There is little enough room in Dakar as it is without moving the Senegalese Government there. They'll have to take hotels over for ministries. I don't think this transfer is necessary. After all, America has its Washington and New York, Switzerland its Berne and Geneva. Why should not Senegal have its St. Louis and Dakar? If they carry out this transfer, St. Louis will be little more than an historical souvenir like Gorée.'

M. Babacar Saye, Mayor of St. Louis and member of the 369 Opposition party, told me with considerable feeling: 'St. Louis has played a great part in the history of the Senegal. Even if it has lost the opportunity of economic development as a port to Dakar, it is the spiritual head of the Senegal. If St. Louis had not existed in the history of the Senegal and French West Africa there would be no Federation today. It has been a bastion of fidelity to France. St. Louisians penetrated every corner of West Africa on her behalf. It has had an immense moral and psychological influence on the present good relations between France and West Africa.'

This attitude I found supported by a young African official from Dahomey, whom I met in the Ministry of Finance. He had travelled all over French West and Equatorial Africa. 'The Senegal,' he said, 'has always been at the head of politics in French West Africa. It has been the *avant-garde* of all Black Africa. After all it was the first to send black Deputies like Blaise Diagne to the

[369] Metropolis. Until recently the African élite has always come from
[571] St. Louis. It is a sort of spiritual centre of Black Africa. It had the
[873] first school—Lycée Faidherbe. And in 1866 it was given the first
Hotel de Ville of the French Union. It is the cradle of the French
Union. It would be a tragedy if it died.'

369 To such men as these it seems scandalous that St. Louis with
175 its great history and traditions should give way to a parvenue like
Dakar. Of all West African cities St. Louis is the one with the most
illustrious and fascinating history. It was called St. Louis after
the great French King, Louis XIII, in the middle of the seventeenth
century. However, in the following century it began to expand
into a town whose inhabitants were a distinct race, comparable
[563] to the Creòles of Sierra Leone. White and black intermarried to
form a group known as the St. Louisians. During the eighteenth
[591] and nineteenth centuries these were the great families of the
[554] Senegal, though today they are losing importance. Names like
Carpot, Descanet, Deves, Guillabert and Crespin are still remembered with respect in St. Louis.

[162] By the end of the eighteenth century the town had more than
7,000 inhabitants and in 1778 a mayor, who had to be chosen
[633] from the local population, was charged with the maintenance of
good relations between the people and the Governor. In 1833
[641] all inhabitants of St. Louis were given the status of French
citizens.

Perhaps the most important date for St. Louis and for West
Africa was 1854, when General Faidherbe was appointed
Governor. Today his mark is still firmly on St. Louis. The
[361] ordered layout of the city and its streets were his work. The large
[491] bridge connecting the island on which St. Louis stands to the
mainland is named after him. The city's most important and
famous school is the Lycée Faidherbe. And even now one can
listen to old folk sitting on the benches of the park, in which his
statue stands, telling tales of the great General, who had fought
against the famous Toucouleur chief, El Hadj Omar and brought
Senegal, Soudan and Mauretania into the French orbit. Perhaps
some of these old people are his own descendants, for he is
reputed to have been a prolific father.

[162] By 1878 St. Louis had grown to a city of 16,000 inhabitants,
and despite the rapid expansion of Dakar and Rufisque farther
down the coast, there was little to worry about the
future.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
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down the coast, there was little to worry about the future. And the creation of the Federal Government there marked its apogee. Five years later when the Federal Government was transferred to Dakar, St. Louis began its long decline which, when the Government is transferred, will be final.

As I walked along the old streets of St. Louis recalling vividly New Orleans, past old houses, their plaster façades beautiful with the patina of a century, and along the river that divides the island from the mainland with its brightly painted fishing boats, I could sympathize with the inhabitants of St. Louis. I could understand their pride; and their fears that their city might die. But at the same time the Government's desire to move into the economic centre of Senegal and the Administrative centre of the Federation, seemed to me a realistic one.

ECONOMICS OF THE REVOLUTION

I returned to Dakar for an appointment with the High Commissioner of French West Africa whose office was on the ninth floor of the Administrative building. When I arrived I was shown into a small ante-room by a messenger dressed in khaki. 648

'The High Commissioner will see you soon,' he assured me.

Within two minutes a similarly dressed messenger beckoned me towards a large swing door. I pulled it open, only to be confronted by another, a foot in front of me. I pushed this open, and entered a large, well-windowed room. For a moment I could see no one. Then a tall, grey-haired man, looking very much like a university professor, came forward towards me, his right hand outstretched. M. Gaston Cusin, High Commissioner for French West Africa, led me to a large chair and, with a degree of informality that put me entirely at ease, he began to talk of the problems of French West Africa. To him, a former Director of Economic Affairs in France, it was clear that West Africa was largely an economic problem. He pointed to a large map of West Africa:

'We are hoping to develop iron reserves here in Mauretania; there in Guinea we want to open up bauxite reserves, in Dahomey

648 we plan to build a modern port; and there in the Soudan we hope to develop livestock for export. For that we would need a number of large refrigeration units here in Dakar.'

Thus he continued in detail all over the vast area of French West Africa stretching from St. Louis to the Chad, from the Sahara to the Guinea Coast, with an area of nearly 1,840,000 square miles, and a meagre population of 18 millions. I pointed to Nigeria and Ghana.

'I am afraid we British took the best bits of West Africa. Yet we haven't put nearly as much money into it by comparison. I wonder what Nigeria would be like if you French had got it?'

His eyes looked longingly at the large chunk of red.

471 'That would be something marvellous!' he said. Since the war the French have poured money into West Africa. Private funds have accounted for a lot, but FIDES, the equivalent of our Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, has contributed more than £175,000,000 to these territories, and together with other public funds the total of capital investment (not from private sources) is more than £300,000,000, for a large, but poor and underpopulated territory.

369 This heavy capital investment has created large cities like Dakar, Abidjan and Conakry. The Africans have come into contact not only with urban life, but with industry. In Dakar there has been a minor industrial revolution. In the past six years, largely because of this, the city's population has swollen to nearly 300,000. Africans have flooded into the city seeking work, [162] attracted by tales of its gay life or lured by its glamour and the prospect of easy money.

274 463 I went down to the large brewery in Dakar, to see a modern industry with Africans as employees.

One of the managers there replied to my question, why weren't there any Africans in senior positions in the brewery. 'We have great difficulty in finding Africans to fill our managerial vacancies. You see, though many go to Paris they nearly all want to become lawyers, doctors, and officials. Very few are interested in becoming technicians. We would pay for their studies if we could find suitable candidates—you know, all part of the *Loi Cadre*. We must Africanize!'

'But haven't you found any good enough?'

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for no-one would undertake his work unless he belonged to that 295
caste. But the laws of supply and demand do not respect hereditary [294]
caste-rights. Mass-production and cheaper shoes dictate the old [565]
leather-worker's redundance. Soon he will fade into the obscurity of a rural industry, a supplier of goods for the local arts and crafts store.

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This was nowhere more evident than in Dakar which has a 369
large number of factories. Here one can see the new Africa rising up. The young negro comes from the bush, illiterate and half naked, living much as his ancestors before him. Soon he is caught up in the revolution. At first his house may be a small wooden shed, shared with members of his family or tribe on whom he is sponging. But soon he may earn thirteen pounds a month as an unskilled labourer, so that he can afford to take rooms with one of his richer brothers, whose weekly pay packet as a cook is six pounds. And so in Dakar people of all tribes meet in the great metropolis, live next to each other in the crowded Medina, and help to create a new town-life as different from that of the bush as city life in nineteenth-century industrial England was from that of the countryside.

S W
In Dakar I met Diop, a young Jollof, well-educated, but out of 369
work. I asked him how he lived and he told me that he just went from relation to relation each day borrowing money. He had had a job before, but after a quarrel with his employer, an African lawyer, he had had to leave. Each morning he left his wife,
pretending to go to work. He deceived her into thinking he still W
had his job, by bringing home money lent him by relations. He [426]
'borrowed' the equivalent of ten shillings from me, and to my astonishment promptly asked me to lunch the next day. His house,
or rather room, was made of wood. Inside, the walls and the floor W
were covered with a gaily patterned lino. A large double bed and [352]
a small divan provided seats. A chest of drawers hung with all the crockery was the only other piece of furniture. On the walls was a
large array of photos of friends and relations, all slightly over- S
exposed to give the effect of a lighter skin. Diop's wife, a ravishing, W
beautiful girl of nineteen, had spent all morning preparing Jollof [262]
rice for us, consisting of rice done in a sort of tomato purée, to
which a delicious white fish with a variety of vegetables and a W
hot pepper sauce were added. A bottle of wine was produced for [273]
me.

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S W
369 me. Diop, Faye, one of his friends, who was secretary to the local
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[264] theatre, and I sat round the large bowl eating with spoons. A
number of people passed, and one old man came in to watch us.

W
[565] 'That's our Griot,' Diop told me. A Griot is a member of a
special caste, to be found in the Jollof and Mandinka tribes, who
[533] sings, drums, dances and tells jokes—a sort of family jester.

He started to talk in rapid Jollof and soon Diop and his friend were in hoots of laughter. For his pains the bowl of rice was handed to him, and another man who joined him.

'Who is he?' I asked.

S W
'Another relation. I have to feed him,' Diop replied.

[602] 'One of the greatest problems in Dakar,' an official of IFAN had told me, 'is parasitism. A man will come to Dakar and get himself a good job, say at ten pounds a month. He has his immediate family to look after. Then along comes a cousin, and installs himself. An uncle from the bush comes to stay three days, decides he likes Dakar and fails to return to his village. A man like this may find he is supporting between eight and fifteen dependants.'

'I suppose that explains why Dakar's population is much
S
larger than opportunities for work would justify?'

[471] 'Yes. It's a great problem, because it prevents any accumula-
tion of capital by Africans. People complain that there is no
[463] African bourgeoisie here, that all the trade is in the hands of
[574] Lebanese and small Frenchmen. It's largely because an African
here cannot, by the laws of hospitality, refuse to give a bed and
food to his fellow tribesmen.'

'Of course, in a way that's a good thing, because no one goes hungry, and it's one way of redistributing wealth voluntarily. A sort of voluntary welfare state.'

'Yes, but if the African is to control the economy of his own economy, he must be rid of this scourge.'

In Gorée I met a Frenchman to whom Senegalese soldiers used to come immediately after their discharge from the Army to leave all their new clothes and money, otherwise they would have returned to the town to hear: 'Oh, you are the most wonderful, most bountiful man alive.' After that there would have been little left of their money.

Diop was perhaps a classic example of parasitism. He himself was a borrower, only to have other people borrowing from him.

was a borrower, only to have other people borrowing from 600
him.

The morning after I had lunch with Diop I went to a Con- 733
ference in the High Commission on Alcoholism. This, it
appeared, was a grave problem in Dakar. The creation of the new [369]
Africa has its ugly sides, and this was perhaps one of its most ugly.
A favourite drink, named after the local bus service, was the [273]
'Car Rapide'. To make it you mix beer, methylated spirits and
a drop of petrol. It is guaranteed to knock you out in one go. In
Zuiginchor a more potent drink was made by adding a well-known Parisian perfume to beer.

A day before the Conference *Paris-Dakar*, the local daily [204]
newspaper, published an article on alcoholism in M'Backé, a
large Senegalese town:

> ### ALCOHOLISM MUST BE FOUGHT
>
> An all out police attack is needed and would be appreciated to 275
> seek out and rid our town of a gang of drunks of both sexes who 733
> spend their time in the small shops and sordid bars which are hidden all over the town in the guise of restaurants and small eating places.
>
> Most of the proprietors of these cafés add to their miserable [548]
> occupations that of pimping. Favouring alcoholism, they nevertheless indulge in all revolting forms of debauchery.
>
> In most parts of our town one finds these small cafés nicely divided, serving as homes and places of business.
>
> A few posts in the ground, a roof of polished tiles, a wooden fence and there you have the ideal café.
>
> The interior of these hovels is divided into small compartments with no ventilation and on the ground a few mattresses covered with dirty blankets. The decoration consists of a few old newspapers pasted here and there to keep out the sun. The bar stock lies among packing cases and hidden under the mattresses. In holes made for the purpose are bottles of wine, red, rosé and white, and beer.
>
> To cover up this business known to be officially disliked, the café proprietors keep a kitchen where periodically they prepare meals, hygienically leaving a lot to be desired.
>
> In these sordid places, the atmosphere heavy with noxious smells, they give themselves up to their anti-social pastimes. Debauchery has been given a home here. These are also the rendezvous of scoundrels and receivers of stolen goods.

S 275 733 After the great Magal de Touba[1] our town inherited bands of homeless among whom were notorious criminals.

S 369 694 Alcoholism was not the only form of moral decadence in a city like Dakar. Actually crimes of violence, robbing and murder were almost unknown. There were rarely any reference to them in the papers, and a police officer assured me that this was true. However, one read frequently of crimes of passion, such as a man stabbing his friend to death in the course of a quarrel.

S 369 548 There was, I was told, an enormous amount of prostitution in Dakar. I was shown one of the city's more notorious brothels in Rebeusse suburb, a rambling shack that had been raided more than once by police. S [563] On the whole prostitution is not organized because of legal difficulties. A number of prostitutes were white women, who receive patronage mainly from Lebanese and Syrians. I was told of one who went around the Médina in a small car, serving the local population.

W S 369 838 548 On the other hand homosexuality had a much freer rein, being prevalent amongst Africans, Mauretanians and Europeans alike. In Place Prôtet, the main square of Dakar, young African boys, more often than not Jollofs, could be seen waiting to be picked up. Under the Code Napoleon it is, of course, legal, and in theory presents no problem, though many people are worried by its spread in the city.

Of course, to many of these boys with no work, it is one way of making money. But amongst the Jollofs it seems to be more deeply rooted. Contact with Frenchmen in St. Louis, who often preferred black boys to black mistresses and contact with the Mauretanians may provide an explanation.

Today one can even see Jollof men dressed in women's clothes. I once met one in a small bar outside Dakar. He was obviously pathetically feminine. The Jollof must be used to this since they even have a word for them—Gor-Digen. The elders and faithful Muslims condemn men for this, but it is typical of African tolerance that they are left very much alone by the rest of the people.

W 589 One reason for the growing tendency of Jollof men to remain bachelors to an age much older than is usual in Africa, if not for their homosexuality, is the character of the Jollof women.

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[1] Celebration of Birth of Prophet.

[P.3A]
[P.2 contains no textual material]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

Political Life in the Urban Centers of Senegal: A Study of a Period of Transition

Senegal and Sudan presently comprise the Mali Federation, which is in the process of achieving sovereignty within the French Community. Senegal itself is one of the most urbanized West African regions, and its cities have been characterized by a gradual growth of modern political life. The author presents some major findings on its urban political activity, based on extensive interviews made in the mid-1950's. The oldest urban elite, almost entirely assimilated into the French way of life, has been only partially successful in developing party organizations that satisfy the interests of the newer urban residents. As a consequence, the most active and radical post-war political activity has been centered in "non-political" bodies, notably labor unions. Also, urban political activity has been increasingly challenged by rural political developments, which have drawn their framework from urban politics. African specialists will note that Senegalese political development has much in common with such development elsewhere in Africa; it also has a number of distinctive features.

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca.1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

THE AFRICAN URBAN MILIEU

● 369 It has been emphasized for some time that an essential characteristic of most cities in sub-Sahara Africa is that they were a "creation of the whites." For the sociologist, the outstanding feature of the African urban milieu is that it is a "drastically new milieu." With a few exceptions, the most important of these cities were founded quite recently, and lie within the framework of colonial history. Those whose functional development and population growth in the past two decades have been most spectacular for the most part date back less than a century. In these cities African urban problems are most apparent, and hence they have more quickly drawn the attention of researchers. The essential concepts of the urbanization process in sub-Sahara Africa have been formulated in this context.

The diversity in these urban situations should not be underestimated, however; it is especially important in the study of

[P.3B]

369 problems arising from political activities. Cities founded in the slave-trade period have traits that distinguish them from the more recent colonial cities, and any discussion of Senegalese cities must take full account of such a distinction.

[177] To be sure, "old cities" and "recent cities"[1] have one fundamental trait in common: both are entirely the products of external compulsion. In the rural districts, the controls introduced by the colonial power impinged on integrated, settled societies, whose solidarity and coherence often enabled them at least to check and moderate external influences, and to confine them to given channels. In the colonial cities, however, foreign activity itself created the framework in which it operated. Its principal effect was to bring together a conglomerate and poorly-integrated population, which from the outset was confronted by novel problems and upon which the agencies of change acted with maximum intensity. This condition is essential in the consideration of problems of political life in an urban milieu.

[P.3C]

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8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[1] An instrumental distinction whose meaning is explained below. For an examination of some criteria making possible the definition of different types of colonial cities, *cf.* P. Mercier, "Aspects de la société africaine dans l'agglomération dakaroise: groupes familiaux et unités de voisinage," in *L'agglomération dakaroise. Quelques aspects sociologiques et démographiques.* I.F.A.N., Dakar, 1954.

•369 Even at this juncture, however, effects of the distinction between old and recent cities are apparent. The growth of the old slave-trade cities took place in two stages. In the first, there was a fairly slow tempo of growth in which the elements comprising the city were united into a relatively integrated whole. In the second stage, corresponding to the recent colonial period, population growth was much more rapid; new strata of city-dwellers appeared, so numerous that the original city could not effectively assimilate them. A series of problems arose from the relations between the comparatively stable nucleus and the weakly-structured host of new arrivals. In Senegal these relations were originally hostile, yet played an important role in certain phases of urban political life.

The complexity of the principal traits of political phenomena in the framework of the colonial cities is suggested in the following discussion.

The Traditional and Modern Frameworks

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633 African urban centers were established more or less wholly beyond the limits of traditional political units.[2] They were distinguished by novel activities and functions, quickly acquired a cosmopolitan aspect, and received a meager administrative organization. As privileged centers for Europeans, they could hardly survive except through a system of direct administration, and withdrew more or less rapidly from the local, pre-European political systems and authorities, which were in no way equipped to absorb them. Yet political problems of the traditional sort were not entirely excluded from urban life. In certain cases the territory of an indigenous political system was largely or wholly incorporated by the city, and officially recognized.[3] Colonial authorities at first assumed only the radi-

[P.4A]

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633 cally new functions that the old system could not manage, but this phase of internal autonomy was brief. The new government progressively assumed all political functions, and the population of the city became diversified.
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633 Effective operation of the traditional authority was then limited to the one ethnic group that henceforth furnished its members. Nevertheless, despite its increasingly ambiguous position and more and more purely formal character, despite the fact that it had no genuine initiative, traditional authority continued to play a role in urban life. Old political systems eventually were used by the modern political organizations as one of the props for their own action, and conversely, some traditional authorities attempted to reinforce their declining influence by insinuating themselves into a new political role.

[369] These interactions merit attention. In effect, traditional political forms were taken over into the framework of urban life, though in rudimentary outline. This was the case in ethnic group and ward organization, for example, which involved the institutions of "ward-chiefery" and "race-chiefery." These were often developed spontaneously, sometimes assuming a clandestine nature. In other cases such organizational forms were encouraged and given official recognition. Some were created out of whole cloth by the colonial authority, which saw in them an effective means for regulating populations still poorly integrated into the framework that it was striving to establish.[4] The role of authorities having traditional origins quickly became secondary, of course, but it has raised contradictions that make the study of interpenetration between traditional and modern political frameworks an essential one.

[P. 4 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[P. 4C]

[Footnote 4 continued on P. 5C - Analyst]

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[2] Their territory, at least in the case of the oldest cities, was often the object of a "concession" by local authorities, and was therefore withdrawn from their direct control.

[3] This is the case, for example, of Lagos; regarding Dakar, where the authorities of the "Republic of Lebou" had their seat, *cf.* C. Michel, "L'organisation coutumière (sociale et politique) de la communauté Laboue de Dakar," *Bull. du Comité d'Et. hist. et sci. de l'A.O.F.*, March 17, 1934; and C. Faure, *Histoire de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert et des origins de Dakar*, Paris, 1914.

[4] G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires* (Paris, 1955) shows clearly the occurrence there of "a transfer onto an urban milieu of leadership agencies already existing in a rural milieu: the

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The New Political Life

369 More importantly, the urban centers
668 deserve attention because of the role they
have played in the development of a
radically new type of political life, one
[177] whose forms have been largely borrowed
from outside Africa. The first attempts
at political organization and activity were
born in the cities. More recently some
political movements have appeared in a
rural context, as a reflection of rural
conditions, but they have drawn much of
their pattern from the cities, or from
among elements subject to urban
influences.

The modern African city presents a
set of conditions favorable to the
development of especially intense political
369 reactions. The position of the colonizing
power is most sharply apparent in the
city, and the instruments of its power
are concentrated there. The rootless
condition of the African population seems at
its extreme; the masses that gather in
the city are unsettled, poorly established
in their occupations, and suffer from
[571] every form of insecurity. The new elites
created and shaped by urban life feel
restricted and disappointed in their
desires for social advancement and for a
share in authority and in modern symbols
of prestige.[5] Finally, the city brings
[563] together a white society and a Negro
society, though often clearly separated
by topography. In these circumstances
racial tensions can develop to their
maximum. Moreover, they assume varied
aspects, *e.g.*, competitive situations in
various spheres, official or unofficial
discrimination.[6] Intense reactions to such
conditions may take no organized form
and may not manifest themselves except
after some delay, however. Here the

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● 369 problem of the "old cities" is again relevant. In them, such reactions can remain unorganized or marginal longer in relation to the official forms of political expression. We shall see that this is typical of certain Senegalese cities.

668 Furthermore, some reactions are born and expressed in a much larger framework than that of political life in its strictest sense of party activity. Demands for justice in the colonial situation can be expressed on different planes and in different fields. In South Africa, for example, Africans are largely barred from social and political action, and the chief demands emerge in religious activities.[7] Elsewhere, political life may not be forbidden, but its forms of expression are limited, either openly or in fact—for instance, by means of a judicial system in which people cannot file a case. [467] Thus, the most radical demands are formulated not within the framework of parties — at least, in their official platforms — but in that of unions or other associations. Attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies are formed in such organizations, pending the possibility of full expression at the political level. In the urban centers of Senegal some of the most important popular forces, at least prior to the great transformations that began in 1956, were to be found outside parties.

The Growth of Rural Political Life

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668 These fundamental demands of the urban population provide models for similar demands that spread from the cities into rural districts. The general preponderance of the cities in political initiative is mentioned above. They are both centers of attraction and centers for the diffusion of foreign influences. An im-

[P.5B]

[P.5C]

hierarchy of administrator-mayor, administrator-deputy mayor, and ward leader corresponds to the hierarchy of regional leader, district leader, and cantonal leader" (p. 169). The contradictions that he points out in the administrative organization of Brazzaville were sharper still at Dakar: the institution of appointed ward leaders coexisted with that of an elected city government, whose relations with the colonial administration did not differ in principle from those of French city governments with prefectoral authority.

[5] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).
Groupement européen de Dakar: orientations d'une enquête," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XIX, 1955.
[6] *Cf. Infra.*, and the Summary Notes Given in P. Mercier, "Aspects de la Société Africaine" and "Le
[7] *Cf.* B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, London, 1948; and G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire*, Paris, 1955.

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369 668 portant part of the urban population has considerable mobility, and thus maintains solid ties and frequent communication with the regions of its origins.[8] Moreover, lesser members of the modern urban [571] elites, *e.g.*, workers and petty offiicials, have been settled in rural centers, thus extending urban influence still further. By these means a double network of individuals more or less shaped by the conditions of urban life is established. Contacts and relations between urban centers and rural districts can vary markedly, however. The area affected by the prestige of political leaders thus may be more or less extensive. The forms of activity and organization created in the city generally can be transplanted to rural sectors only in their rudimentary forms.

In Senegal, historical factors account for the sharp division between city and countryside. In the old coastal cities, a separatistic history and a particular juridical status have contributed to their marginal position in Senegalese life. The consequences of the separation between the former "citizens" of "the four communes" and the former "subjects" of the interior[9] have not been entirely wiped out, even in recent years.

From the foregoing points of view, Senegalese urban political life can be oriented in summary fashion to the general problems of urban political life. A series of particular traits in the Senegalese situation are first interpreted against the historical background. The subsequent section summarizes the results of investigations conducted in certain Senegalese [114] centers in 1953-1955, during a period of transition between two major phases in the development of political life.[10]

[P.6A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1966
MS37 Senegal MS37

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CITIES OF SENEGAL

369 361 [162] In all of West Africa, the phenomenon of urbanization has been most extensive and the variety of its forms most striking in Senegal. The area has about ten communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants each; five of these have well over 30,000 inhabitants and the major urban center, Dakar, has almost 250,000 inhabitants. The urban population exceeds 500,000, about one quarter of the total population. The present urban pattern has no link with a pre-European tradition. Some of the cities wield influence over extensive suburban zones, and the distances separating them are relatively short, so that the western half of Senegal is covered by a close network of urban centers.

633 Partial administration of municipal affairs and familiarity with electoral machinery are by no means recent acquisitions. The first African communes "with full powers"[11] were created in Senegal, in the second half of the 19th century, and there the first "mixed communes"[12] were developed, at the beginning of the 20th century. Among all the French West African territories, Senegal contained the largest number of constituted communes, and alone had almost a quarter of the communes with full powers created in all French Overseas Territories by the law of 1956. As early as 1925 there were 18 communes, of which four had full autonomy. The exercise of political rights in modern form dates back more than 75 years for some cities, and by 1953 there were elected municipal councils in 14 of the 20 mixed communes in Senegal.

[P. 6 B]

"The Four Communes of Senegal"

369 633 175 The four coastal cities have had the longest experience with political rights. All are fairly old; Dakar was founded most recently, in 1857. St. Louis of Senegal, founded in the time of the slave-trade, is the oldest, and a typical example of the "old colonial city." In 1659 a warehouse of the Company of the Senegal was built on the site, the first French settlement in the region. It was a commercial post oriented toward the river, and a small military outpost; it became the jumping-off place for the conquest of the African territories. The general traits of the old African city may still be found in St. Louis' central section, despite recent changes. In such a center the African population was relatively stable.[13] A few European families established residence, and a rather important [563] mixed-blood population developed. By the mid-19th century an urban community with a homogeneous way of life had emerged.

The Isle of Gorée, which became the second commune in Senegal, was occupied in 1677; it was oriented toward the Petite-Cote and the factories of Rufisque, Joal, and Portudal. Of these, only Rufisque developed; it became the third commune. St. Louis and Gorée underwent many vicissitudes before 1815, when they were restored to France. They then returned to "legal" commerce, which was centered in the valley of the Senegal. St. Louis retained its dominance. By the end of the 18th century it had had nearly [162] [563] 7,000 inhabitants, about half of whom were free and almost a tenth European. In the 1870's its population was about 15,000, while Gorée had but 3,000; Rufisque was growing as was Dakar. Finally, the interior back of the Petite-Cote was opening up, and Thiès was founded. In the following period St.

[P. 7 A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[8] These facts were studied by M. Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest*, London, 1936, among others.

[9] *Cf.*, *infra.*, summary historical comments regarding the development of citizenship in the oldest Senegalese settlements.

[10] After 1956, changes occurred more rapidly. There were profound transformations in the orientations of political parties, in the organization of unions, etc. These transformations acquired greater significance in the new legislative and constitutional frameworks instituted in 1957 and subsequently.

[11] These had an organization patterned after that of French communes, even though the conditions under which they operated were not always comparable. It was not until 1956, 75 years later, that communes were established in territories other than Senegal.

[12] These were all characterized by the fact that their mayor was a representative of the French colonial administration. There were various types, according to whether the city council was entirely appointed, or partially or entirely elected. Between the two wars they expanded rapidly outside Senegal.

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● 369 Louis stagnated[14] and Gorée declined,
633 losing people at the expense of Dakar and
195 Rufisque; Rufisque grew rapidly, as the
port for the ground-nut. Dakar entered
[162] a period of prosperity at the turn of the
[439] century.[15] During the late 19th century
the composition of the population already was beginning to change fairly rapidly, especially in the expanding centers, but the old core of urban population continued to hold a dominant place, not only in urban life but also in the colony of Senegal as a whole, whose constitution had come into effect. The people of St. Louis most notably served as essential instruments of the colonization effort.

This dominance was expressed very clearly in the political realm. The coastal cities, in contrast to the interior cities and rural areas, had been introduced to the structure and organization through which modern political life is conducted long before the reforms of 1946. Political activity of the modern type was first limited to the European settlers but was
[563] soon extended to the mixed-blood element
and then to the Negro population. Beginning in the late 18th century, St. Louis had a mayor, always a mixed-blood, who served as intermediary between the governor and the populace. In 1789 the
[668] colony participated in metropolitan political activities, sending to the States-General a petition of grievances that demanded commercial freedom — *i.e.*, abolition of the Company monopoly — and the end of slavery. A satisfactory agreement was reached among employees of the Company, European businessmen, and mixed-blood businessmen, but it was never brought to fruition; a period of disorder set in and persisted until the rebirth of the colony in 1815.

[641] In 1833 French citizenship was conferred upon all free inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée by royal decree. Citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of

[13] We have observed that in such cases a "people belonging to the city" emerged. Their ties with their birthplaces were more or less completely severed.

[14] It had scarcely 20,000 inhabitants in 1920, but its growth resumed in the 1930's. In 1954 it had a population of 39,000.

[15] With the creation of a harbor, which captured the trade of Rufisque, whose modernization appeared impossible, and the installation of the government-general of French West Africa, established in 1895.

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369 the two cities with the abolition of
633 slavery in 1848.[16] The four coastal cities
175 were elevated to the status of communes
with full powers between 1872 and 1887,
[641] and the organization of political life on
a European pattern in the four communes
crystalized the opposition between
the citizens of the old settlements and
the subjects of the territories in the
newly-conquered interior. The cities
alone provided apprenticeship in public
life and in the representative system.
Beginning in 1871 they elected a deputy
to the French Parliament. In 1879 they
[646] elected a Council-general patterned after
those in France, supposedly to represent
all Senegal. It actually represented only
the few urban centers, whose interests at
the time diverged widely from those of
the rest of Senegal. An effort was subsequently
made to repair this breach by
transforming the Council-general into a
colonial council, consisting of representatives
elected by the citizens and representatives
for the non-citizens appointed
by the *notables*.[17] This reduced conflicts
scarcely at all. Meanwhile, citizenship
[641] acquired new importance. At first it was
established by local law and had no effect
in other French territories. Not until
1916 did the "natives of the four communes"
receive full French citizenship
while still being able to retain their personal
status. These citizens were few in
[168] number: scarcely 80,000 in 1939, about
100,000 in the 1950's. The cities tended
to include more non-citizens than citizens
as they grew. Actual participation
in politics developed only gradually. At
[666] the first legislative elections, in 1871,
only a third of those registered voted,
and the rate dropped to less than a fifth

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369 in some years. Since the beginning of the
633 20th century, however, urban citizens
175 have taken an increasingly lively interest
[666] in political matters.[18]

In this restricted political system the
relative importance of the roles played by
563 different ethnic groupings and different
668 cities varied continuously. Ethnic dominance,
first held by the old European
families, passed gradually to mixed-blood
society, which came into being in the
18th century and rapidly acquired wealth,
education, and influence. By the mid-19th
century mixed-bloods made up the
majority of the westernized population.
But the entry of the emancipated slaves,
[166] the first sizable migration toward the
cities, quickly reduced the mixed-bloods
to a minority. In 1900 they numbered
[162] less than 5,000 in the four communes together,
though for several decades their
economic and political influence remained
quite disproportionate to their numbers.
668 Among the cities, St. Louis was
[369] predominant until WW I. At the beginning
of the century it practically controlled
the deputation to the French
legislature and the Council-general —
and hence the economic life of the territory.
Then Gorée-Dakar came to the
fore;[19] in 1914 a citizen of Gorée, Blaise
Diagne, was elected deputy, followed by
Galandou Diouf and Lebou. These men
[645] were the first elected Senegalese to win
broad support at Paris; Diagne himself
was appointed a Secretary of State [a
subministerial post, equivalent to a U.S.
Under-Secretary]. In Senegal, the authority
[642] of elected officials — deputies and
Councillors-general — increased, and
clashes with the civil administration were
frequent.[20]

[P.8B]

[16] Which nearly tripled the number of citizens, who henceforth comprised a body that was more heterogeneous but less completely "assimilated."

[17] Translator's note: the *notables* were influential residents appointed to high political offices in the interior by the local representative of French government.

[18] Especially after 1914, when there appeared a particularly dynamic personnage, Blaise Diagne, whose popularity was widespread.

[19] Dakar absorbed Gorée in 1929. The latter was reestablished as a separate commune in 1956.

[20] At first — at the end of the 19th century — these were conflicts between the merchants, upholding the interests of their agencies, and the civil administration, then engaged in an expansionist policy in West Africa, whose advantages the former could not see. Not until recent years did these conflicts change very much in character.

[p.8c]

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665 French party — the S.F.I.O.[23] — developed and for several years played a dominant role throughout Senegal. In the other territories parties were more often purely local, and simply allied themselves with the French parties. The S.F.I.O. lost its predominence in Senegal after 1951, but kept it in the four communes — St. Louis and Dakar-Gorée being its chief strongholds; it remained there as [666] the African Socialist Movement.[24] This result, the adoption of assimilationist views, was to a certain degree a characteristic of pre-war political life, but on the other hand it contributed to the leadership of the first party that tried to be at once interterritorial and specifically African: the African Democratic Assembly (R.D.A.). It provided some of the most radical elements in the movement, which received considerable support, especially at Dakar. Several radical leaders were the source of the conflicts that resulted in the split in the R.D.A. that followed the change of orientation after 1950. The R.D.A. was subsequently a rather marginal movement in Senegal. This second result suggests the strength of the relations of a party limited to the numerous elite of the old Senegalese cities with the great European currents of political thought.

● [369] [666] But the greatest effect of the diversification of Senegalese political life was felt elsewhere. The appearance and rapid success of the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (B.D.S.) — which stemmed from a division in the S.F.I.O. — were the manifestations, in the political realm, of two essential facts: (1) the important changes that had taken place in the composition of city populations; and (2) the resumption of initiative by the rural populations, who seized the opportunity to express themselves directly, and especi-

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668 665 369 666 ally to express themselves in opposition to the old cities. The legislative elections of 1951 were typical in this respect. The enlarged rural electorate had numerical control and held the key to success in the elections; a substantial part of the urban masses shared in an effort to drive a breach in the old system of urban domination. In this period the ideological aspects of the political parties were still unimportant. The elections of 1951 were a victorious revolt of the new citizens, urban and rural, against the old citizens of the "four communes."[25] The two candidates of the B.D.S. won. Significantly, one of them represented directly, through the unions, the new forces. The division between the whole of the territory and the cities was thus repeated *within* the cities. A new phase had commenced, one in which politics became more complicated. But the forms that can be termed "traditional" for political life were too deeply embedded within the patterns of urban life to give way at once.

Senegalese Political Life in Transition, 1953-1956

668 665 [114] It was under such conditions that researches were conducted on the forms of political expression in several Senegalese urban centers, chiefly at Dakar-Gorée and at St. Louis — that is, three of the four communes — and also at Thiès, a newer city in the interior close to and under the influence of the Dakar-Gorée-Rufisque aggregate. This last study provided certain comparative materials. This essay discusses only some of the findings of these researches. Three essential facts must be remembered:

(1) The importance retained by certain long-standing patterns. A party de-

668 665 signed to be distinctive, and to a degree founded in opposition to these patterns, nevertheless conforms with them, at least for a time, within the "old cities." This is one of the limits of the political system of this period: the deepest political aspirations, which are rapidly gaining strength, can be only partially expressed within a partisan structure.

(2) The central role of certain nonpolitical groupings and organizations[26] in the elaboration of more radical ideologies and in the formation of the most active groups. This must be viewed as a direct function of the preceding condition.

[571] (3) The temporarily marginal status of an important part of the new elites, whose formation had accelerated in the post-war years. At the time of study, a shift of elites was occurring. Youthful elements were vigorously opposed to what was termed the "bourgeoisie of the old cities."[27] This is another indication that the underlying forces still laid outside urban politics; they did not enter them until 1956.

The New Parties

665 369 After 1946 a series of political parties emerged: the Senegalese branch of the S.F.I.O., the B.D.S., the M.P.S., and the U.D.S.[28] Only the first two received wide support, yet one cannot fail to be impressed by the extent of party membership. Out of a group of 1,200 men interviewed at Dakar, for example, more than half (56 per cent) declared themselves members of a party.[29] The percentage was very high, and of considerable significance. The population involved in this sampling was essentially a stable one, or at least one settled in cities for several years. Other researches justify

[25] At the time, the civil administration viewed this revolt rather favorably. Of course, it was only one aspect of the politics of the period. Some rather contradictory alliances were formed to oppose the S.F.I.O.

[26] Assuming a limited sense for the word "political," by applying it solely to party organizations.

[27] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56). Materials for comparison appear, *mutatis mutandis*, in E.-F. Frazier, *Bourgeoisie noire*, Paris, 1956.

[28] Senegalese Populist Movement and Senegalese Democratic Union.

[29] This involved solely the male population.

[P.10C]

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S 665 369 the assertion that the temporary population, especially the seasonal one, shared very little in urban politics.[30] However, the groupings under study clearly extended beyond the nucleus of the "old population," which in Dakar was less sharply defined and more conglomerate than in a center such as St. Louis.[31] The traits peculiar to the latter were still discernible, however: thus, the majority W [369] ethnic group — Lebou and Wolof, which includes the largest number of "old urban families" — exhibited these political characteristics in a more striking form. Exact data gathered on extended family groups revealed political party membership W [665] varying from 50 to 80 per cent among the Lebou and Wolof (as much among women as among men); in these cases, membership was verified by possession of a party card. This verification was not required in the course of the general study previously noted; one may thus assume that some of the men interviewed who declared themselves members of a party were only sympathizers, or had failed to have their cards renewed. Other data, however, confirmed the validity of the information obtained. Thus, during the post-war years the Senegal branch of the S.F.I.O. was among the six most important branches of the party; in the mid-1950's the enormous majority of its adherents were to be found in the coastal cities.

One peculiarity, examined in the course of this essay, requires at least a S [666] partial interpretation. Considering the massive party membership, participation in elections was scanty. Thus, at the time of the last municipal elections in Dakar, the number of persons registered to vote exceeded 50,000.[32] According to the

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census of 1955, one might have expected it to reach nearly 80,000. Abstentions — in relation to the number registered — amounted to about 30 per cent. In this trend one can see the ambiguity that typified political life in the Senegalese cities. Evidence was also gathered on the status of participation in the other phases of party activity. Parties are organized in ward sections, sometimes with separate sections for women. The activities of these sections do not merit detailed study; they vary too greatly in intensity. One point became clear, however, from direct observation on one hand and the results of a series of interviews on the other: these sectional activities drew only a very limited portion — about 10 per cent — of party effectives. By contrast, occasional demonstrations might draw considerable numbers, including individuals from outside the city. Sometimes such demonstrations coincided with propaganda meetings organized directly by the party. In other cases they stemmed from the presence of a party leader as an observer at an official reception, a conference, etc.

Other facts also demonstrate that party membership does not imply militant action in the specifically political arena. A series of interviews carried out during 1953-1954 revealed only a slight degree of ideological unity in the two large parties, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S.; knowledge about specific phases of their programs was generally modest or non-existant. Hence distribution of party memberships scarcely involved a precise ideological choice.[33] This choice to some degree reflected an actual distinction,[34] but this was apparently no more than a tendency. In addition to the primary

[30] But it could remain attached more or less firmly to the political activities of the place of its origin.

[31] It included elements from St. Louis and Gorée, Lebou elements that had become urbanized "on the spot," etc. The population of Dakar tripled 1936-1956, from 80,000 to nearly 250,000.

[32] To be precise, 52,250. These elections are used as an example because the new organization for the city government involved a revision of the electoral lists, the most extensive in many years; and, also, a comparison with recent census figures (compiled in 1955) was possible for the first time.

[33] The facts of the split between the latent ideological content of judgments and opinions of a political sort, and that of the party programs, are noted below. Of course, there were probably distinctions according to level of schooling.

[34] Roughly, between old and new city-dwellers.

[P. 11C]

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cause of this peculiarity, described previously, there were secondary causes, of ethnic, religious, and other natures. Their action contributed to the blurring of lines between the party groups. These facts explain, for example, why the B.D.S., until its recent changes, was unable despite great efforts to change the nature of urban politics. Only the broad action of new factors that were felt considerably beyond the frontiers of Senegal, from 1956 on, brought some change.

These widespread occurrences affected chiefly the two large parties. The other parties, the M.P.S. and U.D.S., which had developed from the schism in the R.D.A., had a quite different nature. They were parties of activists, and in Senegalese political life had only secondary importance. The successes of the R.D.A. elsewhere in West Africa, even during 1956-1957, had only feeble repercussions in Senegal. This fact had many causes, which cannot be studied here. By contrast, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S. were tending to become, in terms of number, parties with mass support; their cores were made up as much by "*notables*" and "elected agents" as by activists. The struggle between these two parties continued to dominate the stage, if not in all Senegal, at least in the cities and in certain rural districts.[35] In some cases it took extremely violent forms.
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Pre-election riots were common between 1946 and 1956. Even in 1957, rather serious incidents marked the reorganization of the commune of Dakar, before the last municipal elections.[36] For the first time, elements of the B.D.S. (now the Senegalese Populist Bloc, or B.P.S.) won strong representation in the city council, previously dominated without opposition by the S.F.I.O. (now the African Socialist Movement — M.S.A.); an outburst of partisan passions marked

[P. 12A]

665 this shift. Such demonstrations revealed [369] the intense hostility between the two main parties. This deeply influenced ur- [666] ban life, in the realms that overlapped into the specifically political domain.

Some indications have been given as to the significance of party membership. They can be supplemented by approaching the problem somewhat differently. To a considerable degree, the parties remained closely associated with the "clienteles" that typified pre-war political life. This trait appeared most clearly in the party in power, the one that controlled the city government. To maintain and increase [669] such a political clientele, the party had access to very important instruments. Through the numerous municipal employees and all others who depended upon city hall, or who directly or indirectly benefited from its aid or its support, it extended a very wide network of influence. This was elaborated by the other network of influence, comprising the traditionally influential individuals, who were partly interwoven into it.[37] If a party had such a basis its dynamic force dropped considerably, and the role of its leaders assumed major importance. The prestige of the leader was essential to the cohesion of the political groups. This fact came out clearly in various researches. For instance, in the course of over 100 interviews it appeared that there were wide gaps between the official orientation of the party to which the respondent belonged and the political goals that he expressed.[38] Adherence to the leader overcame that difference to some extent. A certain formalization of partisan attachment thus appeared, in a primitive fashion. The importance of the leader's prestige was revealed with the greatest clarity in relation to the feminine clientele of the parties. It must be empha- [369] sized that at Dakar, at least among the

[P. 12B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[35] Where the rivalry, furthermore, was chiefly between the "outposts," in this case more or less connected with the tradition of the "old cities," and the surrounding countryside.

[36] The separation of Gorée and the anticipated electoral redistricting had persuaded the civil administration to dissolve the municipal council and to replace it during the electoral period with a bipartisan municipal commission.

[37] Particularly in their activity as electoral agents.

[38] In a general way, these goals showed a much more definite "nationalist" potential.

[p.12c]

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665 369 elements that have been urbanized the longest, the percentage of party memberships has been as high among women as among men. This was a peculiar aspect of the Dakar situation, not found, for instance, at Thiès (where the percentage of memberships among women, depending upon the ethnic group, was from one-half to one-tenth that among men). At Dakar the women's branches on occasion could mobilize large crowds, adorned in party colors. Study of about 30 of these individual cases suggested that the conscious essence of political attachment consisted almost entirely of the relation with the leader.

665 578 The formalization noted above can be studied from various points of view. The fundamental bipartition of political life in a way was responsible for the indirect expression of intragroup and intergroup divisions and rivalries whose nature was other than political. This explains why the line of separation between the two political blocs did not have the same significance to all sectors of the population. In specific situations it assumed many meanings. For example, one could find: (1) hostility between the Lebou-Wolof grouping and the rest of the population (which resembled, without exactly corresponding to, the fundamental division [563] noted above); (2) hostility, more or less muted, between Wolof and Lebou; and (3) hostilities within each of the two groups, in proportion to diversities of origin, status, etc.

This accounts for the relative flexibility prevailing in the composition of the clienteles that made up the parties.^{39} Since the clienteles represented varied levels, however, they introduced new divisions, or revived and solidified old hostilities.

665 (1) A fundamental problem arises from the interactions between the modern political system and what remains of the traditional or semi-traditional sys-

[P.13A]

665 [633] tems. At Dakar, the powers of the "*sérigne*" and of the dignitaries of the former "Lebou Republic" were continued, although they gradually lost their importance.[40] The parties were careful to keep these leading figures among their clientele. As a result there were some rather complex manipulations concerning nominations and successions. A nomination accepted by one party was more or less openly contested by the other. Hence the relatively frequent bifurcation of power: opposing the dignitary who had received official recognition was another who maintained himself as pretender, with the support of the party that had backed his candidacy. Such events stood [667] out even more sharply among ward leaders, who depended most directly upon the party that controlled the city government. Their support was more or less confined to the voters of this party. Hence certain wards had clandestine ward leaders, around whom the members of the opposition party could gather. Of course, such phenomena have accelerated the deterioration of these institutions.

793 665 (2) In the religious field, control over chiefs of the great Moslem brotherhoods similarly has been at stake in intense struggles between the parties. This was particularly true of the main brotherhood in Senegal, that of the Tidjanes. ● [369] This problem has been centered outside Dakar and the other coastal cities, but has had important repercussions in these cities. The rivalries that apparently have always surrounded the choice of the caliph of the Tidjanes were intensified and acquired a greater impact, in proportion as the fundamental hostility of the parties was openly associated with [788] them. Violent incidents involving political enemies occurred even on pilgrimages to Tivaouane, where the caliph resides; they contributed to the prolongation of conflicts within the caliph's family. Well-meaning interference by re-

[P. 13 B]

665 [793] spected figures, with the aim of keeping such matters on a purely religious plane, has had little success. The Tidjane chieftans have been too enmeshed in politics to listen.

527 665 578 (3) A last example involves recreational activities organized at the end of the year around the exhibition of the "lanterns."[41] These activities provided a basis for the formation of temporary groupings founded on ethnic background, neighborhood, occupation, etc. Such groupings undertook the making of a "lantern," and exhibited it to neighbors, relatives and others, eventually by forming a parade. An element of competition entered; the most noteworthy "lanterns" won rather imposing gifts and a brief prestige for the groupings that exhibited them. The parties seized on this competitive aspect. Party sections themselves created "lantern" groupings. With access to considerable material means and a large number of workers, they made "lanterns" that were veritable carnival floats, huge and very elaborate. Their exhibition brought together in a procession the typical rabble of large political demonstrations. At the same time it aroused friction between hostile parties.[42] They had taken over, almost entirely at their expense, demonstrations whose character they had utterly changed. This is a typical example of the way in which disparate activities have been infused by the two-party rivalry.

369 665 This process also has another side: the parties have seen a decline in their opportunities for expressing political drives. In the old cities, they experienced relative stagnation for some years, while social changes accelerated and intensified. Elements just becoming aware of the world

[P. 14A]

369 665 political situation remained aloof from party activity, unless they joined the marginal parties. This was a prime discovery from general investigations at Dakar and St. Louis. Comparison of the principal socio-occupational categories that had been used as a basis for classifying the population under study provided informative data for this topic. The following categories showed a [463] percentage of political party membership higher than that of the average of respondents: farmers and fishermen; unskilled laborers and domestic workers; merchants. By contrast, the percentage of membership was lower among semiskilled workers, higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, and professional people. It is significant that trained workers and the intellectual elements most often kept apart from the existing political system. Such was the situation at Dakar. That at St. Louis was little different, or so it appeared from an incomplete analysis of an inquiry carried out among a sampling of the population in the island wards.

By contrast, the inquiry carried out at Thiès, whose traits are quite unlike those of the "old cities," provided very different results. For all the men, the percentage of membership was smaller than that at Dakar—40 per cent.[43] The following categories were below that figure: [463] farmers, merchants, skilled workers, lower-ranking office-workers, and government employees. On the other hand, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, were higher.[44] Here the greatest degree of party membership corresponded to the most active categories; Thiès does not have the political traditions of the old cities, and the formalization found in them was much less

[P. 14B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[41] At first these were merely decorated lanterns. The custom 1 certainly has a European origin; it is typical of the "old cities" of Senegal.

[42] In 1954 the parades of "lanterns" were prohibited by administrative edict.

[43] The results at Dakar and at Thiès cannot be compared in detail. However, the informative value of these general results could, in each case, be verified at other stages in the research.

[44] It should be noted that in the case of Thiès the category of unskilled workers was much closer to that of semi-skilled workers. The unskilled workers, largely employed by the railroad, comprise a more stable group than at Dakar.

[P. 14C]

1 [i.e, an exhibition of "lanterns" at the end of the year accompanied by recreational activities — see category 116, P. 14A -- Analyst]

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369 665 striking. The data from Thiès enable one to approach in a much more meaningful way the problem of differentiating between the two large Senegalese parties in terms of their socio-occupational composition. Adherence to the B.D.S. was generally predominant in all categories, but the trend toward this party was greater, on the one hand, among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and on the other, among higher-ranking office-workers and government employees. At Dakar, where the B.D.S. was at this time in the minority, a comparable trend was apparent: the party was proportionately stronger among semi-skilled workers and intellectuals. But differentiations of this type cannot fail to be blurred in a context such as that described above.

665 668 Therefore the importance of the groups remaining on the edge of party activities was more significant. Two groups merit particular attention. These were, first, the new cadres emerging from higher education; the problems resulting from their emergence are briefly discussed below. Secondly, there was a rather large group of persons less than thirty years old who had at least a primary school education.[45] The criticisms that the latter expressed against the established political system were often very harsh (against the city *government, against the cadres of the* two parties, etc.). Some had made several attempts to gain admittance to the existing parties, or into youth groups affiliated with the parties. They found themselves in weakly-structured, short-lived groups with no specific political function, but in which political problems were approached in a generally nonconformist manner. Otherwise they devoted their energies to organized nonpolitical groupings.

The importance of some of these nonpolitical groupings must now be examined. To a large degree they offered, more

[P. 15A]

665 668 than the relatively inflexible political parties, adequate frameworks for expressing anti-colonial demands and for creating activists.

Religious Organizations

665 668 793 As distinct from many other parts of Sub-Sahara Africa, organizations of a religious character play only a very limited part here. We have already seen how the "traditional" political parties entered into the activities of some religious groups and attempted to make them recruiting bases for their clientele. The more limited movements alone provided certain means, chiefly indirect, for expressing extremist political demands. This was the case, for example, of a grouping founded by Moslem students at Dakar. However, they received very little support.[48]

Cultural Associations and Youth Movements

668 575 Cultural associations and youth movements have had a more important role in this area. Some of them have contributed to the formation of strong political cadres. In general, the cultural associations have had a rather precarious existence; their activities in some cases have ceased. Their efforts to win the support of the masses by undertaking an educational role — for instance, by means of the theater — have often been disappointing. Finally, they often have had a ambiguous nature. Thus, in a city such [369] as Dakar, founded by highly "assimilated" elements, they have experienced some difficulty in contributing to the development of modernized African culture. But they are not devoid of concern for political organization in a very general sense, removed from party orientation. This was shown with regard to three of the

668 575 most vigorous associations, by an investigation of the topics discussed by the study groups that they created, and of the content of the discussion.[47] By considering such questions as teaching and the language for teaching, the organization of local communities, economic development, interracial marriages, etc., their study of the political problems resulting from the colonial situation had wide influence.

[369] As for the Youth Council of Senegal, which comprised the majority of youth associations and was organized primarily in the cities, the orientation of its activity was even clearer. By the nature of its conflicts with the civil administration, by the content of its demands in behalf of youth, by the topics related to the future of youth whose study it was undertaking, it disclosed a "nationalist" potential of some vigor.

[665] It is essential to note the possible role of associations founded on ethnic or territorial bases, in particular those inspired by youths. Centers for contact with territories other than Senegal, they spread the foreign political influence of the parties predominating within them. This seemed to be the case, for instance, of the grouping of Senegalese youths with relation to the R.D.A. However, these associations were never directly linked with a given partisan organization. The political role that they might temporarily play was very flexible and therefore somewhat indeterminate.

Labor Unions

467 Labor unions should receive especial attention. The union movement in French West Africa is numerically one of the most important, and among the most active, in all of sub-Sahara Africa. [665] Like the political parties, it took form only in the immediate post-war period.

[P.16A]

467 In 1954 it had a membership about 100,-
000, or a little less than one-third of all
wage-earners. The unions have reached
[369] their greatest development in Senegal,
especially in the large cities. In 1954
this territory contained more than half
the union members in French West
Africa, more than a third of all Sene-
galese wage-earners. Dakar has a central
role in this field. It is the headquarters
for the largest unions, which were once
affiliated with French federations but
are now autonomous. Dakar also pos-
sesses a very active "Labor Exchange."
By itself it contains more than two-fifths
of the union members in Senegal.

467 To some extent the significance of
668 the unions is more than occupational
and economic. The degree to which they
[667] complete the political machinery of the
[665] city is suggested by a comparison of the
percentages of party memberships with
the percentages of union memberships.
Of 1,200 persons interrogated during the
Dakar survey noted above, about one-
half (52 per cent) stated they were
union members. The potential ambiguity
of such statements was suggested above
in connection with political parties.[48]
However, an analysis of the respondents
by socio-occupational categories gave
meaningful results. The average rate of
union membership was surpassed by
lower-ranking office-workers and govern-
ment employees, higher-ranking office-
workers and government employees, and
professional people; it was equalled by
semi-skilled workers. With the exception
[665] of the first, these are precisely the cate-
gories whose rates of party membership
were lowest. On the other hand, partici-
pation in union activity was distinctly
more important among the categories
comprising the intellectual elements than

[P. 16 B]

467 668 focussing on some of their asserted policies, revealed that the union struggle was regarded as directed essentially against the government. This must be interpreted not only with regard to the general traits of the colonial system but also in relation to the commanding role that the government played in labor. It was first of all the principal employer: in a city [369] such as Dakar, a little more than a third of the wage-earners were dependent upon it. It was responsible for setting the [465] minimum wage, and it has happened that owing to budgetary considerations and general policy it established a lower figure than non-governmental employers might have adopted. Finally, during the period [466] in question, a central problem was that of enforcing the Code of Overseas Labor, enacted by Parliament in 1952. The civil administration was responsible for its enforcement, and the strikes of 1953 were [468] designed to bring pressure on the administration so as to obtain a "fair enforcement" of its provisions. In the interviews mentioned above, conflicts with employers were scarcely mentioned as such. Employers were identified with the civil administration; the terms "civil administration" and "colonialism" seemed almost interchangeable. The adversary of the unions being essentially the civil administration — and a "colonial civil administration" — their action inevitably assumed political significance, broadly defined.[40]

467 668 563 (2) In the field of union activities the hostility between the European component and the African component of the urban population showed itself most vividly. This stemmed not merely from the fact that the civil administration and the employers represented the power of the "whites." It was also noteworthy that European workers, employees, and [468] officials almost invariably formed separate unions, with goals sharply opposed to

[P. 178]

467 668 both in France and in other countries. Participation in international congresses put them in contact with the ideological currents of the world. A study of the union press was very revealing in this regard.

[665] To the masses, unions proposed goals that were, in the period under consideration, far different from those of the political parties. Unions were in many ways more systematic and more vigorous. They were much less apt to make [563] differentiations along ethnic, religious, or other lines. The unity of action that they practiced banned their assimilating such hostilities and conflicts, whose meaning was foreign to them. These hostilities yielded before the fundamental hostility brought out by union action. The near-unanimity with which the directives of the union have been followed is very [571] significant. For the elites, on the other hand, unions offered, in an era in which the forms and matrices of customary political expression appeared too narrow, a wider and more adequate field of action. Unionism supplied the most accessible agencies for sharing in power of the modern sort. The intellectual elites furnished [571] the substance of the union framework and played a dominant role on their executive committees.[52] Located at the very center of situations of tension and conflict, they found in union activities the most effective way of asserting modern views and of surmounting the limits barring their advancement in the political and occupational fields.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1956

668 ●369 Such were the chief aspects, in a period of transition, of the political life of the large Senegalese urban centers. In the subsequent four years, great changes have occurred. Senegalese political individuality — considerably modified by that of the "old cities" — has remained clear, but it has in great part shifted to

[P.18B]

other fields.

668 In the "old cities," changes have taken
● 369 place that were already evident when the
investigations noted above were being conducted. The importance of these facts must be emphasized:

(1) The separation between the cities and the countryside, and more particularly between the old cities and the rest of the territory, is becoming less sharp. This fact has already been pointed out in connection with recent demographic developments and the growth of the B.D.S. There are other indications. The
571 intellectual elites have more diversified
668 origins; though the oldest nuclei of urban
369 population remain important in their
composition, they are steadily decreasing in size. The bonds among the different sections of the territory are tightening. On the other hand, the old elites are becoming active outside city boundaries, and give a place in their considerations to the problems of rural modernization and evolution. Certain projects established by the youth associations and the unions have contributed to this orientation.

(2) These facts are connected with a shift in generations that has extensive effects. The attitude of youthful elites has been different; they feel themselves competent to assume broader responsibilities.[58] At the same time they are diverging more or less impetuously from the paths of "assimilation," and are striving to rediscover and revive specifically African values. An effort to prove themselves individually by integrating themselves into the existing system is being succeeded by an effort to prove themselves as representatives and guides for a host that must be freed from this system. This is a trend toward nationalism, in the widest sense of the term.

668 (3) In the coastal cities, the grow-
369 ing strength of racial tensions since the
563 last war cannot fail to encourage such a

[P. 19 A]

668 change. The vast increase in the num-
● 369 ber of Europeans, their greater occupa-
[563] tional diversification, the much stronger
reaction to the facts of discrimination, and multiplication of competitive situations — occupational or otherwise — are the most obvious phases of this major phenomenon.[54]

As these factors have come into full operation, a new phase of political life has opened. These are its principal traits:

668 (1) From 1956 on, in unions and in
politics, secessions from the original
665 French bodies — confederations or par-
[467] ties — have multiplied. Previous remarks
indicated the development of this process among unions. After some delay it affected the S.F.I.O. itself, which was transformed, not without difficulties, into the African Socialist Movement. The assimilationist tradition declined, or at least was no longer proclaimed openly. After the parties became autonomous, the distinction between direct and indirect forms of political expression began to disappear. Extremist demands of a nationalistic character found expression within the parties, and worked effectively there after 1957 (at the time when the new "organic law" authorized the first Senegalese government).

(2) To a certain degree, the very old Senegalese political tradition once more became a driving force. At the same time the marginal elements, whose exist-
[571] ence was particularly marked among in-
tellectuals, entered into real politics,
chiefly within the framework of the B.D.S. They comprised the left wing of the new Senegalese Populist Bloc (B.P.S.), which stemmed from the B.D.S., and shared in the creation of the African Convention, which is striving to extend outside Senegal the strictly autonomous orientations of the B.D.S. They tried to organize the B.D.S. as a

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

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[53] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).

[54] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Le groupement européen de Dakar," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.*, XIX, 1955.

[P.19C]

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668 665 mass-party, but in patterns very different from those prevailing in the "old cities." Finally, their influence has been decisive in attempts to regroup the Senegalese parties, "disregarding personal and doctrinal differences." It has been a question of wiping out the fundamental hostility that typified post-war Senegalese political life, which — as we have seen — had more than a purely political significance. This effort led, not without difficulties, to the creation of the African Regroupment Party (P.R.A.). The former rivalries were still evident, though in a diminished and less forceful manner, during 1958-1959. The youthful elements of the B.P.S. at first helped provide the latter with leadership of the other territorial parties. It was they who, at the Congress of Cotonou, introduced the first outspoken assertion by the P.R.A. in favor of independence.[55]

(3) However, the influence of the
● [369] political tradition of the old cities has not been entirely discarded. Added to that of the conservative religious leaders, it helps account for a return to a moderate stand on the part of Senegal. The campaign for the referendum of 1958 showed

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36 leaves the principal streets, the landmarks disappear, /157/ all the parcels resemble one another, crossroads at angles succeed crossroads, wooden structures are lined up one after the other, different and yet similar. The contrast is therefore great between Pikine and the so-called irregular quarters of Dakar, Wakhinane or Baye Gayndé. One is easily lost in both cases; in the second, it is because of the disordered jumble of lanes that wind in every direction, whereas in the first it is because of the geometrical regularity of the streets and the almost perfect alignment of enclosures and walls, which finally eliminate all originality and every distinctive sign. It is impossible, on the other hand, to compare Pikine with the Médina or the new quarters. In the latter, the streets are paved, sometimes lighted, electricity is common in the windows of the houses, and the buildings of durable material far outweigh the wooden huts. In the former, on the contrary, only the broad axes are tarred, while elsewhere sand is king, and although here and there one finds some durable buildings outside the two districts, the great majority of the huts are of wood, sometimes of straw. Village, shantytown, or city? One does not know how to answer this question. Moreover, another contrast, to which reference has already been made, complicates it: the difference which distinguishes the two districts of the ICOTAF and the Pépinière, on the one hand, from the other quarters of Pikine on the other. The former are actually comparable to Ouagouniaye or Bopp, and therefore this duality of habitat, and consequently of living conditions, leads to a modification of the initial question: Is Pikine not made up of a city and a village? Is not the unity of the Pikine agglomeration merely artificial?

175 One is more inclined to believe this if one considers
369 the origin and history of the district. Before 1952 Pikine did
423 not exist, and instead the bush stretched out, with monkeys,
jackals, etc. Only this bush belonged to the state, and it
[166] was on these government lands that it was decided to relocate
the inhabitants of the irregular quarters who had to be expelled from Dakar, in order to realize the planned works of urbanization.

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175 urbanization. An initial slice was portioned out, and a
369 parcel was allocated to the head of each family that was
[423] expelled. Ownership granted an uncertain title, but it could
become definite if the occupant improved his parcel by building
a durable dwelling on it. At first the authorities hardly
believed in the existence of Pikine; there was no easy communication
with Dakar, since the auto road did not yet exist,
there was no connection by express bus, no stores, etc. It
was believed that the people expelled would return to occupy
other lands on the outskirts of Dakar. Contrary to all expectation,
/158/ Pikine lived, prospered, and grew by the
same process that had given it birth, to the point that today
[435] the parcel which originally had no value costs from 30,000
to 40,000 francs. On the other hand, the dwellings that
the Office de l'Habitat has now built in the districts are
[426] sold on credit to those who have the desire and the means to
obtain them.

Pikine thus originated through an administrative decision; it is an agglomeration which has no tradition, no past, a city of recent date and entirely created. Moreover, this brief historical account brings to light another difference which has to do with the mode of peopling it: in the districts it is voluntary, while in the quarters it has been more or less imposed by the administration.

121 This assemblage of peculiar traits make Pikine a very interesting city from the sociological point of view. The investigation, which was conducted during the latter half of 1960, pursued a threefold goal: first, to collect a certain number of general data which would complete or confirm those which had already been gathered; then to examine to what extent the difference in housing conditions did or did not produce a perceptible difference in behavior and style of living, especially with regard to the family; finally, in correlation with the preceding problem, to study the evolution of family behavior in an urban environment and to observe the appearance of new familial structures better adapted to an urban environment than the traditional family.

/165 cont./

167 and the Others (some Manjack and Diola are an exception)
166 come from a distance and that it is therefore normal to see the men emigrate to Dakar and the women remain in the country. On the other hand, one can expect the native Wolof or Sérère women to accompany their husbands, fathers, or brothers to join them when they are settled in the city. An anomaly already pointed out exists no less in this case: Pikine appears somewhat if not altogether like a city reservoir of women, at least like a refuge for them.

/166/ II. Place of Origin and Date of Arrival

166 If one considers the history of Pikine, a preliminary question arises which does not bear on the "where-did-you-come-from" or "when-did-you-arrive?" and which is this: "why did you come to Pikine?" Indeed, let us not forget that in the beginning the Pikine population consisted only of the people who were expelled from the irregular quarters of Dakar, to whom a parcel of land was granted in compensation. The problem is to know whether in 1960 the situation had not changed. Here is the average percentage of the heads of families expelled out of the total, and within each ethnic group. /Table 3 appears here./

In the districts one does not count any family head expelled, since, upon their request, they have all been housed by the following results for the other quarters: 45% of the heads of families have been expelled, and 46% have not. This test is important because it proves that in eight years the mode of the peopling of Pikine has radically changed: from being forced to depart, it has today become voluntary. Another fact is significant for this evolution and its meaning: one finds in our sample a score of families, say 8.2%, who came directly from their former residence to Pikine without going by way of Dakar, and all except one arrived in the course of the year preceding the investigation. The village migrants come to Pikine for the same reasons that impel ● [369] them to come to Dakar, and the inhabitants of Rufisque or of Thiès do not think of leaving the city to settle in Pikine.

[Text continues on p. 16--Analyst]

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166 369 Coming to Pikine means coming to the city, and that is an indication of urban maturity which shows that Pikine is tending toward a relative sociological autonomy with respect to Dakar (1). /167/ /Table 4 appears here./

> 1. Autonomy does not mean independence, and it is quite certain that Pikine is a result of Dakar and that without Dakar there would be no Pikine. We wish to say simply this: migration to Pikine effectively brings about insertion into an urban environment through its distance from the Dakar agglomeration, and permits a migrant to participate in the economic and social advantages of the city.

166 /168/ As for the high percentages of non-expelled among the Peul, Moors, and the other ethnic groups, it is difficult to give a reason for them. All that one can suggest [563] as far as the Moors are concerned is that they are chiefly merchants and that they establish their shops where the population is to be found. It is therefore normal that their presence in Pikine is the result, not of compulsion born of expulsion, but of choice for commercial motives.

Except for several hundred children less than five years old, no resident was born in Pikine. Two things are interesting to know:

1) Where do they come from, what is the respective proportion of their region of origin?

2) When did they arrive in Dakar?

Here is first, for the male heads of families, a detailed table, in absolute figures, for the places of birth divided according to age classes, and then the table in percentages from the principal regions, regrouped this time into only five categories in order to make the principal tendencies more apparent. /Table 5 appears here./

/170 cont./

Table 7

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Ethnic Group	W	S	T	P	M	B	O	Av.
Age	28.1	25	28.9	25.5	28.9	25.6	27.2	27.9

The Sérère leave their homes at a younger age than the others, whereas the Toucouleur and the Moors are the oldest.

If we compare this last result with the tables of the places of origin in each age class, we may reasonably suppose that the first wave of migration toward Dakar set out from Thiès and from the Valley and in a lesser proportion from the outside. A second wave followed it, coming from Baol, and in recent years Thiès and the Valley have again recovered first place. The Diola in Pikine are too few in number to enable one to obtain valid data on the subject of their migrations.

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A final point merits examination: what does their arrival in Pikine mean for the people of Pikine? Or, what experience of the urban environment have they had before this date? For that we have divided the replies into seven categories: those who, before Pikine, lived in only one city, for example, Dakar or Rufisque, and those who have always lived in a city but have known several residences. Then we took as a criterion for the others the age of their arrival in Dakar: before 15 years, between 15 and 30, between 30 and 50, and over 50. A final category is made up of those who come directly from the bush to Pikine. Here (p. 23) are the results in percentages and by ethnic groups:

It is certain that the age at which one arrives in the city has a considerable influence on the facility of adaptation to the urban environment, and that the difference is great between the citizen who has always lived in the city and the peasant who comes there looking for work at the age of 40 or 50. The preceding table therefore permits one to understand from a certain point of view the degree of acculturation to an urban environment of the Pikine population.

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369 It will suffice to regroup together the first three categories -- since one can combine with the citizens those who arrived in the city when they were still children -- as well as the last three, and to leave the fourth intact. /171/ /Tables 8 and 9 appear here./

A third of the family heads are therefore original citizens, a little more than a third is made up of people who arrived in the city between the ages of 15 and 30, and a little less than a third arrived after the age of 30.

On the other hand, if one considers the differentiation by ethnic group, one finds that the Sérère come ahead of the
[167] Wolof, whereas the Moors rob the Toucouleur of last place.

A comparison of the respective rates of urbanization in the districts and in the quarters is very instructive: /172/ /Table 10 appears here./

The contrast between the two lines is very distinct: the proportion of citizens which is close to 60% in the districts is reduced to one-fourth in the quarters, whereas one sees the opposite phenomenon for the category of the Pikine people who arrived in Dakar after the age of 30. Another indication is worth keeping in mind: the Toucouleur are the only ethnic group among whom this difference disappears almost completely, and among whom the peopling of the districts shows the same structure as that of the quarters.

One may sum up the preceding results in the three following remarks:

1) Two-thirds of the adult population of Pikine are country people, the majority of whom arrived in Dakar at the age of about 30, the most important period of immigration being the one after the war.

2) A clear difference distinguishes the districts from the other quarters: in the former, the mode of peopling is solely voluntary and one counts three citizens out of five family heads; in the quarters close to half of the families were originally forced to leave Dakar where they first sought lodgings, and one finds there only one citizen out of five.

[Text continues on P. 26--Analyst]

Table 8

Have lived \ Ethnic Group	W	S	T	M	O	Av.
Only one city	6.5	26.3	4.7	7.1	3	6.6
Always in the city but in several places	27.1	10.5	10.5	14.2	25.8	21.9
Arrived in Dakar before the age of 15	2.8	5.3	7	0	4.5	3.8
Arrived in Dakar between 15 and 30	34.4	52.6	40.6	28.5	42.4	38.3
Arrived in Dakar between 30 and 50	17.8	5.3	30.2	43	18.2	20.4
Arrived in Dakar after 50 years of age	5.7	0	2.3	0	0	3.6
Arrived in Pikine directly from the village	5.7	0	4.7	7.2	6.1	5.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

10: Thoré-23 - S-5 (1960) 1962 MS37 Senegal MS 37

Table 9. Rate of urbanization

	W	S	T	M	O	Av.
Citizens	36.4	42.1	22.2	21.3	33.3	32.3
Migrants to the city between 15 and 30 years of age	34.4	56.6	40.6	28.5	42.4	38.3
Migrants to the city after 30 years of age	29.2	5.3	37.2	50.2	24.3	29.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

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10: Thoré--24 S-5 (1960) 1962 MS37 Senegal MS37

166
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Table 10

Ethnic Group		W	S	T (1)	O	Av.
Citizens	Q.	32.2	37.5	21.6	32.1	24.3
	D.	94	66.7	25	40	59.5
To Dakar between 15 and 30 years of age	Q.	30.5	62.5	40.5	39.3	39.1
	D.	6	0	41.7	60	28.6
To Dakar afte 30 years of age	Q.	31.3	0	37.9	28.6	36.6
	D.	0	33.3	33.3	0	11.9
Total	Q.	100	100	100	100	100
	D.	100	100	100	100	100

1. We have not mentioned the Moors since there is no Moorish family head in the districts.

10: Thoré--25 S-5 (1960) 1962 MS37 Senegal MS 37

/172 cont./

166
369 3) The migrations of the Toucouleur and the Moors show, for each of them, their own peculiarities, which give these two ethnic groups of immigrants an unquestionable originality.

/173/

III. Work, Socio-occupational Structure

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128 Three problems are interesting in this section: the socio-occupational distribution properly speaking, unemployment, and the place of work.

The crude results of the distribution of the occupations are too scattered to show the broad outlines of the structure. It has seemed to us preferable to regroup the various professions into six large categories and to present the table of percentages of each within each ethnic group. Let us specify what each category corresponds to: that without any occupation, we have put the marabouts who do not have any activity, whether they practice full time -- which is rare --, part time, or do not have any students at all. /Table 11 appears here./

It is necessary to add the merchants to the artisans. The category "manual workers" is the largest: it includes the /174/ laborers, orderlies, chauffeurs, in short, all those who do not have an occupational qualifications. By staffs one should understand foremen as well as office employees, accountants, or typists, provided they belong to private enterprises. Under the rubric of "officials" are listed all those who are concerned with public functions from the local or general staff: policemen, government officials, or employees of the municipality. For each ethnic group the first line gives the percentages in the quarters and the second the corresponding percentages in the districts. The bottom line shows the total result, and the two preceding ones the results in the quarters and in the districts.

This table deserves a brief explanation:

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[127] 1st. There are only very few cultivators. One would think that the proximity of the Niayes of Cape Verde and the importance of truck-gardening cultivation would favor

[Text continues on p. 28--Analyst]

/177 cont./

464 Proportion of persons over 50 out of the active labor
484 force 25.3%
162 Proportion of persons over 50 out of the workers
in Pikine 37%
Proportion of persons over 50 out of the workers
in Dakar 16%

[463] Thus, old people prefer the traditional trades, jewelers,
tailors, merchants, which can be carried on locally.

If one considers the fact that the active male labor force
numbers 5,530 individuals and that about 70% of this labor
force goes to Dakar to work, one can estimate the number of
workers whose place of employment is located in Dakar at
464 about 2,800. Another question pertaining to the frequency of
journeys to Dakar shows that 62% of the total labor force,
484 that is to say, about 3,700, make the trip at least once a day.
This means that not only the workers but the unemployed as
well go to Dakar daily. Dakar thus has a double attraction
for the workers of Pikine: as an actual place of employment,
494 and as a place of possible hiring. The two principal means of
484 transportation are: for the officials, the cars called "G.G.,"
thanks to which they can return for lunch at noon, and for the
great majority of others the express buses; only a few have
[493] personal means of transportation, mobylettes /bicycles with
motors/ or vehicles. The length of the automobile trip from
484 Pikine to the Sandaga market varies from 20 minutes to more
than half an hour depending on traffic difficulties. One must
add to this the time required to go on foot through the sand
from the concession to the bus stop. In a very general way one
can say that the worker leaves his house in the morning about
seven o'clock and returns to it in the evening between 6:45
and seven o'clock, provided that he does not have errands on
[369] the way. This quick analysis therefore shows the role of
[361] "bedroom community" that Pikine plays to a certain extent
in relation to Dakar.

462 After the male labor force, it is necessary to say a word
463 about female work. The great majority of the women do not
162 have any occupation other than that of housework: more than
two-thirds. The 32% who draw monetary income from their

S
W
SR
/178 cont. /

462 162 the jobs most thrust into the modern rhythm, like the last two categories of the saleswomen in the Dakar markets, are held by Wolof of Sérère women. The rate of activity of these last two is generally higher proportionately, since almost 40% of the Wolof or Sérère women are reckoned as having an occupation outside of the household, /179/ while this proportion drops to 13% for the Toucouleur and the other ethnic groups.

S 462 162 A final point deserves to be mentioned: although one finds some women devoted to traditional occupations in the sample of the districts and even though one or two stalls are to be found there, we have, in turn, not found any woman there who works outside as saleswoman, housekeeper, or typist; the female workers of our sample are all found in the stratum of the quarters.

S ●369 462 In conclusion one may say that acculturation to the urban environment by means of modern work seems for the time being to have left aside the female world. Except for the Wolof and Sérère sectors of the female population, the rest have remained untouched. It is only under the strong [462] pressure of economic motives that the women become reconciled to going to work, and the Sérère women give proof of more initiative than the others. But when this compulsion ceases and the woman again takes up her traditional behavior: housewife, and nothing but housewife. This return to tradition may seem astonishing; it is explained by the educational level of those whom we have called "literate." It is this point that should now be studied.

IV. Educational Level and Schooling

121 If belonging to a specific ethnic group constitutes a fundamental conditioning prior to settling in a city, the educational level, on the contrary, is both a sign and a factor of acculturation. On these grounds, therefore, it also has considerable importance when it is a matter of studying the possible variations of behavior, attitudes, and opinions. The initial results have shown that these were in fact, with

Table 26. -- 2) Districts

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	1	2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10 to 15	15 +	TOTAL
1										
2			2	1	2	2	1			8
3		1	3		4	4	3	5		20
4	1					1	2	4	1	9
5				1			2		1	4
6						1				1
7										
Total........	1	1	5	2	6	8	8	9	2	42

/194 cont./

511 of the family. This is an extremely important phenomenon. In
592 order to understand it better, a study of the group occupying the parcel is now in order.

427 A first distinction arises regarding the mode of occupation.
511 Aside from the tenants and owners of their parcels, there are also those who are neither the one nor the other and who live
[592] gratuitously in a hut that does not belong to them, generally because of their kinship ties with the owner. Here is the table in percentages of these three categories arranged by ethnic groups. /Table 27 appears here./

62% of the occupants are thus owners, but we have seen
[369] that only 45% have been expelled from Dakar and have therefore from this fact become owners of the parcel that has been granted

/194 cont./

511 them. As a result, a certain number of family heads, around 427 17%, are owners only because they have bought their parcel. [369] This fact therefore shows that Pikine has become a choice locality where it is worth the trouble to spend money in order to establish oneself, and thus corroborates the hypothesis set forth above, that the evolution of Pikine today attests to an indisputable degree of urban maturity.

In the districts one counts only 9% who are tenants; all the others are owners or on the way to it. But while the rent of a room in a hut located in the quarters costs an average of 500 francs, the price is much higher in the districts, and this income permits the owner, who for his part is obliged to make a monthly payment to the Office de l'Habitat hardly higher /195/ than the amount of the rent, to acquire at the end of five years a dwelling by paying, in a word, only a ridiculous amount. It is difficult to evaluate the frequency of this abusive practice; in our sample it was three out of four tenants.

351 511 Another point has to do with the possibility of dividing the parcel into half parcels or of two and even three homes being associated on the land of a single parcel. This possibility does not exist in the districts, where, in practice, economic obligations and the arrangement of the habitat as a rule require having only a single home per parcel. In the quarter, out of 264 homes, one counts 191 of them, namely, 72%, that are alone on the land; 46, or 17%, are in groups of two; and 27, or 11%, are in groups of three.

511 592 The types of association are very diverse, from the households which are united by a bond of kinship and which represent 22% of the cases of association, that is to say, 6% of the total, to homes living on two half-parcels rigorously separated. The most frequent case is that of two unrelated households living together, who share, if not the same hut, at least the same inner court, each having its fire and doing its cooking separately. In general, the families thus grouped contain only a limited number of members, the scantiness of a half parcel not being favorable to the installation of numerous families. Since this factor does not

/197 cont./

511 592 602 per home in the districts. This fact may be explained by two other reasons: on the one hand, the disappearance of homes reduced to single or divorced persons, in favor of the conjugal family; on the other hand, as part of this, an increase in the number of spouses.

2) Family solidarity is no less a patent fact in the districts than in the quarters. It works in two ways: the first consists of taking complete charge of the housing and support of brothers, nephews, or other relatives. This is shown in the figure of 38% of the families who extend beyond the framework of the conjugal family properly speaking. In this respect the inhabitants of the districts behave much the same as the others. But they make a greater effort with respect to the second form of family solidarity: sending money to relatives to all or part of their living expenses.

369 ● 3) The betterment of living conditions and the participation to a certain degree in the material comfort that the urban environment brings with it do not necessarily mean a rupture and an overthrow of traditional social behavior. On the contrary, on two points, polygamy and family solidarity, there is a reinforcement of these behaviors, and, if one may apply this terminology to Senegal, it is not "detribalization" which should be spoken of, but "supertribalization."

/198/

Conclusion

Despite its youth, Dagoudane-Pikine is a definite city no less than Dakar, although closely dependent upon the latter. It is a city by reason of its area, the size of its population, the effort undertaken with regard to equipment, especially with regard to schools, and finally by the type of work offered to an important part of the economically active population. It is also a typical African city, with its small number of durable buildings, the considerable unemployment, the large number of young people, and above all, its gross deficiencies of public equipment. We have not spoken of its health equipment; it is still terribly inadequate, although [944] [943]

/198 cont./

● 369 [444] [743] a pharmacy has opened since the investigation took place, and the construction of a maternity hospital is in progress... Some large sewer works are to be undertaken.

369 571 On the other hand, it is certain that the material difference between the two habitat groups, very distinct geographically, brings about and expresses an indisputable sociological difference. The population of the districts enjoys superior conditions of comfort, it is better acculturated to the urban environment, the educational level there is higher on the average, and, on the occupational level, one finds there a large proportion of officials and minor staffs of industry and commerce. All these factors therefore contribute to accentuating a certain separation between two social layers. But at the same time that integration into modern life and work and participation in the advantages and obligations of the urban environment alienate the inhabitants of the districts from traditional conditions, and by that even from their fellow-citizens who do not have the same advantages, a reverse movement of return to tradition or of reinforcement of former behaviors is discernible. There is thus not really a rupture: the family patterns, the relationships between man and woman, change less quickly than housing conditions, and this explains why the unity of the society has not been affected, at least not yet, by the recent change, and why the style of family life remains the same in the parcels of the quarters or in the enclosed concessions of the districts. A more detailed analysis of the conflicts of these contradictory forces belongs to another work.

ST. LOUIS

[8]

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The native of the large cities of Senegal, one from Saint-Louis in particular, is evolving, but his expenses for ceremonies of "pleasure," baptism and especially marriage, are evolving also, and unhappily much more rapidly. The young man looks for a way to be able to manage this vertiginous soaring of expenses; he struggles, if not to stop it, to curb it at least. Some associations have been formed in order to agree on a fixed sum which one [9] [Fig. 6 appears here] [10] is not to exceed, as for the expenses of marriage. They scarcely seem to give the anticipated result, their members not facing up to the strength of character required for the attacks, with innovation as the object. Nevertheless, one should cite the nearly general agreement of the members on the precept to "defy the tempest" and to pay no attention to the desires of their parents, parents-in-law, and spouses for having pompous nuptials. Those among them who do not feel capable of restraining their vanity by acting "poverty-stricken" avail themselves of the facilities that they have for [589] changing posts and contracting bush marriages (1). Most of them remain single.

What is the origin of these high expenses? We are going to look for it in the local customs, without any expectation of finding it in former times or in the laws of the Koran, which we have merely submitted to, and which in any case we are trying to adapt to our fancy. What are the phases of marriage? What expenses does each one require? We shall give them specifically as we consider the single case of a man from Saint-Louis. Saint-Louis is the "center of good taste" for the colony and serves as the model for it. Finally, do these exaggerated expenses have

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1. For the men and women of Saint-Louis, any woman who does not live in Saint-Louis or has no ancestors in this city is from the bush and hence is of mundane breeding and an inadequate housekeeper.

[10 cont.]

369 consequences with regard to celibacy and the orientation of
581 manners and customs? This will be the last part of this too brief sketch.

What is the origin of the expenses?

It is in large part in the social organization of the Senegalese Blacks before the introduction of Islam and before the French peace.

584 Marriage then depended upon the wishes of the fathers and mothers of the spouses. The marriage portion imposed was
583 enormous, even though proportional to the social rank of the fiancé and to his wealth. It was made up of captives and animals. In return, the wife, in order to maintain her dignity in the eyes of the husband and the co-spouses, joined her new residence with often as much wealth as she had received. This per-
[582] haps is the origin of the frequent unions between cousins, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew. The purpose of this for the family was to keep its wealth concentrated.

As Moslems, we have introduced the Koran and the Koranic marriage portion, different for a slave and for a free woman, with an assessment proportional to the wealth of the husband, but which is principle requires no costly pomp and which is not preoccupied with griots [singers, poets, storytellers].

With the French peace, the captives have been withdrawn from the exchanges, and the idea of replacing them with gold, money, or animals (now very vulgar property) prevails.

369 But with freedom the horizon was also widened. The
584 suitors, formerly localized and nearly always known in advance,
178 have multiplied. One originally from the Fouta is quickly transported to Sène and, without bloodshed, without abduction, can marry a girl whom many young men dream of winning. The rivalries, which not long ago were settled on the field of battle or by thrusts of daggers, have perpetuated themselves under the indifferent eyes of the Whites, but on the field of marriage and by thrusts of gold or banknotes (diamalé, rivalry for a woman).

ST. LOUIS

[10 cont.]

369 533 The griots, those "vipers' tongues," have put together new songs in order to make up for the loss of the spoils of war never to be hoped for again. Without exaggeration or error, one can assert that the very high cost of the marriage expenses is due [583] only to the griots, who, using their malevolent genius, contrast in their chants the generosity of such and such a man with the parsimony of the other, spicing all the praises with references to his always legendary and generous ancestors.

369 583 To dazzle the girl and her relatives with his generosity and his wealth, to wrest from the rivals acknowledgment of their poverty, to overwhelm with goods persons of inferior castes whose praises will never cease, to enrich the prestige and the dignity of his parents-in-law -- there is the origin of the enormous expenses which must be faced by those who marry in Saint-Louis.

The phases of Marriage and their cost

369 565 582 [584] This is not the place to show what role the girl plays in the act which is going to decide her life. Nevertheless, let us be permitted to affirm that today some freedom is permitted the girl in choosing a spouse, always with the condition that her choice must be a man of her rank. Native society is, in effect, compartmented, and the smith, the jeweler, the cobbler, the griot never becomes attached to a guer (2) woman with the permission of his parents. Conversely, the guer must remain in his domain, and the custom which formerly authorized the [631] chiefs to contract marriages with caste women, always under the pretense of conquest in battle, is tending to disappear.

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2. All the persons who do not belong to an inferior caste -- griot, cobbler, etc. Not to be confused with gor, free man, who is not a slave or a freed man.

ST. LOUIS

[10 cont.]

●369 584 So some young persons of the same rank are going to marry. Communication is maintained more or less secretly by neighbor women or more commonly by a caste girl, a friend of the future wife, until the young man is certain of success. Then he goes to make his "attack" with thrusts of banknotes; he must compel his rivals to yield to him. The parents of the girl are not supposed to know about the thousands of francs thus pledged, and the cost is not counted in the expenses of the marriage. When the rivals accept their defeat, the candidate makes his request [11] officially. Otherwise, the attack must continue until it is settled. Then the man announces his candidacy, and the real expenses for his marriage begin.

369 584 583 1. The Varugar. This is the sum that is deposited, with the approval of the parents of the two young people. It is a guarantee for the man that the girl will no longer receive any other candidate, and, for the girl, assurance of being obligatorily supported by the suitor. The amount of the varugar varies: fixed at 2,500 francs at the minimum, it easily reaches 25,000 to 30,000 francs among the "nouveaux riches" of the Black market place.

As the proverb says, however, it is a long way from the cup to the lips, and it is a long way between the varugar and the marriage. Even though the amount due first is within the reach of every purse, the actual expenses of the marriage are enormous, and the man has to set about with the utmost slowness to save what is needed. Need it be added that, faced with following fashion and dressing accordingly, the future spouses devote to that a large part of their earnings? In order to make haste, very often the young man goes on a "campaign" and returns at the end of several years (two to seven) bearing the sum required for the marriage and for the nuptials, the last two phases.

2. The N'dakutar. This is a lump sum of 1,000 francs at least (which sometimes exceeds 5,000 francs), which the suitor gives to the girl in order to be presented to her parents. Accepting the n'dakutar implies for the latter the duty of

[11 cont.]

369 584 583 dismissing all present or future suitors. Originally this was an indemnity to be shared among the unhappy rivals, or was intended as reimbursement for the advances collected by the parents of the girl without her knowledge. Some reputedly avaricious families demand it several times.

369 683 3. The Marriage Portion. Its amount does not rigorously follow the fluctuations which characterize the other expenses. It amounts to 2,500 francs and is fixed by a marabout, by converting the heads of cattle of Koranic law into French money. Religious in nature and hence escaping the whims of fashion, its importance is wholly secondary. One can delay five or six years or more before paying it. Many monogamous households get along very well, even though not a sou of the marriage portion has been paid. Payment becomes obligatory, however, when the husband wishes to contract a second marriage. [587]

4. Ngegenay (The Pillow). This is an optional expense, but one that good breeding requires. It consists of leaving under the wife's pillow a sum of money and a quantity of little gifts (perfumes, sandals, bracelets, etc.) the day after the first nuptial contact. It is like a manifestation of the joy that one felt upon finding his wife to be virgin. [585]

5. The Decoration. This is the essence of the Saint-Louis marriage. All of the expenses listed up to here are more or less private, or in any case little known, except for the marriage portion, by the neighboring quarters or the relatives far away from the city. For the Decoration, the payment is preceded by widely disseminated announcements several months in advance. It is exhibited before all the relatives of the married couple, their friends, their acquaintances, before all the persons of inferior castes, who go everywhere and who will repeat what they have seen, in brief, before the city.

Optional in the beginning, it today assumes such an obligatory character that only in Saint-Louis do the instructors dare to avoid it or to minimize its importance. Of what is the Decoration composed? Essentially of a box, a basket for effects and a basket of small goods, but most especially what one has been able to amass that is precious and rare, and which has not

[11 cont.]

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been distributed for the older children.

a) The Pani (the box). In appearance it may be ordinary or magnificent, according to the aesthetic inclinations of the sisters of the husband. Often it is an old metal box that contained tidbits. In any case it is not the appearance that interests us, but the contents, which generally are:

[301]

12 louis d'or 51;
2 gold necklaces, we say "chains";
2 pairs of gold earrings;
1 or 2 pairs of gold bracelets;
4 or 8 sautoirs, medals of gold which encircle the figure.

[435] The box is found already prepared among the jewelers. Its minimum price is 6,000 francs. Its value easily reaches 20,000 francs and more.

[585] b) The Basket for Effects. This is an expense of recent character and of practical import. Formerly, on the day of the nuptials, the husband gave his wife a bundle of banknotes as personal property accruing to her from her marriage. But the tradition that the woman should be generous made this money disappear immediately, distributed among the persons of caste who came from everywhere. I would have willingly given, if I had known it, the name of the first Saint-Louis man who replaced this packet of money with a quantity of clothing, thus putting his wife in a position to benefit from it herself. The basket actually contains articles whose number and quality vary, but which constitute a veritable trousseau no less, which may last for years. For an individual from a "great family" or a "peasant," it includes as much as:

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12 robes [boubous] of crepe de Chine (of which 4 of 8 meters each are obligatory, 160 francs per meter);
12 robes of rich bazin (4 obligatory of 8 meters each at 225 francs per meter);
4 camisoles, ordinary or of Lagos fabric;
[12] 4 camisoles of crepe de Chine (extravagantly cut to a length of 4 or 5 meters);

ST. Louis

[12 cont.]

369 12 silk headkerchiefs (6 obligatory, valued at 500 to
583 600 francs each;
291 12 kerchiefs with "edging" [mouchoirs de "bord"] (6
435 obligatory, valued at 300 to 375 francs each);
2 silk handkerchiefs;
4 Mauritanian mats, on which the objects are detailed, valued at 500 francs each, and most of all rare, which costs dearly.

369 685 c) Basket of Small Goods. This is a creation of the well-bred man of Saint-Louis, who during the 3 or 8 or 15 days that the nuptials last wishes the guests to be treated well. The young people of both sexes are supposed to crowd into the spacious rooms, suitably decorated and illuminated, and to be "overwhelmed" by the songs of the griots. The husband considers their rejoicings an imperious duty and offers them a basket generally containing several packs of cards, packages of toothpicks, perfume, razor blades, pipes, tobacco, incense, kohéal, fans, tidbits, etc.

369 d) The Gifts. These expenses are the final obligations
585 and bear the name of "decorations of castes." As we have noted,
565 since the first visit of the husband, the persons of caste have
not officially benefited further from his generosity or from that
of his wife. But custom requires that these people be gratified.
It should be noted also that the guers have their men of caste who
are faithful to them from father to son. In their presence and
when they are equal to their task. Whatever their fortune or
[596] rank (in the Europeanized society), a guer cannot address any other
persons of caste without their permission. Only one coiffeuse ar-
[302] ranges the hair of a young girl until her marriage, and one
[306] jeweler repairs or makes her finery. The marriage is the ceremony of their dedication and the occasion of proving to them
that they have not placed their confidence in vain. These
persons comprise two categories: that of the woman and that
of the man. Let us note at once that the latter cannot be too
demanding without showing a lack of the proper attitude. They
form part of the general staff of the husband, and, under penalty

[12 cont.]

369 585 565 of humiliation, they must, as must he, show proof of generosity.

How does one go about "decorating these persons"? There are the griots, the jewelers, the cobblers, and also ... the captives; the husband gives 1,000 francs or more to each grouping, and his relatives a supplementary sum, always distinct from that given by the husband, of such a nature that each caste receives 10,000 or 20,000 francs or more. This sum will be divided under the direction of the caste head.

585 369 This ceremony concludes the marriage, because immediately, for three streets around, there is nothing but hysteria and hubbub, with griots coming and going, as well as drivers (3).

3. We have not said anything about the expense for the food. Each morning during the whole period of the nuptials, the husband must give a sum large enough to provide food for all of his guests and those of the wife. It is obligatory for the parents of the wife to send supper to the mother of the husband on the first day. I have seen a case that merits being noted. On the occasion of a recent marriage, the parents-in-law sent from Saint-Louis to Louga a wagon of food, 25 large basins, "tolis," containing 25 foods estimated in 1939 at 4,000 francs, deducted from the meals of the mother, which were, it was said, transported by five or six carts.

Consequences of the high price of marriage on the manners and customs

369 178 584 581 Such expenses greatly hinder young people from marrying. Most of them, if they do not wish to remain single, are obliged to leave their city to contract bush marriages, which are almost

[12 cont.]

369 always temporary marriages, so great is the attachment of the
178 Saint-Louis man for his city and for the girls of his city. Al-
[584] [redacted]ion is very unfortunate for the boys, it is less
[581] ~~so~~ for the girls. Although some of them are still sacrificed very
young to rich old men, many wait to meet the young man of
[562] their choice before marrying. The marriages of infant girls
have become very rare: the girls of Saint-Louis now marry at a
[582] reasonable age, at about 20, much like French girls. It is a
369 profound change. Convinced of being obliged to wait a long
178 time for a husband, they are acquiring an independence that
562 their mothers have not known; they go out, they go to dances
where they dance European dances, they dare to sit at a table
[191] in a café, they dress according to their taste, they speak French.
They go to school without constraint, which is also a revolution,
and they, like the boys, look for a salaried position, which
allows them a very broad life, like single persons, and which,
within the household, frees them from the guardianship of the
[595] husband. Polygamy, which the modern [evoluées] women
generally refuse, is more and more rare in Saint-Louis (4).

[578] 4. A polygamous husband most often shuns the modern women for the sake of peace in his household, because the personal earnings of these women permit them to buy finery other than that which he periodically distributes to his spouses, and this provokes jealousy and quarrels. Recently a young female official was supposed to enter the home of a Saint-Louis official as the third or fourth wife. She opposed her parents and married according to her inclination.

Educated girls have long been judged quite harshly, but this is passing. Many of the young girls who married against the wishes of their parents have been quickly forgiven when the latter saw the good appearance of the household and the affluence

[12 cont.]

369 that [13] prevailed there. This has been made obvious by the
178 war; the modern households have suffered from economic diffi-
662 culties much less than the others, because the women proved to
[511] be much more skillful in getting out of difficulties with the little
that could be obtained.

369 Will the custom of such sumptuous expenses with regard
581 to marriage last? It is difficult to tell. It evidently greatly
satisfies the pride of the man of Saint-Louis by exhibiting his
[556] wealth and his generosity. If it makes marriage difficult for
young people, this is very regrettable, because the precious
years of youth are lost and the children will come too late; it
makes marriage the great affair of one's life, which is good,
[562] and it has contributed in a very large measure to the freeing of
the girls, which, except for some extravagances, is a great
benefit.

Diagne Oumar Syr

Instructor at N'Dioum
(Circle of Podor)

[17]

The Village of Cambérène (Dakar)

361 The village of Cambérène was founded about 1885 by the
175 gathering of tabilés [disciples] around their teacher, Li Mamou
Laye Thiaw, who had set up his dwelling near the watercourse
Der Gui N'Dargou to the northeast of Yoff (east of the present
gardens of the Government).

731 Li Mamou died in 1909, and his brother, Seydina Issa Laye
175 Thiaw, succeeded him at the head of the small zaouïa, which
622 in 1914 was the victim of an epidemic of the plague.

Seydina Issa decided, as is generally done in such cases, to change the location of the little village.

361 Considering his first location unfavorable, being too near the Niaye, he decided to establish it in the open air in front of the heights of the string of littoral dunes on the very edge of the sea, which should, he thought, be healthier.

Having ascertained that in Dakar an effort was made to
●[369] align the houses and to put straight and wide streets between them,
he resolved to order that, in establishing the new village, the
center of the site was to be the mosque, which, first constructed
[346] of wood and straw, was replaced in 1939 by a handsome edifice
of masonry.

To the north and south of the mosque, Seydina Issa laid out two parallel avenues east to west. He placed the dwellings of his family facing the entrance of the mosque, leaving open a large space which he had reserved to the east; at right angles to the principal streets, some north-south streets were laid out, and each family put its dwellings in the form of a U opening on the principal streets.

[18] [Fig. 1. appears here.]

The arrangement was subsequently respected, and the most recent of the 28 land-grants open on a third east-west avenue.

The curious fact of this very precise outline is not noted when one arrives at Cambérène by the road, nor when one goes about on foot within the village, and even the diagram on the map on a scale of 1/50,000 does not make it stand out. Thus, it was a

[18 cont.]

361



Fig. 1. Aerial view of the village of Cambérène.

surprise when the accompanying aerial photograph, taken at random during a flight at low altitude, revealed the prescribed arrangement of this village.

369 This attempt at urbanism merits notice as proof that evolution in Senegal can be circumspect and effectual and can adapt modern conceptions to local conditions.

G.J. Duchemin
(Dakar)

17: Mercier
● 369

MS37 Senegal MS37

/For a study of aspects of African society in the agglomeration of Dakar: family groups and neighborhood units, see category 116, pp. 2-57./

18: Savonnet MS37 Senegal MS37
369

[For information on the quarters of Thiès see category 116, pp. 12-20; on the economic activities of Thiès see category 116, pp. 21-27.]

MS37
Thies

361 /70/ New countries present the peculiarity that their important cities are established along the coast, for example, in South America and in Australia. West Africa is no exception to this rule: Dakar, Conakry, Freetown, Monrovia, Abidjan, Accra . . . are port cities. In contrast, cities in the interior are rarer; Bamako and Bobo-Dioulasso are important centers, but represent exceptions.

Thiès in Senegal does not entirely belong to either one of these categories. Located some 50 kilometers as the crow flies from the nearest port, it benefits from this proximity only in a very imperfect way. Nor is it a city of the interior; its economic relations with the port of Dakar do not permit such an appellation.

361
369 It is of recent creation and cannot, in contrast to Saint-Louis, Rufisque or Dakar, boast of a rich historic past (African or colonial); it no longer possesses that embryo of the old Creole middle class which would have been able to check its evolution toward the rapid formation of a more modern society, more Western in its conception. It is a new city that seems by a stroke of fate to have thrust out from the African bush as a kind of crossroads where the lines of modern communication have come to promote its fortune.

361
133 Before examining the different reasons which governed its implantation on such a site, it is advisable to place the city within the Senegalese countryside that surrounds it. When the traveler, leaving Dakar, takes the road or the railway which leads him to Saint-Louis, he leaves the Atlantic coast at the village of Bargny and then crosses the plain of Cape Verde over some 60 kilometers. A few moderate undulations occasionally break the monotony of the landscape; these are the Ndias "massifs." A little before the village of Pout, the eastern horizon is obstructed by a line of elevations giving the impression of sizable and brutal relief. Very soon, however, some ten kilometers from this village, one reaches the slope of Thiès. Its altitude is very slight; it culminates at 137 meters. The road and railway track ascend /71/ the face by a steep grade that makes use of a narrow defile called "Ravin des Voleurs" /Ravine of Thieves/. One quickly

/71 cont./

133 The presence of a marl-calcareous horizon at a slight depth, the arrangement of the layers sloping toward the east, has favored the formation of a perpetual phreatic layer close to the surface and capable of supplying all the wells of the Thiès plateau.

The Thiès slope describes a concave line 40 kilometers long which begins in the north at the height of Mont-Rolland
[361] and ends abruptly in the south at the height of the village of Tiao. The brow of the slope, with an average altitude of 100 meters, is cut broadly and deeply only by the "Ravin des Voleurs." At the foot of the slope there stretches a depressed, more or less swampy zone, /72/ /Fig. 1 appears here/ which borders it from north to south. Beyond Mont-Rolland, toward the northwest, accumulations of dune sand extend to the ocean (Fig. 1).

369
175 During the period of the pacification of Senegal by Faidherbe, Thiès was only a small village of unruly Sérère-None /Serer/, pillagers of caravans when the occasion pre-
[361] sented itself. This village was established near the actual site of the Faidherbe Redoubt, in a shaded and cool spot, hence the name "Diankhène" which was given to it and which means place of repose.

In 1856 Dakar was founded, and Saint-Louis developed.
[648] A treaty concluded with the damel of Cayor (2) authorized the
[206] installation of a telegraph line to connect these two cities. But the execution of the work came up against the ill-will of the damel and the continual insecurity that prevailed in the region of Thiès.

After the creation of the post of Mbidjem, near Lake Tanma, the /73/ post of Thiès was built in 1863. Its
[361
487] role was to pacify and to cover, in case of necessity, the troops that operated in the region. The latter, coming from Gorée and from Dakar, took the trail /piste/ from Rufisque to Pout and from there reached the post of Thiès and Cayor by way of the "Ravin des Voleurs," the only easy and direct passage that connected Cayor with the Cape Verde Peninsula.

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2. Damel, Wolof word meaning sovereign.

/73 cont./

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
OCÉAN
ATLANTIQUE
DIOBAS
DIAN DER
Lac de Mekhé
Lac Tanma
Mbidjem
Pallo
Mont Roland
Falaise
Lam Lam
Ravin des Voleurs
Vers St Louis
THIÈS
de Thiès
Pout
Sébikotane
Rufisque
DAKAR
GORÉE
Tiao
Popenguine
Vers Kaolak
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5

Fig. 1. The location of Thiès in Senegal. 1. Main paved road; 2. secondary road; 3. railroad; 4. swamps; 5. sand.

175 369 361 Verde Peninsula. As long ago as this epoch Thiès seems to have been a strategic point and support point of primary importance.

As early as 1880 the provinces of Diander and Diobas were pacified. The military posts lost their importance and were abandoned one after the other, for example, Nguiguis (near Tivaouane) and Mbidjem. Only the one at Thiès, because of its exceptional location, survived and developed.

175 369 499 244

2. The commercial escale (1880-1923).

The years of the decade 1880-1890 correspond to the period of the development of groundnut cultivation in Senegal and to the construction of the Dakar--Saint-Louis railroad.

/73 cont./

175 369 499 133 The surveys for the future course of this railway revealed that the shortest route would have to follow the Atlantic coast, but since this is bordered by dunes it would necessitate some important construction work. The passage across the slope of Thiès was also a serious obstacle, but the "Ravin des Voleurs" made access to the plateau possible; the line would thus follow the valley which cuts the brow of the hill, then the depression which follows the plateau to the east, and would pass in front of the military fort established at its extremity.

175 369 [361] The fortune of Thiès was made: as early as 1885, the date of the opening of the railroad, the merchants of Rufisque set up branches there; a plan for dividing the future city into lots was outlined. This plan, unfortunately, foresaw the development of the city only north of the line, along the trail connecting Thiès with Rufisque and Dakar. A Catholic [797] mission was established in the vicinity, and in 1893 the first civil administrator occupied the new residence built near the Faidherbe redoubt.

175 369 439 [496] [492] The groundnut policy developed successfully; 20,000 tons of groundnuts were shipped by rail from the Thiès station in 1890 (3). Commerce, however, was not established in [366] [441] permanent fashion in the *escale*: only during the period of trading (from November to May) did the European employees sent by the firms of Rufisque live in the city and buy groundnuts, millet, cotton ... at their branches; from May to November they returned to Rufisque, and most of the shops in Thiès were closed, the city seemingly dead.

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3. Convoys of camels competed with the railway up to 1910 and transported their cargo to the port of Rufisque. Thiès was the last stop before reaching the quays of embarkation 50 kilometers away.

/74/

175 The major part of the commerce was then concentrated
369 north of the railway; nevertheless, as early as 1895 some
[366] shops were established to the south, near the residence.
In 1890 Thiès had a permanent population of 1,200
[162] inhabitants. Some native quarters were established in the
175 vicinity of the commercial escale. The little village of
369 Thiès-None was shifted from the other side of the railway.
361 A native quarter was attached to the western part of the commercial zone; it was moved toward the south after the
plague of 1911 and took the name of Randoulème (a word
meaning in Wolof: remove yourself). Takhikao (storied
house in Wolof), established originally near the first storied
house belonging to Maurel and Prom, was ultimately pushed
back along the route to Saint-Louis (Fig. 2).

175 Little by little, while the military function fell asleep,
369 the development of commerce brought stable economic
[366] activity to the city. Until 1914 the city grew very little,
and its population amounted to only 2,400 inhabitants at that
[162] date; from 1885 to 1914 the city gained only 1,400 souls in
all.

The military function of the city recovered part of its
former importance during the war of 1914. The base of Thiès
[712] became a center of military training for new recruits. The
quarter of Diakhao adjoining the camp was enlarged by the
arrival of the families of the military. On the other hand,
commerce was threatened during this period. The French
175 personnel, which since the beginning of the century had been
369 permanently established, was summoned to the colors. In
441 order to avoid shutting up shop, the Levantines were called
563 upon. The latter had made their appearance in Senegal as
early as 1895 and up to that time had played only a very
secondary role in the market of the city: selling candles,
matches, beads... The war of 1914 facilitated their entry
into the lucrative activity of trade.

MS37
Thies

/74 cont./

369 3. The establishment of industries (1923-1945).

498 [175] The event which gave a decisive impulsion to the commercial escale and which brought Thiès to the rank of a city was without question the establishment of the railroad repair shops in 1923. As early as 1907 the first work had been undertaken to connect Thiès to Bamako directly by rail; difficulties of all kinds and then the war impeded it. In 1923 only the junction of the two sections had been made at Kidira on the Falémé. There was some concern to have the repair shops of the Thiès-Niger established in the center nearest the coast. Thiès, head of the line, was chosen as [162] the center. In a few years the city grew by 10,000 souls, going from 3,000 inhabitants in 1921 to 13,000 in 1929.

369 441 The opening of the railroad yards not only brought about the arrival of many workers and their families, but at the same /75/ /Fig. 2 appears here/ time gave a strong impulsion to commerce. The regular injection of credits by this new industry brought about a renewal of commercial activity which showed in the expansion of the firms already established and the creation of new stores. The Africans, who up [472] [563] to that time worked solely for the profit of firms under European management and who had been kept out of the retail business, opened small shops for their own profit (4).

The latter, appealing to an essentially native clientele, multiplied as soon as the economic scope of the city increased. At the same time the number of artisans increased.

[563] After the war, the Levantines, who had been the only ones able to carry on commerce in complete tranquility for four years, set up businesses for themselves. Their experience

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[177] 4. It is the military, it seems, who brought back from France this idea of establishing for themselves small grocery stores copied from those encountered in the villages of the mother country.

/75 cont./

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
N
Vers Mt Rolland
Ngent
Mission
Escale
Diekhao
Gare
Piste de Dakar
Vers Dakar
Camp militaire
Résidence
Piste de St Louis
Vers St Louis
Takhikao
Village Bambara
Vers Diourbel
Piste de Mbour
Piste de Khombole

Fig. 2. Thiès in 1910.

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563 acquired during the period of hostilities, their knowledge of the language, and their great aptitude for adapting themselves to the customs of the country and for living under very curtailed conditions /76/ made these newcomers serious competitors whom French commerce tried, but in vain, to eliminate. All the concessions of the northern escale were now occupied (5); the

5. There was no question of extending the first lots farther to the north; the concession ceded to the Mission prevented such an extension.

newcomers -- chiefly Syrians -- set up their factorerie (6) in the

[443]

6. Factorerie: shop where everything is sold and where at the same time

/76 cont./

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441
563
local products (groundnuts, millet . . .) are bought or bartered for.

443 still almost empty quarter of the residence.

369 433 458 Already the economic equilibrium of the city was no longer essentially based on the commerce of trade, subject to price fluctuations, but also on the budding industry which assured it a certain stability. It is true that the latter, barely acquired, was put to a harsh test during the world crisis from 1930 to 1934. In the course of this difficult period the price of the groundnut slumped. The old commercial firms which depended solely on the trading were no longer able to meet their payments and liquidate their stock: Société Française du Sénégal, the firms Lacombe, Latrille... The sounder establishments were themselves obliged to close their city branches temporarily, for example, Peyrissac, Maurel Frères. Nevertheless one did not see here a complete slump in commerce with spectacular failures such as occurred in Dakar, but rather commercial liquidations, sales of stocks that were repurchased by Levantines and wholesale companies.

[471] [563] The effects of the crisis, which ended in 1934, resulted in a redistribution of commercial ownership, a re-adaptation of commerce to the new requirements, along with the definitive establishment of the Levantines.

369 498 433 At this date the fusion of the two railroad companies, the Dakar--Saint-Louis and Thiès-Niger, stimulated an expansion of the industrial quarter by regrouping at Thiès the workshops originally installed at Dakar for the Dakar--Saint-Louis railway.

369 [162] [511] [361] On the eve of the Second World War the city reached the figure of 22,000 inhabitants, 1,200 of them Europeans. The almost complete disappearance of epidemics, the better food supply, the construction of comfortable houses (Ballabey district created as early as 1925 for the railway workers, villas for officers) permit metropolitan families to settle in a permanent fashion. In a parallel manner, the native

/76 cont./

369 361 quarters spread out toward the southwest in the vicinity of the workshops: "Derrière la voie ferrée /Behind the Railroad/" and "Bambara" developed on the outskirts of "Randoulène."

4. Thiès, industrial and strategic city (after 1945).

369 712 The Second World War temporarily slowed down the economic activity of the city. As in 1914, one saw a /77/ very earnest renewal of the military function: an autonomous motorized detachment (D.M.A.) was established in the old military camp which was considerably enlarged; an air base created a little before 1940 doubled the one of Ouakam installed at the gates of Dakar and now inadequate.

The experience of the last war had demonstrated the possible vulnerability of Dakar. Strategy demanded the formation of a strong base in the rear areas of the capital of French West Africa to support it if the need arose. The location and the proximity of Thiès met these requirements. In order to give maximum effectiveness to this enterprise, the means of communication between the two cities had to be improved, the military camps reorganized and modernized. [491] A strong and wide road was built between these two cities. Its course was different from that of the old trail; it entered Thiès not from the west but from the south. The military camp covered several dozen hectares, the installations of the air base were improved and enlarged, and the annexes permitted the permanent establishment of officers and troops (Fig. 4).

369 361 From 1947 to 1952 intense activity prevailed in the city. The entire district, except the old escale, formed a veritable workshop where vast avenues cut across the native quarters, where plazas were created, where zones of green were distributed. [498] In the industrial precinct of the Dakar-Niger, new workshops intended for the repair of Diesel tractors and the construction of passenger coaches were installed. New villas along more modern lines for officials and railway workers rose almost everywhere in the city. The old escale, paralyzed within too narrow limits, was aroused

/77 cont./

369 361 and attempted as far as possible to renovate the lines of its architecture and to offer to its clientele pleasant salesrooms with tastefully arranged windows and displays.

The native quarters for their part were enlarged and improved, penetrating deeply into the neighboring bush. The quarters of "Randoulène-Sud" /South Randoulene/, of "Grand Thiès" /Greater Thiès/, and of "Médina" were new creations. Diakhao and Takhikao develop. Some African officials and [342] merchants have since begun some construction of small villas in durable material that replace the traditional straw hut or the simple plank hut.

[162] The growth of the population was considerable; from 24,000 in 1945, it reached 40,000 inhabitants in 1953, 2,700 of whom were Europeans.

369 433 Thus, from the founding of the first military post near the village of Thiès-None up to our time, the growth of Thiès has been accomplished without any shocks. It has not known the great hopes of Dakar, the depressions, the failures of Rufisque and Saint-Louis. The /78/ wars, the crises are shown in the graph of its evolution only as simple plateaus (7).

369 361 433 Its fortune, as we have tried to show, comes from its exceptional site at the entrance of the sole path of access to the plateau of Thiès, along with the relative proximity of Dakar. Through the action of these three essential functions, commercial, industrial, and military, it enjoys an economic equilibrium that seems more stable than that of the other cities of Senegal.

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7. G. Savonnet, "Evolution démographique de la ville de Thiès /Demographic Evolution of the City of Thies/," Notes africaines, pp. 122-124.

/82 cont./

357 [577] [524] [364] heat heavily laden with the most diverse odors, they play cards or checkers. There is no question in such crowded quarters of removing all the household rubbish and used water. It is frequent in the course of walks within this zone to run into piles of refuse or to cross several ditches full of stagnant, dirty, and malodorous water. Sometimes at a bend in a street one is surprised to discover some straw huts in the middle of a spacious courtyard (Plate XI A).

361 351 The quarters of the south, newly divided into lots, remind one of that of North Diakhao with its embryos of streets intersecting at a right angle, /83/ its huts arranged in a loose order inside each square and huddled in the shade of mango trees.

Each concession of Médina, in distinct geometric forms, marked off by tapades of millet stalks, is of a meticulous neatness that contrasts with the other quarters of the city. [795] This strict order, this rigid arrangement where all imagination is banished, is a reflection of the peculiar character of the Moslem Murid sect that occupies it.

361 The Cité Pillot, finally, built for the higher operatives and the specialized workers of the Dakar-Niger, to the south of the Bamako railroad, gives the appearance of a series of buildings that resemble those of barracks. The arrangement [342] of the new constructions is that of small houses with twin apartments.

● 369 Thus, each of the European-type quarters, like the native quarters, possesses some particular trait or even its own individuality, which seems to correspond to a definite social structure: milieu of merchants, millieu of officials, milieu of artisans, of laborers, of cultivators.

At the same time, each stage of its evolution has stamped this or that part of the city with its original imprint, which makes it possible to follow quite easily the successive periods of its expansion.

/88 cont./

871 Education has developed in a remarkable fashion; each year more than 2,000 school children attend the public and private schools. The number of young pupils also has increased steadily, but only for the past dozen years. The modern college, because of its inadequate size, refuses numerous requests for admission every year. In spite of the annual opening of new classes, it can be estimated that only one child out of three of school age attends school.

●369 563

4. The Social Structure of the City

1. The Whites.

In 1955 we are far from the heroic epoch when Thiès was considered an unhealthy place and when the mortality was very high. The arrival of the first European families at the beginning of this century could be considered an important event. It marked the possibility of permanently implanting a white colony in the escale.

The climate has been made more bearable by the many improvements in comfort that have created a propitious atmosphere for the establishment of family life. [162] In 1953 there were almost 1,200 women out of 2,700 Whites.

369 563 573 The European population is divided into a certain number of "milieus": army, operatives of the Dakar-Niger, officials, merchants. Contact between any of these assemblages is very loose: with few exceptions the relations between individuals belonging to different groups are not very frequent; there is visiting only among people of the same background. The transfer of personnel, which is repeated every two years, has the result that the time of residence is not ordinarily long enough for a newcomer to break away from his milieu. A certain apathy and a lack of curiosity limit these human contacts with neighboring groupings.

The armed forces, and Dakar-Niger, because of the very conception of their internal organization, live in isolation. Each of them has its co-operative, its club, its

/88 cont./

369 bar, and sometimes its cinema and its swimming pool; /89/
563 they form a small city that is self-sufficient. The officers
of the administration by their very functions seem to have
573 more extensive relations in the different milieus.

Among the merchants and artisans, the problem is
different because of the very stability of their work and the
length of their stay. In this commercial and artisan milieu
one could define three very distinct "groupings": the "old
ones" who have lived in Thiès for several decades; the "new-
comers" from after the war; the Levantine-Moroccan grouping.

The first are not very numerous; they live in their old
factorerie, which, in spite of recently added arrangements,
preserves something old-fashioned about it. They are able to
191 talk to the native in his own language. Their life, while it
has become more comfortable, is lived modestly; they go
out little and entertain only among themselves. Every two
484 or three years they take a few months' rest in France during
the season of cultivation in Senegal. As a result, their life
is quite withdrawn.

The second group, made up of recent emigrants, is en-
tirely different. It primarily contains bachelors or young
married people more or less in love with adventure perhaps,
but above all seeking a broader existence. They generally
427 live in one or two rooms rented from a Levantine or Moroccan.
Since it is difficult for them to cook at home, the restaurant
265 provides for them. In general they adopt a careless attitude,
484 are restless, and speak loudly; their first savings are intended
for the purchase of a motorcycle or a small car which will en-
493 able them to escape from the city. Moreover, they are per-
546 sistent spectators at the four local cinemas, which have a
new program every day.

The group of Levantines is different from the two pre-
ceding ones; their life is spent between their shop and their
484 apartment. Rare changes take them to Dakar on business.
Their interior is comfortable, arranged according to Oriental
353 taste; they love vivid colors and pile up cushions. They
484 rarely go back to their country of origin; some of them have

S /89 cont./
369 not left Africa for 30 or 40 years. Others, more favored by
563 business, take a trip each year to France or western Asia.
573 Generally, the children pursue their studies in their parents'
484 land of origin and speak French and English fluently. This
new generation of Levantines, to whom one must add a few
191 Moroccans, is becoming integrated little by little in the
529 metropolitan milieu through the medium of sports associa-
tions and hunting parties. These amicable relations will
578 perhaps favor to a certain degree a closer relationship between
477 these groups which are so often antagonistic on the com-
mercial level.

/90/

2. The Africans.

S According to the census statistics gathered in 1953, the
369 ethnic composition of the city was the following: out of an
563 African population of 36,050 inhabitants, the Wolof appeared
162 as the most numerous and, with 23,624 individuals, made
W up 65.5% of the population; the Toucouleur, numbering
162 3,356, represent 9.3% of the total; the Bambara (Sudanese,
rather) attained third place and accounted for 6.8% of the
369 population with 2,447 individuals; the Sérère, although
settled in the vicinity of Thiès, included only 1,856 persons,
namely, 5.1% of the total. The Peul and the Moors, respectively 1,074 and 843 individuals, made up 3% and 2.4%
of the total. The Sarakolé and the various other groups,
represented, respectively, by 650 and 2,190 members,
formed 1.8% and 6.1% of the population.

W These details speak eloquently of the ethnic hetero-
162 geneity of the Thiès population. Still, it should be empha-
369 sized that the number of true Wolof is certainly less than the
statistical figure given; after a stay of some ten years spent
563 in Thiès, the Khassonké or the Sarakolé, who will have lost
almost all contact with his country of origin, who will have
married a woman not of his race, who will have adopted
the language, the food, the corresponding Wolof name, will
speak of himself as belonging to this group.

/90 cont./

369 As one may well imagine, the most populated zones are
563 the ones located near the railroad workshops; Derrière-la-
[161] voie-ferrée, Randoulène, and Bambara have densities from
102 to 125 inhabitants per hectare (14). These quarters are at the same time the places of the most complete intermingling; almost 40% of the population is made up of elements foreign to the region of Thiès where Wolof and Sérère live.

We quote these figures, of course, in order to pose the problem of contacts between the various ethnic groups and of the relations between individuals.

369 Nevertheless, we should set apart the Moor group,
563 whose conduct clearly differs from that of its colored neigh-
573 bors. The Moors do not have any relations with the Blacks, except for purely commercial reasons. They meet only among themselves, travel only accompanied by one of their fellows. Their sobriety, their sense of thrift (often carried to excess), and their frigid calm estrange them from the often expansive temperament of the Blacks. Perhaps a certain feeling of superiority toward the population which they dominated before our arrival is the origin of this profound gap between people of identical material circumstances.

369 /91/ The Black masses seem at first estimate to form
563 a homogeneous whole. Nevertheless, among the elements which compose it there exist traditional distinctions of customary, ethnic, and religious origin, and social distinc-
[182] tions linked to recent structures: a new hierarchy in the

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14. In French Equatorial Africa, in the quarters of Brazzaville (Poto-Poto and Bacongo), it reaches 100 inhabitants per hectare. Information taken from Documents and Statistics, Ministry of the F. O. M., No. XI, March 1954, p. 25.

/91 cont./
369 industrial enterprises and in the public function. Even in a
563 professional category a certain hierarchy of a traditional
[182] order survives and is always respected. In the workshops of
[565] the Dakar-Niger, for example, the higher supervisory staffs
are made up of workers belonging to superior castes: free
[466] men, descendants of chiefs' families... Operatives coming
from families of griots or former captives, in spite of their
skill at the work and their training, would have only very
weak authority over their subordinates.

[578] The animosities between individuals belonging to
formerly hostile groups or to opposed religious sects may
sometimes reappear in the course of contacts between individuals or groups of individuals. Along the same line
[466] of thought, [illegible]ertain favoritism may creep into the relations
between fo[illegible]an and subordinates belonging to the same
ethnic category or the same religion.

369 Within each ethnic minority scattered through the
563 city spontaneous associations spring up, led by the oldest
573 among them. These friendly groups meet periodically. They
are at the bottom of the mutual aid to the newcomer, to the
workman who lives temporarily without funds in the escale.
Each of these gatherings is at the same time the occasion for
"folkloristic" celebrations, reminding the members of the
group of their customs and their country of origin.

369 The traditions which have been able to survive by
177 being adapted to the new conditions of the society lose
their importance to a certain extent in contact with new
563 ideas and Western influence. We have already remarked
that the notion of ethnic group is rapidly obliterated when the
individual is transplanted for a long time in a city very far
from his natal village. The family ties, and above all the
[593] authority of the head of the family over each of its members,
become extremely loose in the city. We see a breaking up
of the subordination that subjected each of the members of a
family to the paternal authority. The child is no longer
compelled to adopt the trade of his father; he may choose
the work that he thinks will suit him. The young girl is
[584] rapidly becoming emancipated, and rare are the Thiès

/91 cont./
369 families in which the father imposes on the child the spouse
177 of his choice. The spread of the teaching of the Moslem and
563 Christian religions count for much in this loosening of the
[584] too confining ties of family tradition. This breaking up of
[593] ancient, too narrow social structures is not a strictly /92/
urban phenomenon; it also occurs in the countryside, but
[182] with less force and with a certain delay.

369 The presence of the industrial bloc of the Dakar-Niger,
565 on the other hand, has had as an effect the formation of a
working class, which is a specifically urban phenomenon.
178 Although the ancient system of castes does exist in human
contacts, that of social class is little by little being substituted for it. In sum, there actually exists a superposition
of the two systems, but the pre-eminence of the second is al-
[177] ready being affirmed. Through daily contacts and the rapid
[467] diffusion of social ideas coming from the West, the mass of
workers is organized, it is grouped by syndicates, it has set up
[474] consumer co-operatives. Because of the great number of
the members of this worker group, the workshops of the
Dakar-Niger and, through repercussion, the city of Thiès
itself have become the most active and the busiest centers
of French West Africa. The strike that in 1948 paralyzed
[468] railroad traffic on the two lines (Dakar-Bamako and Dakar--
Saint-Louis) for several months is certainly proof of the influence of a powerful and organized grouping, and a typical
urban phenomenon.

369 Thus there exists in Thiès a somewhat special social
563 climate that sometimes makes the relations between Whites
578 and Blacks strained. Chiefly during these periods of social
crises. But these tensions are always temporary and automatically disappear as soon as the conflict is settled.

369 A much more important problem that seems general
161 in all of the cities of Black Africa is that of the too rapid, if
not excessive, swelling of the urban population. We have
[162] seen that the population of Thiès has almost doubled from
1945 (24,000 inhabitants) to 1953 (40,000 inhabitants).
Dakar, Conakry, and Abidjan have grown in the same
proportions.

/92 cont./

●369 166 [162] All of the new elements that swell the urban quarters are young elements coming from the country; 32% of the population is made up of young people less than 14 years of age (15) whom the so-called facilities of the city have attracted. The countryside is being drained of its energetic elements and the city does not have enough work to give to those who come to settle there. [464] [574] A class of idlers and parasites is forming little by little, living on either the generous African hospitality or by expedients. This aspect of the social problem of the large African cities is one of the more urgent to be solved.

369 168 The public authorities are disturbed by this enormous swelling of the urban populations, which far exceeds the actual needs. It seems that none of the methods adopted up to now for decreasing them /93/ have given appreciable results. Perhaps the efforts that are now being made to improve the conditions of rural life and promote some modernization of agricultural techniques will allow the economic capacity of the countryside to increase and will curb the rural exodus. Greater stability among the urban population would then permit the establishment of more coherent and better balanced social structures.

Georges Savonnet.

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15. In France this percentage is 24%. the figure estimated according to the census statistics given in the review Population, Oct.-Dec. 1954, p. 718.

/14 cont./
442 during which commercial operations in groundnuts are authorized.
654 It is opened and closed each year by governmental decree. In
438 general it begins at the end of November or the beginning of
December and closes at the end of April. The date of opening
the campaign is set about two months after the beginning of
the harvest, in order to avoid premature uprooting and to favor
438 the reimbursement of the seed advanced. This system never-
442 theless leads to some smuggling in the south, because the
[439] *navétanes*, anxious to return home, and the peasants, without
any money, are tempted to sell in Gambia. At the time of
the close, the transactions have been over for a long time, but
this decision prevents the eventual sale /15/ of the seed distributed by the Mutuelles. In order to have the commodity
brought in gradually and to avoid heavy transactions at the beginning of trade, operations are suspended from Friday to Monday. Nevertheless by the end of the month of January nearly
all of the harvest has been negotiated.

366 2) *The "points of trade."* Since 1932 the operations of
442 selling must take place in the localities called points of trade
438 or "*escales*" located on the railroad or a road (Circular of 13
July 1932). These points of trade, which were 175 in number
in 1935, now number more than 300. The limitation, in 1932,
on the number of the points of trade was a response to the desire
to moderate the rhythm of the selling and to avoid the proliferation of intermediaries. The recent creation of new *escales* is
[244] devoted to the conquest of new lands and is an attempt to avoid
the abuses of cultivation on the lands near the former points of
trade.

The accession of a locality to the rank of *escale* makes
[369] it legally an urban center, with the obligation of division into
lots /*lotissement*/ and, for the merchants, permanent buildings.
The campaign is a period of great animation for the *escale*.
442 The merchants or traders open their bank of purchase or "factory."
437 Traditionally, intermediaries, or "masters of language," conduct
[492] the producer to the factory. The groundnuts, transported by don-
[488] keys and in bags loaned by the trader, are weighed and emptied

/372/

369 [361] "Dakar is the only city, in the European (or Western) sense, in all of West Africa," wrote D. Wittlesey in 1941 (1).

[162] [563] [505] Things have changed since then; Conakry, Bamako, Abidjan, and other centers have become true cities. It is incontestable that the 230,000 inhabitants counted in the census in 1955, of whom more than 30,000 were non-Africans, make Dakar the most important city in all of the Black Africa of French expression. In 1957 its port had more traffic than all the other ports of former French West Africa; in 1960, 8,000 vessels, with a capacity of 21,000,000 tons (2), put it among the most frequented [162] ports of Africa. But 50 years ago Dakar did not have 25,000 inhabitants. The rhythm of its growth is thus on a level with that of certain mushrooming cities in the United States of America. Dakar does not owe this extraordinarily rapid development solely to favorable natural conditions, as is often said, but also and especially to a complex interaction of historical, economic, and political factors. It is a crossroads born out of the effective integration of the African world and South America in the European economic system, an integration linked with the search for raw materials and markets, made possible and necessary by the great technical progress realized since the middle of the nineteenth century. City-crossroads, all of its vitality depends on the state of its relations.

[133] 1. Birth of Dakar. The head of the peninsula of Cape Verde, on which Dakar was established, is an assemblage of

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[113] 1. Derwint Wittlesey, "Dakar and other Cap Verde Settlements," The Geographical Review, 1941, p. 609.

2. The official figures are 7,948 vessels and 20,992,111 tons.

/372 cont./

369 plateaus made up of two volcanic systems of different ages,
133 separated by a small, low plain, the whole tilting toward the
east-northeast. This head of the penisula is savagely attacked
by oceanic floods which create on these coasts many capes and
little bays, as well as some little detached islands not very far
away. It is in one of these little bays, the bay called Dakar,
361 the most extensive and the best protected, that the great modern
369 port is located, between Pointe de la Défense and Pointe de
Bel-Air (Fig. 1).[1] Incontestably, this head of the peninsula makes
a favorable site for a port city, a site whose equal would be sought
in vain in West Africa (Fig. 2).[2]

/373/ But even more than the site, it is the location of
131 this forward cape of Africa that constitutes a trump of the first
361 order in the cards of Dakar. Crossed by the north parallel 14°
369 40' and located at the center of curvature of the great western
487 bulge of the African continent, almost halfway between the
30th degree north where the desert begins and the regions of the
Bénin, former slave-dealers, the peninsula occupied an interesting position in the former navigational system of the central and
southern Atlantic, for both the ships coming from the north and
those coming from the south. It was in fact chosen as the first
place of easy reprovisioning for the sailors who had traveled for
several days along a desert-like coast from south of Morocco,
while, for the ships coming from the Gulf of Guinea, it was the
last place for provisioning available before the Canaries. Moreover, the tip of the peninsula is the most westerly of all the
headlands of the Old World. Cape Dunemore in Ireland, which
is the most westerly in Europe, does not go beyond 11° west of
Greenwich, whereas the peninsula of Cape Verde goes beyond
17° west, even reaching 17° 32' 16" at Cape Almadies. Dakar
is thus more than 500 kilometers west of Casablanca (3); it is

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[113] 3. Marcel M. Chartier, "Dakar, Port aérien /Dakar, aerial port/," in Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 1948, p. 87.

[1] [See category 116, p. 5--Analyst]

[2] [See category 116, p. 11--Analyst]

/373/

369 therefore one of the Old World's closest points to South America
36 (4). Dakar and Natal are about 3,000 kilometers apart.
[131]
[487]

4. Cape Roxo and the region of
Freetown are closer from Cape St.
Roque by 250 kilometers (cf. J.
Richard Molard, in "La presqu'île
[113] du Cap-Vert /The peninsula of Cape
Verde/," I.F.A.N., Dakar, p. 10).

These advantages of site and location, however, should
not make one forget that the tip of the peninsula of Cape Verde
did not have easy access. On the one hand, the shallow depths
[133] which border it on its north front caused many shipwrecks, the
369 pillage of which in part supported the riparian populations, and,
175 on the other hand, it did not offer any security for the possible
[579] establishment of a settlement because of the very independent
character of the Lébou, who were tightly organized in a geronto-theocratic republic under the authority of the "Great Serigne" (5).

5. Great Marabout.

after being freed from the bondage of the Damel (6) around 1809.

6. King of Cayor.

Thus, one should not be surprised that the actual occupation of the peninsula by France was very late. For a long time the island of Gorée better satisfied the needs of the early navigators. Discovered by the Portuguese at the same time as Cape Verde, in 1444, the island, located off the southeastern cape of the peninsula, was still uninhabited when the Hollanders appeared at Cape Verde in 1588. In 1617 the latter bought it from the chiefs of the coast "for iron and some nails" (7). This island of less than a

[113] 7. Dr. Cariou, note on Gorée in "La

369 175 [113] /373 cont./

presqu'île du Cap-Vert,"
op. cit., p. 274

square kilometer nevertheless satisfied a double /374/ /Fig. 1 appears here / concern of the Hollanders, security and commerce: security first for the ships, which could find an excellent anchorage in the bay on the northeast of the island, immediately so appreciated that its excellence -- Goede
[103] reede, "the good roadstead" in Dutch -- served to designate the establishment under the name of Gorée (8) in distinguishing

8. Nora and Ch. Toupet,
[113] "L'origine du nom de Gorée,"
in Notes Africaines, January 1959,
pp. 17-20, I.F.A.N., Dakar.

it from the other islands of the peninsula; and then, security for the occupants. From this point of view, the insularity would have been a great advantage for the site of Dakar. Finally, with regard to commerce, the island of Gorée, although minuscule, sufficed for barter with the natives of the coast and could well fill its role as a warehouse for products and slaves. As soon as these views were confirmed by the facts, Gorée became the object of competition among the Hollanders, French, and British, finally coming to the French. In spite of
[439] this changing of hands, the establishment of Gorée, thanks to
[162] the slave trade, /375/ prospered, and around 1845 it harbored
[567] more than 5,000 persons. The abolition of the trade, and then that of slavery, around the middle of the century dealt it a mortal blow, bringing about a crisis from which Gorée did not recover. There was indeed an attempt at adaptation to the new conditions, the Goréans trying to make the island a place for commerce with the continent, where the cultivation of the groundnut had already developed, but on this point Gorée could not rival the peninsula. The inhabitants understood it; there were those who encouraged the occupation of Dakar with the idea

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
Pointe des ALMADIES
LES MAMELLES
Pointe de Bel Air
Pointe de Fann
Pointe de la DEFENSE
Ile de GOREE
Ile des MADELEINES
Cap MANUEL
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2,5
5km

Fig. 1 The site of Dakar.

175 of making it a kind of colony (Pl. XXI A).[7]

•369 But at the same time, with slavery abolished, Europe was instituting new forms of relations with the underdeveloped countries, imposing itself on the populations for the establishment of a new order less cruel than slavery and better suited for profitable improvements that were more diversified, more systematic, and more in accord with the requirements of the European societies which the technical and industrial revolution was more and more transforming. From this perspective, Dakar could become an incomparable point of support: its site was favorable for the establishment of a city; its coves could harbor a military port and a commercial port.

[712] Thus, on 25 May 1857, Dakar was officially occupied in the

[7] [See category 116, P. 15--Analyst]

/375 cont./
175 name of France by the post-captain Protet, who materialized
● 369 this taking of possession by the construction of a protective fort,
[912] from which outfitting soon began. Work on the port[1] began in
[505] 1862, and, on 4 November 1866, the first accomplishments
were inaugurated by the first passage of a packet-boat. As early
[502] as the first of April 1864, the lighthouse of the Grande-Mamelle
was lighted, followed two years later, on the first of December
1866, by the two lighthouses with fixed lights at Cape Manuel
and the Pointe des Almadies /Cape Almadies/. A first plan for
the future city was approved by the decree of 1 July 1862, while
from this time on a plan for a railroad to link Dakar and Saint-Louis agitated opinion.

Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the launching of Dakar,
put under the administrative guidance of Gorée, was difficult;
the city was unpopulated, the Goréans monopolizing the lands
without wanting to leave their island. Moreover, Rufisque,
closer to the regions where groundnuts were cultivated, was
better located for commerce with the interior and, because of
this, contributed to blocking the development of Dakar. But
[633] the decree of 17 June 1887 separating Dakar from Gorée marked
a decisive turning point (1885) in the life of the new creation.

369 2. Dakar, metropolis before being a city. Having become an autonomous center as a result of the Conference of Berlin, at a period when the colonial rivalries between the great powers were accentuated, Dakar benefited from the effective support /376/ of a mother country determined to make it a base for its expansion in West Africa.

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369 It was the port in particular that was to be the essential
instrument of the launching and of the power of Dakar. Its first
elements constructed shortly after the occupation were clearly
insufficient, and as early as 1892 it was necessary to extend the
old embankment by 200 meters and to add on to it a pier of 280
meters (present Pier III). But it was especially from 1899 that
[912] the great works began. The military port, which had to serve as

[1] [i.e., the port of Dakar--Analyst]

/376 cont./

504 the support point for the whole military organization of the
369 West African coast, was constructed between 1899 and 1902.
712 Some of these accomplishments, such as the north jetty, the extension of the south jetty, and the dry dock, also concerned the commercial port, the construction of which began immediately afterwards and continued from 1903 to 1910. Two new piers were added to the first one, delimiting three docks between the south jetty and the military port, while the outfitting of the platforms was vigorously carried on (9).

[113] 9. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar", Annales de Géographie, 1936, pp. 607-671.

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648 This phase of the construction of the port was accompanied by a very important act which was to serve as support for the development of Dakar: the transfer in 1902 of the office of the Government-general of West Africa from Saint-Louis to Dakar, which led to the establishment of high administrative offices in this city (Contrôle Financier, Treasury, Public Works, etc.) (10), although the Governor-general, awaiting

10. Morazé, Ch., op. cit., p. 620.

the construction of his palace, was installed at Gorée, where he remained until 1907, an event adding considerably to the accomplishments on the port and which marked the beginning of the prodigious vigor of Dakar (Fig. 3). †

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[505] As early as 1911 the port registered a tonnage of more than four million tons; it exceeded 5.6 millions in 1913. During the course of the First World War it played a role that greatly surpassed anything that the founders could have hoped for: in 1917, a tonnage of 10.5 million tons. To be sure, the end of the war led to a sharp decrease in the arrivals and departures,
[504] but the recovery that followed the war was such that new works for the port soon became necessary. They were done between

† [See Category 116, P. 19-- Analyst]

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/376 cont./
1927 and 1933 in the northern zone, where laying out a platform intended for groundnuts was undertaken with the construction of three new piers, one of which was intended for traffic in combustibles. Finally, a maritime wet-dock was installed in the southern zone (11).

Moreover, these new works did not end the construction of the port. Outfitting and new arrangements continued up to the eve of the Second World War and were taken up again immediately afterwards, making the port the complex organ that it is today: /377/ 6,904 meters of quays, of which 2,794 have depths of 20 meters and more, 2,103 meters with depths of 8 to 9 meters, 580 meters with depths of 6.50 to 7.50 meters, and, finally, 1,427 meters reserved for small boats, the total providing quay posts for 31 ships at a time; a water surface of 210 hectares; 682,000 square meters of platforms, of which 53,940 square meters are covered; and, finally, 240,000 square meters of storage space for hydrocarbides (12). These are the essential elements of the infrastructure of the port of Dakar, which has become a very effective instrument, fully valorizing a favorable location at the crossroads of the heavily traveled maritime routes. Dakar thus receives ships from practically all of the countries possessing a merchant marine; only the flags of Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, and Russia do not wave in the port of Dakar.

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[439] This great frequentation comes about first from the fact

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11. Coursin (L.) *op. cit.*, p. 278.

12. *Synthèse de la situation économique de l'ex-A.O.F. durant la période 1948 à 1958*, Vol. IV, p. 712. Publication of the Chambre de Commerce, d'Agriculture et d'Industrie de Dakar.

/377 cont./

369 439 504 that Dakar is designated above all as a port d'escale, "a service station," of the tropical Atlantic, provisioning the ships with water and, above all, combustibles; the latter, represented in former times by coal in particular, are now almost entirely made up of hydrocarbides, the export and import traffic of which sometimes represents more than double that of merchandise: 211.1% in 1954, 233.6% in 1955, 186% in 1959.

369 439 487 But, beyond this role as a port d'escale, Dakar thrust ahead as a metropolis, governing a large region. In fact it is via Dakar that food products (rice, flour, sugar, etc.), cloth and thread, industrial products, etc. come in, principally destined for Senegal, Mauritania, and the Sudan, which, in return, send groundnuts, gum, hides wax, etc. to it for export. This situation is the result of struggles in the recent past between Dakar and the old maritime or river ports which shared the light traffic of former times. [505] The construction of the port and modern means of communication with the interior permitted Dakar to eliminate its rivals very quickly.

369 [505] The establishment of Gorée, caught in a crisis since the abolition of slavery, despite the resistance, at first active and then passive, of its municipality (13), has been practically eliminated from the economic circuit since the accomplishment of the great work of the commercial port. Business then emigrated to the continent, while the city went to sleep, losing more and more of its population; [162] from 3,200 inhabitants in 1872, it went to 2,068 in 1891, 1,249 in 1910, 998 in 1921, so that the commune was abolished and attached to Dakar in 1929, [633] and then the entire island was classified as a historical monument in 1944.

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[113] 13. In the work by J. Charpy (La Fondation de Dakar /The Founding of Dakar/, Larose, Paris, 1958), there is a series of documents on the various aspects of this resistance.

/377 cont./

369 The reconstitution of the municipality in 1956, a simple elec-
633 toral operation, proved /378/ /Fig. 2 appears here/ to be incapable of giving life to Gorée; at the beginning of 1961 it was forced to reattach itself to Dakar, for which it is nothing more than a tourist annex. Nevertheless, due to the crisis in housing
[362] in Dakar, it offers its old houses to workers from the victorious great city.

The elimination of the other rival centers was not as easy,
369 but no less radical. The railroad linking Dakar and Saint-Louis,
505 finished in 1885, did not immediately bring about the decline
496 of the old Senegalese capital. On the contrary, asleep since
487 entry up the river became impossible because of the increase in tonnage of the ships, it seems to have gained a revival of activity, especially after the construction of the Kayes-Niger section of the railroad at the end of the century. In fact the products des-
[439] tined for the Sudan or coming from there, which took the path of the Senegal River, were subjected to an obligatory freight-break there, which made Saint-Louis a quite important mart. But the construction of the Thiès-Kayes railroad after the First World War and the /379/development of automobile traffic had the effect, on the one hand, of directly annexing the Sudan to the zone of influence of Dakar, and, on the other hand, of isolating Saint-Louis and the old escales /trading centers/ of the Senegal River and accelerating their economic decline (Fig. 2).
369 Bakel, Matam, Podor, and Dagana are no more than administrative centers without any great economic activity. Saint-Louis,
[633] continuing as the capital of Senegal, preserved an appearance of vitality longer. But in 1957 Dakar robbed it of this function to the great despair of its population, which, after a phase of violent opposition, complains today in a passive resistance that the tokens of sympathy and the promises expressed a thousand times in the official speeches of the state authorities do not come to anything.

369 As for Rufisque, for a long time it had more economic
505 trump cards than Dakar. In fact, when the port had not yet been
439 constructed at Dakar, it was more advantageous to load the

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

Fig. 2. The quarters of Dakar. --1. Dakar-ville and the industrial zone; 2. Greater Dakar; 3. Médina; 4. villages of the suburbs; 5. railroads.

●369 505 439 [441] groundnuts at Rufisque, nearer to the centers of production in Cayor. Therefore Rufisque soon became the groundnut capital. As early as 1862, 27 European or Goréan merchants were established there (and 12 at Bargny, located three kilometers farther to the east). Three years later, this figure climbed to 35 (14).

14. Note 1 in Fondation de Dakar, op. cit., p. 328.

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633 The activity at Rufisque was so great and the launching of Dakar so

/379 cont./

369 difficult that the commandant of Gorée, Pinet-Laprade, in a
633 letter of 9 May 1862 (15), proposed to the governor of Senegal
that the authority of the settlement of Rufisque be abolished in
order to avoid stifling Dakar. Evidently Pinet-Laprade was
not followed, and the declassing of Rufisque, which nevertheless
was to intervene later, was the result of a bitter struggle. As
369 soon as it was possible to draw up alongside the quay at the port
505 of Dakar, Rufisque lost the advantage of its situation, which had
504 permitted a saving, in relation to Dakar, of some 30 kilometers
of land travel. Actually, this drawing up to the quay by the
ships ended the slow transshipments which caused a great loss of
time at Rufisque. Therefore, as early as about 1930, Rufisque
[633] had been declassed; in 1933, after the construction of the groundnut
platform at the port of Dakar, it did not load more than 10%
of the harvest of Senegal, as against 28% at Dakar. Today no
maritime loading is done at Rufisque, and the city maintains
some economic activity only by grace of a new orientation tending
to make it an industrial annex of Dakar.

369 Thus, the elimination of rivals has resulted in a tendency
505 for all of the activity of collecting the products of Senegal,
439 Mauritania, and the Sudan to be concentrated at a single pole.
Only two ports, Kaolack and Ziguinchor, have succeeded in maintaining themselves /380/ and even developing themselves as ports of direct importation and exportation. In 1933 Kaolack exported 52% of the Senegalese harvest of groundnuts, and Ziguinchor nearly 10%, while Dakar had only 28%. Specifically, in addition to a regional exportation equal to half of the Senegalese harvest, Kaolack handled the rail shipments of a large part of the production of eastern Senegal and even of the Sudan. In the case of Ziguinchor, it handled the production of Casamance, which has no other export port. Today the conversion of the

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15. Archives of the G. G. A. O. F. 4 B 20, 13 G 299, L 9, in Fondation de Dakar, op. cit., pp. 327-329.

/380 cont./

369 505 439 groundnut before exportation has given Dakar an undisputed advantage over Kaolack. In 1957 the exports of groundnut products (shelled groundnuts, oil cake, oil), which represented only about a twentieth of the total traffic of merchandise in the port of Dakar, was more than the total of the import and export traffic of Kaolack (292,000 metric tons as against 220,000 metric tons). In any case neither Kaolack nor Ziguinchor, both located on rivers which are difficult to enter because of the shifting banks of sand or mud, can be dangerous rivals in any way for Dakar, which, because of this, practically thrusts itself on all of Senegal, Mauritania, and the Sudan. On the other hand, Dakar dominates from afar the three other large maritime ports of former French West Africa, Conakry, Abidjan, and Cotonou, whose total traffic in 1957 equaled only about three-fifths of the traffic of Dakar.

369 [433] But even though the port is the basic instrument of the power of Dakar, there are other additional elements that reinforce this power.

369 509 [487] First there is the place that Dakar occupies in the sphere of aviation. Since the first direct connection with France via the Mediterranean coast of Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania (16), its role has not ceased to grow on the international plane.

[508] The hydrobase of Bel-Air and the airport of Ouakam, which served the first trans-Atlantic airplanes, are outclassed today by the great airport of Yoff, which was begun in 1940. Well equipped, this airport of international class and one of the largest airports of Africa is by far the most important one in former French West Africa, accounting by itself in 1957 for a fourth of the airplanes (arrivals and departures), a third of the passengers embarking or debarking in former French West Africa, and half of the passengers in transit. For certain directions, such as South America, the passengers from all of West Africa must embark at Dakar.

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16. Marcel M. Chariter, "Dakar, port aérien," op. cit., p. 84.

/380 cont./

000 at Dakar.

369 Even more than in the sphere of aviation, however, it is
648 on the commercial and industrial plane that the other states of
[433] former French West Africa were, before the recent political
disturbances, dependent on Dakar. In fact Dakar was the seat
[453] of the banks and of the commercial associations or the branch
agencies of the mother country, all of whom /Pl. XXI and XXII
[441] appear here on unnumbered pages/ /381/exercise from Dakar,
if not always a role of direct administration, at least some co-ordination and in any case an influence that is not negligible on the branches scattered across Senegal, former French West Africa, and sometimes even across foreign territories. Thus, the C. F. A. O., the S. C. O. Z., the B. A. O., and the B. C. A., which practice their activities in practically all of Black Africa, although having their seat in Paris, are strongly established in Dakar, from where they manage a number of agencies and branches. On the other hand, the Société Maurel et Prom, which has branches in Senegal, Mauritania, the Sudan, Guinea, and Gambia, the "Commerce Africain," which has establishments in Senegal, Gambia, the Ivory Coast, and the Cameroun, and other companies have their
[439] seat in Dakar (17). Moreover it must be added that several industries (oil factories, soap factories, breweries, cement factories, textile factories, shoe factories, etc.) established on the peninsula of Cape Verde send a part of their products to other territories in former French West Africa.

369 Finally, because of its former function as federal capital,
633 Dakar brought together all of the federal political and adminis-
648 trative organs, which permitted it to direct and co-ordinate all of the political, administrative, and economic life of former French West Africa.

Thus, Dakar became the leader, the undisputed metropolis, upon which there depended a regional assemblage much

[Text Continues on p. 17--Analyst]

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17. "Le Commerce Africain" transferred its seat from Dakar to Paris in July 1960.

/381 cont./

369 larger than that of Paris. In Dakar, this function as a metrop-
648 olis, which has been confirmed since the construction of the
633 commercial port, preceded and conditioned the development
of the city.

369 3. The city. The commercial affairs which thus make
166 African products and products from the outside converge toward
167 the Dakar crossroads could not fail to bring with them a great
[487] number of people. First, there are the Goréans, finally resigned
to their fate, who accompany or follow the commercial or administrative establishments being transferred to Dakar; then, non-Africans, administrators, technicians, merchants, etc., usually arriving from Europe by the same route as that of the imported manufactured products. But above all there are the masses who arrive by road and by rail, by these paths of a money economy which have greatly disturbed the villagers' traditional institutions and thus communicated to the people a mobility formerly unknown in the rural world. Willingly or unwillingly, the rural people of Senegal, of the Sudan, of Upper Guinea, and of the Upper Volta take to the road and rails to cast themselves into an /382/ /Fig. 3 appears here/ /383/ adventurous existence which will lead many of them to Dakar and to settle there. Finally, Africans from Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, students at the large educational institutions and officials who come in connection with the functions of the federal capital, also arrive by sea.

369 This human convergence, which since the last decade of
162 the century has continued to grow, has caused a vertiginous in-
crease in the population. To be sure, for the period before 1955
[633] there were only estimations, all the less certain because the
boundaries of the commune have often changed, but the official figures (18), even though they should be corrected here or

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[113] 18. Synthèse de la situation économique de l'ex-A.O.F. durant la période 1948 à

/383 cont./

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[113] 1958, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 35: 1910, 24,000; 1921, 32,000; 1931, 54,000; 1945, 132,000; 1955-56, 231,000.

[633] there, nevertheless give an acceptable idea of the direction of the development of the population of Dakar. The first 20 years that followed the construction of the port were characterized by a not very spectacular progression, the population merely having doubled, going from 24,900 in 1910 to 54,000 in 1931. This relative slowness of growth should undoubedly be attributed to some check due to the First World War, but it is basically explained by the then very imcomplete [496] character of the modern paths of penetration, the railroads from Thiès to Kayes and from Louga to Linguère not having been finished until after the war. By contrast, the progression has been particularly rapid in the 20 years that followed, and, in spite of the checks that would seemingly have been put into operation by the Second World War, the population has more than quadrupled between 1931 and 1955, reaching 230,000 inhabitants at the latter date (19).

[113] 19. Recensement démographique de Dakar 1955. Résultats définitifs, 1^{er} fascicule /Demographic census of Dakar for 1955. Final Results, No. 1/. Publication of the Service de la statistique de l'ex-A.O.F., July 1958. The following figures given for the population of Dakar have been taken from this number or have been calculated from the figures that it gives.

369
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162 This Dakar population, very diverse in its make-up, is an almost complete sampling of the ethnic groups of Senegal, to which are added elements from the other territories of former French West Africa and also some non-Africans. Thus, jostling

[Text continues on p. 20--Analyst]

/Fig. 3 Caption cont./

36
102 a-g. The piers. -- I. Town Hall. -- II. Chambre de
491 Commerce. -- III. Sandaga Market (Ponty-Clemenceau cross-
496 roads). -- IV. Former Palace of Justice. -- V. General
504 Postoffice. -- VI. Treasury. -- VII. Kermel Market. --
712 VIII. Military Circle. -- IX. Residence of the President of
743 the Republic. -- X. Military Hospital. -- XI. African
Hospital. -- XII. Palace of Justice. -- XIII. Camp Bornis. --
XIV. Camp Galliéni.. -- XV. Station.

●369 /383 cont./ one another in Dakar are Lébou, Ouolof /Wolof/,
563 Toucouleur /Tukolor/, Sérère /Serer/, Sarakolé, Diola, Socé,
162 etc., who are Senegalese, but there are also Mauritanians, Sudanese, Voltaics, Guineans, Ivorians /persons from the Ivory Coast/, Dahomeans, Cape Verdeans, Lebano-Syrians, French, etc. The Lébou, who are the original population of Dakar, today represent scarcely one-tenth of the population, exceeded in number by the Oulof, the Toucouleur (20), and even by the 30,000 non-Africans,

[113] 20. A. Diop, "L'immigration toucouleur à Dakar (enquête /investigation/ 1958-1959)," I.F.A.N., Dakar, p. 1. The author, citing an investigation by the M.I.S.O.E.S., gives the figure of 31,000 Toucouleur in 1959.

among whom the French constitute a great majority of close to 23,000 persons in residence. This character of Dakar as a
[166] region of call is illustrated first by the fact that only a little more than one-third of the population was born there, /384/ and then by the quite obvious inequality between the number of men and that of women. Before the war, among the Europeans, there were 65% men as against 25% women and 10%
[744] children (21). Today the systematic destruction of the

21. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

162 /384 cont./

369 563 [744] [132] breeding-places of mosquitoes in the numerous swamps of the peninsula having been successfully undertaken by the federal authorities, one can better appreciate the exceptionally pleasant climate of Dakar, subject eight months of the year to the "influences of the Canaries" (cool and brisk current, marine trade-wind from the northeast), and an equilibrium tends to be established between men, women, and children, the first nevertheless still remaining the most numerous; in 1955, 39% men against 31% women and 30% children for the total non-African population; and 35% men, 30% women, and 35% children for the non-African population in residence. Among the Africans, one can verify the same phenomenon: 36% men, 31% women, and 35% children less than 14 years of age for the total population; 34% men, 31% women, and 35% children for the population in residence. Despite this tendency toward equilibrium, the fact remains that for the whole population of Dakar, men over 14 years of age are definitely more numerous than women over 14 years of age and than children; the balance sheet gives 37% for the men as against 30% for the women and 35% for the children.

369 563 166 162 This situation is explained by the fact that immigration to Dakar is first of all of interest to the men, for whom it carries the hope of a better position, but it also represents a daring enterprise on which one does not take women and children until definite opportunities for settling down present themselves. This fact is particularly clear for the non-resident population, among whom the proportion of men is very high. Thus, among the non-resident Africans, there are 57% men as against 27% women and 16% children. The proportion is even higher among non-resident foreigners: 77% men as against 12% women and 11 % children.

[464] But though settling in Dakar is almost always linked to employment for the non-African population, it is not the same for Africans. The destruction of the villagers' traditional institutions, modern transportation, the facilities for hospitality

/384 cont./

369 in the city at the home of a relative, at the home of a friend
563 or the friend or relative of a friend, or at the home of a resident
166 originally from the same village or merely from the same
162 region -- all of this ultimately makes up the factors that are
464 more decisive than the salary. Because of this, while among
the resident non-Africans the number of persons employed
amounts to 43 % of the total and 64% of the economically
active, among the resident Africans, the proportion of workers
is no more than 27% of the total and 42% /385/ of the economically
active. If one adds to that the salaries, on the average
369 much higher among the first than among the second, one finds
511 in Dakar some of the contrasts characteristic of West African
563 cities: on the one hand, among the non-Africans, a high
standard of living which is often shown in the appearance of
their quarters, and, on the other hand, the mass of the African
population whose settling in the city is tied neither to a correlative
augmentation of the normal opportunities for lodgings
nor to a higher living standard in relation to the bush, which
gives to the African city, or at least to some of its quarters,
an appearance more wretched than that of the villages of the
interior.

369 This situation, formerly very clear, put Dakar in the
563 normal category of West African cities, where a white city and
a black city stand in contrast (22), a contrast that was the result
[361] of a de facto segregation imposed, not by law, but by the norms
of urbanism and of hygiene, to which it was impossible for the
bulk of the natives to subject themselves, and also by the high
[465] price of rent -- the non-Africans being nearly always lodged by
their employers. In 1936 Charles Morazé wrote: "Formerly
Europeans and natives lived mixed. Innumerable families lived

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[113] 22. Dresh, J., "Villes d'Afrique occidentale /Cities of West Africa/," Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 1950.

/385 cont./

● 369 in small apartments, true caravansaries contained within the
563 European city. This promiscuity was deplorable. Europeans
and natives were not in fact subject to the same epidemics;
[164] yellow fever, for example, fatal for the white, is benign to
the black. The danger of a mixed population was that the
epidemics would spread without being stamped out in time.
[361] Finally, the system lacked style; therefore as early as 1916
the creation of the native village of Médina was decided upon"
(23).

23. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

There it was, in a way, the theory of the urbanism of
the West African cities ! Nevertheless the problems of land
were so complicated at Dakar (24) between the two world wars
[167] that, with the Lebano-Syrian immigration and the Crédit
[452] Foncier /Mortgage-loan Society/ helping, there was created,
in contact with the European city and the Médina, a collection
[367] of quarters more mixed in their contents and in their appearance.
Up to the end of the Second World War Dakar preserved this
appearance of a threefold city. But after the war a series of
new factors caused a rapid and brutal evolution in Dakar. The
return to normal economic activities after the slack period
following the war, the awakening and amplification of political
and syndical life, the creation of the Fonds d'Investissement Economique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.), and, finally, the ever greater
influx of rural people into Dakar led the federal authorities to
take a series of fortunate initiatives, /386//Fig. 4 appears here/

[113] 24. See the work by A. Angrand, Les Lébou de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert (Essai sur leur histoire et leurs coutumes) /The Lébou of the peninsula of Cape Verde (essay on their history and their customs)/. "La Maison du Livre," Dakar.

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

Fig. 4. Médina. -- 1. Industrial zone;
2. quarters more or less urbanized;
3. irregular quarters.

● 369 which progressively transformed the Dakar agglomeration.
563 There was first the creation of the S. T. A. G. D. (Service
temporaire de l'aménagement du Grand-Dakar /Temporary
[361] Office for the Arrangement of Greater Dakar/) for a systematic urbanization of the city. Then there was the decision
to promote a policy of lodgings for African officials, while
a society for a mixed economy, the Société Immobilière du
Cap-Vert (S. I. C. A. P.) /Building Society of Cape Verde/
[362] studied and made up forms for cheap dwellings for mere renting or for rent-sale. At the same time there was the law
called "Lamine Gueye," which equalized upward several
[465] elements of the African and non-African wages at the time
when "l'africanisation des cadres" /Africanization of the
[647] staffs/ was promoted, which led to a mixture of Africans and
Europeans in the administrative lodgings and in the new quarters
for officials. Finally, first the staff-law and then autonomy

/386 cont./

●369 and independence have had the effect of reinforcing this mixing
563 the more since it sometimes brings about a pure and simple substitution of African staffs for European staffs in many of the lodgings.

Finally, although today the quarters of Dakar are still clearly distinguished by their appearance, the differentiation of their contents is less and less based on origin and tends to be a social rather than racial differentiation. Therefore, instead of the traditional division of the West African cities into "white city and black city," let us distinguish four sections in the Dakar agglomeration: /387/ Dakar-ville, the Médina, Greater Dakar, and the suburbs.

361 1. Dakar-ville. The plateau from the southeast to the
369 head of the peninsula and a part of the plain from Cape Manuel to the avenue El Hadji Malick Sy constitute what today is called Dakar-ville. The essential characteristic of this part of the Dakar agglomeration is that almost all of its buildings are permanent, except for some islands of huts. This is where practically all of the administrative offices, the large-scale
[366] commerce, the major part of the Lebano-Syrian commerce, and the great markets are found. But Dakar-ville shows very diverse aspects (Pl. XXI B) (Pl. XXIIA).

The Plateau is the best arranged part of Dakar-ville. It is there that the first nucleus of modern Dakar was located, extending around the port, from the station to the Protet Plaza and the Military Circle. Little changed, this nucleus has re-
[363] mained very much as it was at the beginning of the century;
[342] it is intersected by narrow streets, bordered by old houses in colonial style, with stores on the ground floor and lodgings
[347] with verandas on the upper floor. This nucleus has remained the business quarter, that of the large-scale commerce domi-
[441] nated by the great companies and the old Bordeaux firms, C.F.A.O., S.C.O.A., N.O.S.O.C.O., S.O.C.O.P.A.O.,
[366] Chavanel, Maurel et Prom, etc., surrounding the Kernel market, surmounted by its cupola of 1900 style. Several old administrative

/387 cont./
361 buildings, the General Postoffice, the Treasury, the Town
369 Hall, the former Délégation, the former Palace of Justice,
and the Chambre de Commerce are included there. A "city"
phenomenon tends to be produced in this quarter which, very
lively by day, is almost completely empty at night. Toward
the east this quarter extends along the road to Bel-Air and the
old road to Rufisque by way of the industrial section of Dakar
where the factories have been established largely since the war.
On the northwest, on each side of the avenue W.-Ponty, extends
a mixed quarter, commercial and residential, harboring the
old Lébou families, having benefited from the facilities offered
[427] by the Crédit Foncier, and the Lebano-Syrians and Cape Verdeans
who rent or are quasi-owners as a result of long-term leases.
It is therefore an old quarter that developed especially after
the construction of the commercial port and has preserved its
narrow streets, quite unique today, its low houses dominated
here and there by some recent building. The avenue W.-Ponty,
366 with greatly varied commerce, the avenue Gambetta dominated
369 by the Lebano-Syrian commerce, the avenue Roume bordered
by beautiful buildings and enlivened by luxury commerce, and
finally the avenue Maginot which is shared by great stores of
the West and Lebano-Syrian commerce in fabrics near the market
of Sandaga are the most completely transformed arteries of this
section of the Plateau, where many cafés and restaurants, /388/
cabarets, and cinemas maintain far into the night a nonchalant,
but pleasant animation following the rushing business of the day.

Beyond the Boulevard de la République, which bounds the
369 old quarters on the west and which is distinguished by its many
361 buildings, commerce disappears almost entirely, giving way to a
residential zone of middle-class appearance, with its villas often
more comfortable than stylish. This residential zone, formerly
[563] entirely European, is mixed today, harboring European and
African staffs. Barracks and hospitals separate this quarter from
[712] Cape Manuel, formerly a military zone, but today occupied by
the monumental, Palace of Justice dominating the newly estab-
[344] lished embassies. But all of Dakar-ville is not as well arranged

/388 cont./

369 361 as the Plateau. The low quarters that border the avenue Malick
Sy and which are crossed by the route de l'Abbattoir /Slaughter-
[363] house Road/ quite obviously differ from the rest. In Rebeus and
in Niayes-Thioker, few of the streets are paved, and, during
[364] winter, ponds where household debris rots often surround the low
permanent houses and the neighboring huts.

[162] Dakar-ville has only 46,000 inhabitants, among whom
[563] are almost two-thirds of the 30,000 non-Africans of Dakar.

Gorée, the fallen capital, which has become a military,
tourist, and, to a slight extent, residential annex of Dakar, is
attached to this section.

[563] 2. The Médina. Containing practically only Africans,
the Médina is much more densely populated than Dakar-ville.
[764] Blocked on the west by the Moslem cemetery and on the north
by the canal of the Gueule-Tapée, the Médina has not ceased
stretching toward the east since its creation during the First
World War. It presents several aspects: the oldest part, east
[363] of the avenue Blaise-Diagne, has all of its streets paved and
planted with trees; it has few huts, and permanent houses are
[364] erected almost everywhere there; many sanitary facilities and
public fountains complement the private establishments and
make this quarter relatively clean and pleasant (Fig. 4 and Pl.
XXII B).[1]

The farther one goes toward the east, however, beyond
the avenue Blaise-Diagne, the newer the quarter is and the more
it gives the appearance of a wretched village. Thus, between
[363] the avenue Blaise-Diagne and the Gendarmerie, although some
[364] principal arteries are paved, most of the streets remain sandy
and obstructed with household rubbish. Moreover, one notes
some permanent houses here and there, to be sure, but huts are
much more numerous. East of the Gendarmerie, Colobane is
even less well arranged, while, beyond the automobile road,
Kip-Coco and Quartier Mous, veritable camp cities for new
arrivals, are called "irregular quarters," that is to say, quarters
temporarily tolerated, although no right of the inhabitants to
settle there can be recognized (Pl. XXIII A).[2] /Pl. XXIII and

[1] [See category 116, p.16--Analyst]

[2] [See Category 116, p.29--Analyst]

/388 cont./

369 Pl. XXIV appear here on unnumbered pages/. /389/ /Fig. 5
361 appears here./

3. Greater Dakar. Of all the sectors of the Dakar agglomeration, Greater Dakar is certainly the one that presents the sharpest contrasts. The quarter of the "Gueule-Tapée" resembles the old Médina, while Fass and "Usine Biscuit" /Biscuit Factory/ remind one of Colobane, but aside from these there stand some modern quarters that are quite varied in appearance, contrasting strongly with the "Médinas," the "Colobanes," and the irregular quarters that surround them. [873] It is in this sector of Greater Dakar that the University is found, raising its majestic buildings on the edge of the sea. It is flanked on the north by the rich quarter of Fann-Résidence where the residences of ministers and members of their cabinets, directors of houses of commerce, and high officials are grouped; to the south military villas and the allotment of Fann Hock separate it from the Gueule-Tapée. Point E, Zone A, Zone B, /390/ the Cité des Douanes /customs/, and that of the Port de Commerce are officials' quarters, while Bopp, formerly a swamp, has in recent years become a pretty little quarter, all the houses of which were built by officials [452] with the aid of the Crédit du Sénégal /Local Association of Senegal/. The S.I.C.A.P. which extend along the route des Puits /Roads of the Wells/ (Karacks, Baobabs, Liberté I, Liberté II, Liberté III, etc.) are pleasant lots intended to facilitate for Africans the acquisition of property (Fig. 5).

Finally, the quarter of Derklé forms, in several groupings of houses, a residence for petty African officials, another one for the African employees of private enterprises, and finally a quarter called the "Castors," the houses of which have been built by their associated and grouped owners with the aid of the public authorities.

Greater Dakar is the most extensive and the heaviest populated sector in the Dakar agglomeration. [162] It includes more than [563] 73,000 inhabitants, among whom is numbered one-sixth of the non-African population.

[Text continues bottom of P. 31--Analyst]

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
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DERKLÉ
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FANN RÉSIDENCE
Université
Lycée technique Delafosse
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Fig. 5. Greater Dakar. -- 1. Officials' quarter; 2. Derklé; 3. H.L.M.; 4. houses of officials; 5. loan grouping.

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369
4. The suburbs. The suburbs of Dakar are composed of 13 villages, of which those closest to Dakar, Ouakam, N'Gor, Yoff, Hann, Thiaroye, and M'Bao resemble Colobane. The others remain typical traditional villages. Only Dagoudane-Pikime escapes either category. Created *ex nihilo* less than ten years ago to serve as an outlet for the irregulars of Dakar who were to be found there, driven back as urbanism progressed, [162] it already has the appearance of a little city with its 10,000 inhabitants.

/390 cont./
361 inhabitants. It had an official center and wide streets, which,
● 369 however, are not yet paved. Despite this city appearance,
[363] however, Pikine is more intimately dependent on Dakar than
the other villages of the suburbs; it is a workman's suburb, and
all of its provisioning comes from Dakar, while practically all
of its inhabitants are employed in the great city. With this
exception, the villages of the suburbs have as their essential
[438] role the provisioning of Dakar with fish and fresh vegetables.
Many transportation facilities in common connect them with
[489] Dakar-ville from very early in the morning until around the
middle of the night (Pl. XXIII B, Pl. XXIV A and B).

This is the arrangement or juxtaposition of the various
elements of the Dakar agglomeration, whose present population
[162] may well have exceeded 300,000 inhabitants.

369 4. Perspectives. The Dakar agglomeration has the
appearance of an unfinished city in the process of being organized,
even though its function as a West African metropolis
has been confirmed for a long time. There are surprises in
this situation for those who analyze the old European urban
civilizations, where one sees an ancient city existing as /391/
/Fig. 6 appears here/ one that patiently developed its relations
in order to become a metropolis and to constitute a solid
and dynamic assemblage where urban and metropolitan functions
369 mutually support one another. Dakar, however, is above
all a center of relations which has woven with its hinterland
439 connections that have the appearance of complementary ties,
433 but which actually are ties of dependence: dependence in
fact because in the Senegalese and Sudanese interior the development
of export crops is tied up with the means of evacuation
organized by Dakar; dependence also because the export crops,
in breaking up the former village autarchy, have given Dakar
the role of a great relay-station in the importation of food
products in compensation and manufactured products which
have become a necessity there where formerly they were unknown;
dependence, finally, not only for the Senegalese and

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

Fig. 6. Dakar's zone of economic influence.
1. Navigable course; 2. railroad;
3. road.

369 Sudanese interior, but also for the whole of former French West
433 Africa through the role of management that the administrative
439 offices, the banks, and the great commercial agencies play from
Dakar.

In truth, however, this pre-eminence of Dakar which rests only on its role as a relay-station, a "service station," which receives for redistribution, carries with it grave weaknesses. And first of all it is necessary to note that the influence of Dakar, which extends supremely over a regional assemblage larger than France, is actually /392/ nothing less than a sign of the underdevelopment of the regions thus dominated. It in fact signifies for them an economy of trade, without local conversion of the products, with few urban centers playing an important role in regional management. Now, precisely this influence, while maintaining the economy of trade, prevents any new orientation of the economy in a national sense. Because of this, the ties uniting Dakar with its zone of influence appear to be of the same nature as those that tie the colonies to their mother countries, or, more accurately, they are only shackles; the nationalism of the new states will confuse them in a similar

/392 cont./

369 condemnation.

433 Consequently it is necessary to emphasize the same 439 instability of this role of Dakar as a relay-station. Already [505] strongly rivaled in its function of provisioning ships by such ports as Las Palmas and Santa Cruz of Tenerife (25), better located on the direct route between Europe and South America, Dakar is no longer an imperative stop in the tropical Atlantic because of the greater autonomy of the ships in the matter of provisioning. On the other hand, the recent political evolution which has led to the "Balkanization" of former French West Africa has not only broken all the administrative and political ties which were among the most notable elements of the power of Dakar, but it has also permitted at Conakry, Abidjan, and Cotonou other possible relay-stations for the interior regions to become rivals, more and more limiting the zone of influence of Dakar. The recent breakup of the Federation of Mali, completely and at a single stroke turning the traffic between Senegal and the Sudan toward Abidjan in particular and to a lesser extent toward Conakry, is a particularly striking example of the instability of the position of Dakar. In the present state of affairs, nothing remains for Dakar but the Senegalese interior and Mauritania, and this latter country, which is building its own port at Port-Etienne, is seeking to free itself (Fig. 6).

Thus, grave threats weigh on the metropolis of Dakar. In any case, even in the eventuality of a recovery in the

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[113] 25. Nicolas, J.-P., "Les hydrocarbures de soute à Dakar; 2^e rapport. Eléments d'information sur la position concurrentielle des îles Canaries, 15 Nov. 1960 /The hydrocarbides stored at Dakar; 2nd report. Data on the competitive position of the Canary Islands, 15 Nov. 1960/," I.F.A.N., Dakar.

/392 cont. /

369 economic relations between Senegal and Sudan, or better, in
433 the eventuality of the formation of a West African common
439 market, the role of collection which has perpetuated the superiority of Dakar is today threatened by decline because of the nationalism of the states and their desire to convert their own products locally. It therefore seems that salvation for this metropolis in a virtual crisis is not in an illusory rebirth of its former role, but in a new and unequivocal orientation of its activities. It should no longer be a pole of suction, but become a pole of development of the hinterland.

Assane Seck.

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125 During the years 1960 and 1961, a demographic investigation by sampling was undertaken over the whole territory, the first one in the history of Senegal. (Administrative counts, city censuses, and an investigation in the central valley of the river /Senegal River/ had been made previously, but never a demographic inquiry covering the whole territory.)

The country has been divided into two large parts: the urban
•[369] zone, composed of the whole region of Cape Verde and the cities
[162] of Thiès, Saint-Louis, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, and Louga; and
the rural zone, which includes the rest of the territory. The sampling fraction was 1/50 in the rural zone and 1/20 in the urban zone. Subsequently a sampling to the twentieth was obtained by dividing into two a certain number of maps of the rural zone.

It will be seen merely from the method utilized that it renders illusory the study of small groups /groupes à effectif réduit/. It should be acknowledged from the first that the numbers below 500 (that is, 25 in the sample) are not significant.

II - The Structures:

III - The geographic distribution:

114 The operations in the field begun in the month of April
1960 were terminated in the month of August 1961 (April-June
'60 for the rural zone, July '60 to August '61 /2/ for the urban
162 zone). It should be acknowledged that on the whole the numbers
indicated below correspond to the situation on the date of 1 July 1960.
(Table 1 on following page)

This table shows, on the one hand, the low average density and, on the other hand, its great variability.

[563] The non-African population is made up essentially of French
and Lebano-Syrians. It is heavily concentrated in the urban zone
and particularly in Cape Verde; 74% of the non-Africans of Senegal
161 are actually in residence there. Moreover, this concentration has
648 become accentuated in recent years for several reasons: the departure of the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments from Saint-Louis;
the closing of a number of agencies in the interior following the
Change in The Commercial Circuits.

Wolof MS30
Serer FA32
Tukolor MS27

/2 cont./

000 change in the commercial circuits.

S 162 /3/ It should not be without interest to give an idea of the peopling of the various regions by ethnic groups. (Table 2 on following pages)

W [162] It is shown that the Ouoloff /Wolof/ constitute more than a third of the total population. This group is abundantly represented in most of the regions, with the exception of Casamance and Senegal-Oriental. It is known that their arrival has determined the growth of the population of Dakar. It is not impossible that persons belonging to other ethnic groups but speaking Ouoloff have been given as Ouoloff.

SR [162] The Sérère /Serer/ are second in rank from a numerical standpoint. They are relatively grouped in Sine-Saloum and in the region ot Thiès.

T [162] /4/ The Toucouleur /Tukolor/, the majority of whom are in the river region, are scattered throughout the territory; they are, however, less numerous in the region of Diourbel.

W [162] One can also note that the Casamance groups scarcely ever wander away from their region of origin except to come to Dakar, and that the Lébou are largely concentrated in Cape Verde.

S [563] Concerning the non-Africans, whose concentration at Dakar has already been mentioned, one will note the presence of a Lebano-Syrian group in the region of Kaolack and a French group in Saint-Louis and Thiès.

S [369] The population of Senegal is still essentially rural, but the urbanization movement, which is noted in all of the regions by reason of the diversification of economic activity and especially the industrial development, is particularly marked there. This factor will greatly modify the geographical distribution of the population during the coming years.

The following table gives the population of the cities which constitute the urban zone. (Table 3 follows Table 2.)

/5/ In sum, the urban population is close to 705,000 inhabitants and represents 23% of the whole. Dakar alone has 12% of the population of Senegal, which is not abnormal. But

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